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Abstract
Dynamic capabilities explain how firms adapt to environmental dynamism by modifying
their underlying resources and capabilities. However, despite a robust understanding of how
dynamic capabilities are influenced by different dimensions of environmental dynamism (eg.
velocity), scholars have not explained how dynamic capabilities develop in the presence of
different configurations of environmental dynamism. Common configurations of environmental
dynamism include environmental shifts, which pertain to discontinuous environmental change,
and ongoing environmental change, which depicts hypercompetitive environments. In this
thesis, I explore how dynamic capabilities develop in the context of a configuration of
environmental dynamism that I call persistent disturbances, defined as repeated temporary
events confronting firms. My research investigates how firms build and further develop dynamic
capabilities in the presence of persistent disturbances.
In my research, I engaged in an inductive historical case study to build new and to
elaborate on existing dynamic capability theory. I chose the North American automotive
industry for my context, focusing on the time period between 1965 and 2010, during which the
industry was confronted with persistent disturbances in the form of labour difficulties, economic
cycles, competitive pressures, energy challenges, and government regulations. I focused my
analysis on three firms: General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford. I created a longitudinal dataset
consisting of both qualitative and quantitative data obtained from archival sources including
annual reports and the Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks. I analyzed these data in three iterative
stages. First, I focused on identifying the persistent disturbances that had impacts on automotive
firms. Second, I explored how the firms in my study responded to those persistent disturbances.
iii

Third, I built new theory and elaborated existing theory pertaining to how dynamic capabilities
develop over time in the presence of persistent disturbances.
My analysis yielded important findings. First, I found that, in response to persistent
disturbances, dynamic capabilities developed through a process of capability layering. The
result was a dynamic capability architecture that comprised layers of capabilities that functioned
to facilitate change. Dynamic capability development proceeds from early periods of coping
towards increasing technical fitness as firms build new dynamic capability layers by adding and
modifying the capabilities that functioned as building blocks supporting the dynamic capability.
My research also distinguished persistent disturbances from other configurations of
environmental dynamism and offer insights regarding how different configurations of
environmental dynamism influence dynamic capability development.
Overall, this thesis makes important contributions to dynamic capability theory and to
understanding the role of environmental dynamism in strategic management scholarship. My
thesis also has important implications for practice.
Keywords: Dynamic Capabilities; Resilience; Environmental Dynamism; Automotive
Industry
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
1.0

Introduction
The automotive industry has experienced significant disturbances over its long history.

In the 1930s the industry was the site of violent and prolonged battles with labour movement and
union organizers. Through depressions and recessions the automotive industry has been subject
to the whims of economic cycles—booms and busts. Then in the 1970s the automotive industry
was hit hard with oil crises and concerns over national security and fuel economy, followed
closely by a national furor and government regulations regarding safety and smog-producing
emissions. Throughout, North American automotive firms faced increasing threats from
Japanese and other foreign competitors. What is most striking about these disturbances is that
while automotive firms responded to them with new management practices and technologies, not
only did the disturbances persist, but the North American automotive firms continued to be
challenged by these disturbances. This research asks how firms build and further develop
capabilities that permit adaptation to such persistent disturbances.
The literature on dynamic capabilities offers a strong starting point. Dynamic capabilities
research addresses how firms respond to environmental change (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997;
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003; Helfat, et al 2007). Dynamic capabilities have been
defined as a firm’s “ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external
competencies” to address changing environments (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997: 516).
However, despite a robust understanding of how dynamic capabilities are influenced by different
dimensions of environmental dynamism (eg. velocity), scholars have not explained how dynamic
1

capabilities develop in the presence of different configurations or patterns of environmental
dynamism, such as persistent disturbances.
To address this theoretical gap, I conducted a longitudinal, historical case study,
analyzing Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors (GM) within the North American automotive
industry between 1965 and 2010. I supported my study with a unique archival dataset
comprising automotive firm annual reports, firm and industry analysis, Compustat data, and
other data in order to construct rich case histories pertaining to how firms responded to the
persistent disturbances in their environment. This longitudinal view permitted me to study how
firms developed dynamic capabilities over time in response to persistent disturbances.
Guided by my data analysis, I focused on five persistent disturbances in the North
American automotive context: economic cycles, labour disruptions, energy challenges,
competitive pressures, and government regulations. I further focused on how firms built
dynamic capabilities to adapt their manufacturing operations in response to three persistent
manufacturing implications which resulted from the five persistent disturbances I found. The
persistent manufacturing implications facing North American automotive firms were fluctuating
consumer demand for vehicles, fluctuating consumer model preferences, and profit margin
pressures. I found that firms addressed these persistent manufacturing implications over time by
developing distinct dynamic capabilities in manufacturing flexibility. Figure 1 offers an
organizing framework graphically depicting how persistent disturbances, persistent
manufacturing implications, and dynamic capabilities relate to one another.

2

Figure 1 From Persistent Disturbances to Dynamic Capabilities

Three main findings emerged from my research. First, my research stressed the
importance of incorporating not only dimensions of environmental dynamism such as velocity,
but configurations of environmental dynamism. By configurations I am referring to patterns of
environmental dynamism such as environmental shifts, which involve dramatic or discontinuous
change to a firm’s environment, and ongoing environmental change, which describes
environments in a constant state of flux or churn. I focused my research, however, on an
important third configuration of environmental dynamism called persistent disturbances, which I
defined as repeated temporary events confronting firms.
Second, my research highlighted the importance of dynamic capability architecture,
which refers to how capabilities relate to one another. By examining in detail the dynamic
capabilities associated with manufacturing flexibility that developed over 45 years, I discerned
that the dynamic capability architecture of manufacturing flexibility comprised a family of
dynamic capabilities, which in turn comprised layers of capabilities that changed over time. This
highly layered capability architecture serves a critical function in explaining how similar
dynamic capabilities can function so differently.
Finally, building on my insights into dynamic capability architecture, my research shed
light on how dynamic capabilities develop over time. I found that in environments characterized
by persistent disturbances, instead of building dynamic capabilities in response to uncertainties
and unknowns, firms built dynamic capabilities in response to repeated and predictable
3

disturbances. Firms develop their dynamic capabilities by building entirely new dynamic
capability layers and by adding or modifying the capabilities that functioned as building blocks
supporting a dynamic capability. Development proceeds from early periods of coping, as firms
struggle with deploying dynamic capabilities that exhibit poor technical fitness with respect to
the type of change required, to periods in which the dynamic capabilities exhibit high technical
fitness and are well adapted to the demands of the persistent disturbances.
This thesis is presented in six chapters. In the next chapter I review literature on dynamic
capabilities and environmental dynamism, clearly articulating the gaps with respect to how
dynamic capabilities research addresses environmental dynamism. In subsequent chapters, I
review my case-based methodology, describing my research context, data sources, and data
analysis, and present my findings. I organize the presentation of my findings by describing the
history of the five persistent disturbances I found in the North American automotive context,
three persistent manufacturing implications, and subsequently how the automotive firms
developed dynamic capabilities in response. Following this I analyze these findings, building
theory and formal propositions pertaining to how firms originate, develop, and deploy dynamic
capabilities. Finally, I discuss my findings, clarify my contributions, and close by offering
opportunities for future research into dynamic capabilities.

4

Chapter 2 – Literature Review
2.0

Literature Review

2.1 Dynamic Capabilities
Formal definitions of dynamic capabilities are plentiful. The earliest was proffered by
Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997: 516), who described dynamic capabilities as the “ability to
integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly changing
environments.” Eisenhardt and Martin (2000: 1107) extended the definition to incorporate the
ability of firms to initiate change, defining dynamic capabilities as “the firm’s processes that use
resources…to match and even create market change.” These “firm processes” refer to routines
that permit the integration, reconfiguration, acquisition, and release of resources in response to
changing markets (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Further, in a recent book taking stock of
dynamic capabilities research to date, dynamic capabilities were defined as “the capacity of an
organization to purposefully create, extend or modify its resource base, and consists of patterned
and somewhat practiced activity” (Helfat et al 2007: 121).
While differing in some details, these definitions collectively highlight critical features of
dynamic capabilities. First, prior literature has situated dynamic capabilities within a hierarchy
of capabilities. Dynamic capabilities modify lower-order ordinary capabilities and resources
(Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Collis, 1994; Winter, 2003; Salvato
and Rerup, 2011). Ordinary capabilities are those that firms use in their day-to-day operations
(Winter, 2003). They constitute a firm’s ability to execute day-to-day tasks (Pavlou and El
Sawy, 2011) and produce outputs of a particular type (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). Dynamic
5

capabilities permit firms to create new combinations of these ordinary capabilities (Pavlou and
El Sawy, 2011). For example, product development processes or routines are higher-order
dynamic capabilities that are employed to reconfigure the types of products a firm manufactures
or the services the firm offers (Danneels, 2008). This reconfiguration involves creating,
modifying, repurposing, and releasing a firm’s internal (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Danneels,
2010; Danneels, 2008) and external resources (Lichtenthaler, Ernst, and Hoegel, 2010; Capron
and Mitchell, 2009).
Second, dynamic capabilities aim to achieve and maintain fit with a firm’s changing
external environment (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Helfat et al, 2007). Thus, dynamic
capabilities address how firms deal with the environmental dynamism that threatens to make
their existing capabilities obsolete (Winter, 2003; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). In this respect
dynamic capabilities draw heavily on early contingency theory arguments that emphasize the
importance of firms developing capabilities that are appropriate for a given environment (Pfeffer
and Salancik, 1978). Environmental dynamism is at the core of dynamic capabilities, driving the
very need to develop dynamic capabilities (Wang and Ahmed, 2007).
Third, dynamic capabilities are practised, patterned, and purposeful responses to
environmental change. Similar to ordinary capabilities, dynamic capabilities imply that an
organization can perform an activity in a reliable and satisfactory way (Helfat and Winter, 2011).
Helfat and co-authors (2007) describe dynamic capability as a capacity, stressing that the
performance of the capability must exceed some minimum threshold of proficiency. The
dynamic capabilities literature argues that change due to dynamic capabilities should be
distinguished from “ad hoc problem solving” (Winter, 2003:992). The latter refers to change
6

that is not routine or patterned and that is often undertaken in response to unpredictable events
(Winter, 2003: 992). In short, not all change to a firm’s ordinary capabilities is a result of
dynamic capabilities. Capabilities can change in an ad hoc manner as discussed above, but
Helfat and Peteraf (2003) also stress that a firm’s ordinary capabilities can also change in nonroutine ways through what they articulate as a capability life cycle.
Dynamic capabilities draw from both the resource-based view of the firm and
evolutionary economics (Di Stefano, Peteraf, and Verona, 2010; Barney, 1991; Nelson and
Winter, 1982). From a resource-based perspective, dynamic capabilities were originally
conceptualized to redress a gap in the ability of the resource-based view to explain sustainable
competitive advantage in dynamic, Schumpeterian environments (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen,
1997). These are environments in which existing competences are destroyed, requiring the
development and elaboration of new competences. Scholars adopting the resource-based view
emphasize that dynamic capabilities are a critical component of a firm’s ability to renew its
competitive advantage over rivals, often through wholesale change and dramatic transformations
(Rosenbloom, 2000; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000).
From an evolutionary economics perspective, dynamic capabilities are hierarchically
nested routines. In this view, a firm’s zero-level routines are the ordinary capabilities that permit
firms to make a living in the here and now. Dynamic capabilities are higher-order routines or
capabilities that extend, modify, or create lower-order capabilities (Zollo and Winter, 2002;
Winter, 2003; Danneels, 2008). This routine-based perspective clarifies that dynamic
capabilities are built deliberately in areas where the need for regular change is strong and the

7

benefits of building such a capacity outweigh its maintenance costs (Winter, 2003). This
conceptualization of dynamic capabilities often emphasizes continuous, routine change.
There is much debate as to whether dynamic capabilities directly provide competitive
advantage for organizations. Whether dynamic capabilities simply permit firms to reconfigure
their resources, or whether they are also tied intimately to firm performance and sustainable
competitive advantage, remains a matter of debate (Easterby-Smith, Lyles and Peteraf, 2009).
Research by Teece and colleagues claims that dynamic capabilities contribute to competitive
advantage (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Teece, 2007), while Shamsie, Martin, and Miller
(2009) found no relationship between dynamic capabilities and firm performance in a sample of
project-based firms. Research that makes performance claims has been accused of committing a
tautology—defining dynamic capabilities in terms of the desired performance outcomes (Priem
and Butler, 2001; Arend and Bromiley, 2009). The emerging consensus is that dynamic
capabilities do not directly contribute to a firm’s performance or its competitive advantage;
instead dynamic capabilities permit a firm to manipulate its resources (Helfat et al 2007).
Dynamic capabilities are a source of competitive advantage when "applied sooner, more astutely,
and more fortuitously than competitors” (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000: 1117; Wang and Ahmed,
2007).
While there is substantial theory pertaining to dynamic capabilities (eg. Teece, Pisano,
and Shuen, 1997; Teece, 2007; Helfat et al, 2007), part of the challenge for scholars is that
empirical research into dynamic capabilities remains nascent (Newbert, 2007; Barreto, 2010;
Danneels, 2010; Helfat and Peteraf, 2009). Recently, research has begun to fill the void and
provide the field with more substance. I provide empirical examples of different types of
8

dynamic capabilities in Table 1 (an extended review of empirical dynamic capabilities research
can be found in table A2 in the Appendix). These dynamic capabilities can be loosely grouped
into dynamic capabilities that address relationship management, organizational structure, product
and service development, and general management.
Table 1 Examples of Dynamic Capabilities
Topic
Relationship
Management
Organizational Structure

Product and Service
Development
General Management

Examples
• Alliance management (Anand, Oriani, and Vassolo, 2010;
Kale and Singh, 2007; Schilke and Goerzen, 2010)
• Architectural innovation (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001)
• Resource divestment (Moliterno and Wiersema, 2007)
• Resource allocation (Coen and Maritan, 2011)
• Diversification (Doving and Gooderham, 2008; Dixon,
Meyer, and Day, 2010)
• Foreign expansion (Luo, 2002)
• Research and development (Danneels, 2008; Helfat, 1997)
• New product development capabilities (Henderson and
Clark, 1990; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995)
• Dynamic managerial capabilities (Adner and Helfat, 2003)

Given the breadth of possible dynamic capabilities, Helfat et al (2007) encourage
scholars to clearly and precisely specify the nature of a dynamic capability under analysis.
Discussing dynamic capabilities with greater precision provides managers and academics with a
stronger understanding of what dynamic capabilities are and, more important, what can be done
to further develop them. Even still, much research into dynamic capabilities pertains to what are
clearly very general dynamic capabilities, such as learning, knowledge transfer (Galunic and
Rodan, 1998; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Zander and Kogut, 1995), integrative capabilities (Brown
and Eisenhardt, 1997; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994), and absorptive capacity (Zahra and
George, 2002). Marcus and Anderson (2006: 19) argue that general dynamic capabilities involve
“searching for new ideas and methods, comparing company practices to the best in the industry,
evaluating practices in other industries, and experimenting.” Critics of this approach argue that
these dynamic capabilities are described much too generally. They suggest that attempting to
9

hedge against all contingencies by building general dynamic capabilities generates costs and
complexity that may exceed the benefits provided by dynamic capabilities (Winter, 2003;
Drnevich and Kriauciunas, 2011). Winter (2003) goes further, stating that there is no such thing
as a general-purpose routine for dynamic change.
Scholars have also sought to understand the mechanisms that undergird dynamic
capabilities. This work is still in its infancy (Moliterno and Wiersema, 2007). However,
consensus has emerged that two broad mechanisms are at play: one for sensing, search, and
selection and another for reconfiguration and deployment (Teece, 2007; Helfat et al, 2007).
Sensing, search, and selection refer to the capabilities of firms to identify and take advantage of
threats and opportunities in the environment (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). For example,
firms need to identify what new products and services they should produce for a given set of
environmental changes before they can reconfigure their resources in response. An accurate
understanding of a firm’s resources, including their fungibility (Danneels, 2010; Dixon et al,
2010), is also important to the development of dynamic capabilities. Schreyogg and KlieschEberl (2007) argue that firms must be capable of monitoring their own capabilities. Thus
dynamic capabilities involve a significant decision-making component (Helfat et al, 2007). The
second mechanism, reconfiguration and deployment, refers to the various ways in which firms
create, extend, and modify their resource base. In the next section I discuss how firms build and
develop dynamic capabilities.

2.2 The Origins and Development of Dynamic Capabilities
Dynamic capabilities are not readily purchased; they must be built, maintained, and
developed by the firms that possess them. This is not a trivial challenge. It requires that firms
10

make long-term commitments (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). It follows that there is no
single development path for dynamic capabilities. Instead, different paths are effective for
different types of dynamic capabilities and in different contexts. In a study of Indian and
Pakistani firms, Malik and Kotabe (2009) found that three capabilities formed the foundation for
the dynamic capabilities they were studying. These included organizational learning through
experience, reverse engineering in order to gain valuable product knowledge, and manufacturing
flexibility in order to improve integration and coordination processes. Similarly, scholars have
identified that a firm’s idiosyncratic incumbent capabilities or “positions” directly influence the
development of dynamic capabilities. These positions include technological, complementary,
reputational, and structural resource endowments (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). For
instance, studies have found that prior experience (King and Tucci, 2002) and capability
strengths (Wernerfelt, 1984) play significant roles in how a firm develops its capabilities. Firms
are found to diversify and develop along firm strengths. Lavie (2006) extends this logic, arguing
that large gaps between a firm’s desired and existing capabilities lead the firm to acquire or
substitute new capabilities in lieu of evolving or developing existing capabilities.
Sensing capabilities, a critical component of the processes or routines that undergird
dynamic capabilities, also play an important role in the initial and ongoing development of
dynamic capabilities. Sensing capabilities permit a firm to identify new development paths
(Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997) as well as provide an accurate understanding of the firm’s
existing capabilities, which can inform further development (Lavie, 2006; Capron and Mitchell,
2009). Danneels (2008) found that many organizational antecedents of dynamic capabilities are
within managerial control. He cited slack resources, environmental scanning, willingness to
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cannibalize, and constructive conflict as factors that positively influence the development of
dynamic capabilities.
Recent research has begun to discuss capability development in terms of life cycles (Keil,
McGrath, and Tukiainen, 2009). This body of work argues that capabilities, like products or
organizations, move through life cycles from founding through development and maturity
(Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). As the capability proceeds through the life cycle, events can arise
that are strong enough to alter the development trajectory of that capability. Helfat and Peteraf
(2003) call these events selection events. Selection events are external to the capability but not
necessarily the firm. Selection events can be as simple as a change of managerial priorities or a
difficulty in obtaining critical raw materials. Following a selection event, a capability branches,
developing in different ways. Helfat and Peteraf (2003) discuss six such development paths,
encompassing retirement, retrenchment, renewal, replication, redeployment, and recombination.
Dynamic capabilities, in that they are capabilities themselves, are also theorized to follow a life
cycle (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003).
Underlying much of the development of dynamic capabilities are models of how
organizations learn. While some learning can occur through passive experience accumulation,
most of the learning associated with dynamic capability development is conceptualized as being
intentional and deliberate (Zollo and Winter, 2002; Romme, Zollo, and Berends, 2010).
Learning occurs through processes of knowledge articulation whereby knowledge is shared and
communicated as well as knowledge codification which involves deliberate actions to develop
useful repositories for knowledge such as manuals and reports (Zollo and Winter, 2002).
Dynamic capability development must balance this knowledge articulation and knowledge
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codification must strike a balance between permitting firms to exploit this knowledge and
allowing firms to explore new knowledge (March, 1991). Beyond what is highlighted in the
above discussion, there is sparse treatment in the literature regarding how dynamic capabilities
are built, developed, and maintained. However, some research effort has examined capability
development more generally. Since dynamic capabilities are themselves capabilities, the insights
from this more general research can be productively applied to dynamic capabilities. There are
two broad views on capability development. The first conceptualizes capability development as
emergent and gradual (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000; Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001). Firms
build on prior successes and strengths, as well as close gaps or improve underperforming
capabilities (Shamsie, Martin, and Miller, 2009). In this way, capabilities are built up from
repeated interactions over time (Ethiraj et al, 2005). Capabilities are also developed deliberately
and strategically through investments in critical infrastructure, systems, and processes (Ethiraj et
al, 2005; Winter, 2003). Lavie (2006) views capability development as occurring at multiple
levels of analysis: at the level of the portfolio of capabilities through substitution, at the level of
capabilities through transformation, and at the level of routines through evolution.

2.3 Dynamic Capabilities and Environmental Dynamism
While differing in some details, definitions of dynamic capabilities highlight that their
central purpose is to achieve and maintain fit with a dynamic environment (Helfat et al, 2007).
Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997: 516) describe dynamic capabilities as the “ability to integrate,
build, and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly changing
environments.” Eisenhardt and Martin (2000: 1107) extended the definition to incorporate the
ability of firms to initiate change, defining dynamic capabilities as “the firm’s processes that use
resources…to match and even create market change.” These arguments flow from a long
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tradition of literature on fit and contingency between a firm and its environment (Lawrence and
Lorsch, 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1982).
Despite the centrality of environmental dynamism to dynamic capabilities, a significant
amount of research in dynamic capabilities is agnostic to the role of environmental dynamism. A
review of the literature highlights that when researchers do incorporate environmental
dynamism, it is most frequently viewed as a precursor to dynamic capabilities. What has been
discussed as important is the degree of dynamism (Barreto, 2010). Highly dynamic
environments drive the development of firms’ dynamic capabilities (Wang and Ahmed, 2007)
and justify the expense of developing dynamic capabilities (Winter, 2003). Eisenhardt and
Martin (2000) further argue that the degree of dynamism influences the nature of the dynamic
capabilities that firms build. In moderately dynamic environments, dynamic capabilities take the
form of routines, while in highly dynamic environments, dynamic capabilities resemble simple
rules or heuristics. In the next section I discuss environmental dynamism in more detail,
highlighting three configurations of environmental dynamism that I argue are critical to studying
dynamic capabilities.

2.3.1 Environmental Dynamism
Environmental dynamism, in the simplest of terms, pertains to change in a firm’s external
environment. Environmental dynamism destabilizes a firm’s competitive environment and is
associated with heightened uncertainty that makes accurately understanding external
environments challenging (Sirmon, Hitt, and Ireland, 2007; Milliken, 1987; Duncan, 1972). As a
construct, environmental dynamism is often loosely defined and conceptualized along a unidimensional continuum from stability to ever greater dynamism. Despite this uni14

dimensionality, scholars have attributed a wide variety of different characteristics to
environmental dynamism, such that environments can be dynamic in many different ways
(Duncan, 1972; Dess and Beard, 1984).
A recent study has summarized the body of research on environmental dynamism into a
four-dimensional construct comprising unpredictability, ambiguity, complexity, and velocity
(Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 2009). Unpredictability describes environments with little to
no perceivable pattern. Ambiguity refers to the clarity with which environments can be
interpreted and understood. Complex environments are characterized by interconnections among
different facets of the firm’s environment, such as from regulatory, competitive, and economic
sources. Finally, velocity refers to the rate at which firms are presented with new opportunities
(Eisenhardt, 1989) or face challenging disturbances.
While environmental dynamism comprises multiple dimensions, organizational scholars
commonly conceptualize dynamic environments in terms of configurations of these dimensions.
By configurations I mean recognizable patterns of environmental dynamism. Prior literature has
emphasized two such configurations: environmental shifts and ongoing environmental change.
Environmental shifts consist of a period of stability punctuated by dramatic, discontinuous,
stepped change (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). In contrast, ongoing environmental change
describes an environment undergoing continuous and unrelenting change (D’Aveni, 1994). My
study is particularly interested in a third configuration of environmental dynamism, which I call
persistent disturbances. Persistent disturbances constitute a pattern of repeated related
disturbances that manifest over long periods of time. Below I discuss each configuration in turn,
distinguishing them from one another (see Table 2).
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Table 2 Configurations of Environmental Dynamism
Dimensions

Environmental Shifts

Ongoing Environmental Change

Persistent Disturbances

Dramatic, discontinuous
environmental change
Shift from mechanical to electronic
typewriters
Large, dramatic change

Continual environmental change

Specific aspects of environmental
change are repeated
Automotive industry, perennial
problems
Constrained change; aspects of
change fixed or anchored

Dynamism:
Unpredictable
Dynamism:
Ambiguity

Rarely predictable; no pattern in
environmental dynamism
Highly ambiguous; difficult to
understand shift early on

No pattern in environmental
dynamism
Highly ambiguous; difficult to make
sense of shifting landscape

Dynamism:
Complexity

Yes; multiple contingencies can
create conditions for discontinuous
change
Two gears: generally slow pace of
change prior to and following shift;
relatively rapid during shift
Punctuated Equilibrium (Gersick,
1991; Tushman and Anderson,
1986)

Yes

Graphically

General
Description
Example
Severity of
Change

Dynamism:
Velocity
Representative
Authors

Semi-conductor industry, constant
churn
Small changes; unstable industry
structure

Some pattern in environmental
dynamism
Diminishing ambiguity; repetition
diminishes ambiguity surrounding
disturbance
Yes; multiple persistent disturbances

Fast; rapid pace of change

Slow or fast; velocity not especially
relevant

Hypercompetition (D’Aveni, 1994;
Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997;
Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995)

Jolts (Meyer, 1982)
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Environmental Shifts
Environmental shifts are dramatic or discontinuous environmental changes to a
firm’s environment. They occur infrequently and rarely repeat. This configuration of
environmental dynamism can be driven by a number of factors. Scholars have studied
environmental shifts due to disruptive technologies (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985), new
competitors (Sirmon, Hitt, and Ireland, 2007), and major regulatory or political regime
changes (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008; Dixon, Meyer, and Day, 2010; Pettus, 2001). For
example, an environmental shift in the transition from mechanical to electronic products
threatened the long-term viability of a number of firms and industries, including those
manufacturing mechanical typewriters (Danneels, 2010). Similarly, Dixon, Meyer, and
Day (2010) studied dramatic political and economic shifts in transition economies as they
transformed from state-run to competitive-market economies.
Driven largely by their discontinuous nature, environmental shifts are rarely
predictable and they often take organizations by surprise. While it is common knowledge
that environmental shifts are possible, the exact nature and timing of the shifts are
difficult to reliably predict. Further, because they are singular events with which firms
will have had little experience, environmental shifts can be difficult to understand and
interpret as they are emerging. This ambiguity is heightened when one considers that
environmental shifts are often caused by a complex interaction of seemingly unrelated
events combining in new and novel ways (Anderson, 1999). Environmental shifts often
make more sense from a historical perspective once the shift is complete. The velocity of
an environmental shift has two paces: a slow, measured pace prior to and following the
environmental shift that is itself, typically relatively rapid. This two-pace pattern closely
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resembles that of punctuated equilibrium models of change (Tushman and Romanelli,
1985; Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Sastry, 1997; Gersick 1991). In these models,
environments change from equilibrium to equilibrium.
Ongoing Environmental Change
Ongoing environmental change describes an environment that is in a state of
constant flux or churn. The causes of this churn can include new competitors,
technologies, or products. Firms are required to continuously evolve their basis of
competitive advantage (Burgelman, 1994). Scholars have studied continuous and
unrelenting pressures to reduce costs (Pablo, Reay, Dewald and Casebeer, 2007), and
rapid innovation in products (Lee, Venkatraman, Tanriverdi, and Iyer, 2010) and product
markets (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001; Rindova and Kotha, 2001). Ongoing
environmental change is akin to hypercompetition (D’Aveni, 1994; Wiggins and Ruefli,
2005; Lee et al, 2010) or environmental turbulence (Easterby-Smith, Lyles, and Peteraf,
2009). The semi-conductor industry is often held up as an example of ongoing
environmental change due to its high rate of technological and product innovation.
Ongoing environmental change is difficult to predict because firms are confronted
with a series of unique challenges. Given the high state of flux, there are no readily
identifiable patterns in the ongoing change. Further, since the environment is always
changing, the incremental changes are highly ambiguous, making them difficult to
understand. By the time a firm has made sense of its changed environment, the
environment is changing again. The pace of change is of central importance in ongoing
environmental change and can be very rapid.
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Persistent Disturbances
Most studies conceptualize environmental dynamism either as environmental
shifts or as ongoing environmental change. However, I argue that neither of these
configurations fully captures the nature of the environmental dynamism that many firms
experience. I argue that firms are often challenged not by a changed or changing
environment, but by similar disturbances that repetitively affect the firm month after
month and year after year. Good examples include economic cycles, changing customer
fads, and fluctuations in customer demand. A third configuration of environmental
dynamism that I call persistent disturbances, captures these repeated and patterned
disturbances.
I define persistent disturbances as repeated temporary events confronting firms.
By temporary, I mean that the disturbances do not bring permanent change to the
environment. The impact of the disturbance is felt over a relatively short period of time
and then dissipates. However, while each individual disturbance is temporary, such
disturbances cumulatively affect the organization over a long period of time by repeating
at either regular or randomly irregular intervals.
A small subset of prior literature has touched on concepts similar to persistent
disturbances, albeit from different perspectives. In a classic study, Meyer (1982)
introduced the concept of a jolt. Like disturbances, jolts are “transient perturbations
whose occurrences are difficult to foresee and whose impacts on organizations are
disruptive.” However, in his work on jolts, Meyer focused on a single discrete jolt or
disturbance, and not a series of repeated disturbances. Another related concept is that of
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issues. Issues are events or developments that organization members identify as having
some important consequences to their firm (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991). While
repeating over time, issues, unlike disturbances, are heavily influenced by the way in
which organizational members make sense of them. Finally, the organizational resilience
literature employs the concept of adversity or threats that challenge firms (Sutcliffe and
Vogus, 2003). While these ideas form a foundation to better understand persistent
disturbances, they have not been developed within the context of dynamic capabilities.
In terms of the four dimensions of environmental dynamism, persistent
disturbances are distinct from the other two forms of change. First, they exhibit relatively
predictable patterns of environmental change. Unlike studies of rare events (eg. Lampel,
Shamsie, and Shapira, 2009; Rerup, 2009), studies of persistent disturbances focus on
common disturbances. Disturbances repeat and that repetition means that the subsequent
changes are easier to anticipate or predict. That same repetition means that persistent
disturbances are less ambiguous. The repetition of relatively similar disturbances
provides firms with greater opportunity to learn about and to better understand the
disturbances. Persistent disturbances exhibit significant complexity when multiple such
disturbances manifest concurrently. The greater the number of persistent disturbances
facing a firm, the greater the complexity as these persistent disturbances interact.

2.4 Dynamic Capabilities and Configurations of Environmental
Dynamism
Research has not theorized explicitly regarding a relationship between different
configurations of environmental dynamism and the nature of dynamic capabilities that
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firms build. I argue that this is because scholars have tended to focus their studies on
only one configuration of environmental dynamism at a time—either environmental
shifts or ongoing environmental change. For instance, studies may examine
environmental shifts, such as the transition from mechanical typewriters to electronicbased office equipment (Danneels, 2010; Rosenbloom, 2000), or the impact of radical
technological developments like microprocessors (Burgelman, 1991; 1994), radial tire
technology (Sull, 1999), and digital photography (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). Still other
studies investigate how firms renew capabilities (Capron and Mitchell, 2009), enter new
markets (King and Tucci, 2002), and make effective investment decisions (Shamsie,
Martin, and Miller, 2009) in the face of rapid and ongoing change.
However, looking across studies, I found that how scholars describe dynamic
capabilities differs according to the configurations of the environmental dynamism found
in the study’s context (see Table 2). Scholars studying environmental shifts describe
dynamic capabilities that reflect the need for firms to prepare for a variety of scenarios to
effectively respond to an environment that has become dramatically different following
an environmental shift. These dynamic capabilities are also more oriented towards
sensing, geared at identifying future possibilities. They are developed in anticipation of
and deployed during and following an environmental shift. In contrast, scholars studying
ongoing environmental change describe dynamic capabilities as being associated with
highly routinized change processes. These processes continuously evolve a firm’s
underlying capabilities, matching ongoing environmental dynamism with ongoing
organizational change. They are built in advance of, or in conjunction with, the
emergence of a dynamic environment. The development of these types of dynamic
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capabilities is ongoing and continuous, such that higher-order dynamic capabilities
modify lower-order dynamic capabilities (Collis, 1994; Winter, 2003). While scholars
describe dynamic capabilities in different configurations of environmental dynamism,
they have yet to incorporate those differences theoretically.
This review identifies two avenues to further develop dynamic capability theory.
First, the dynamic capabilities literature has focused on dimensions of environmental
dynamism and has paid little attention to the role of configurations of environmental
dynamism. Second, there have been few empirical studies illuminating the development
of dynamic capabilities (Shamsie, Martin, and Miller, 2009; Ethiraj et al, 2005;
Narayanan, Colwell, and Douglas 2009). Thus, despite the central role of environmental
dynamism to dynamic capabilities, we know surprisingly little about how environmental
dynamism influences dynamic capability development. The need for research in this
regard is reinforced by calls for increased adoption of longitudinal methods when
studying dynamic capabilities (Easterby-Smith et al, 2009; Danneels, 2008). This study
takes aim at these gaps in the dynamic capabilities literature, asking how dynamic
capabilities develop over time in the presence of a particular configuration of
environmental dynamism—persistent disturbances.
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Chapter 3 – Methodology
3.0 Methodology
3.1 Case Study Approach
I have adopted a case study methodology to address the research question above
with the aim of inductively building new theory and elaborating existing theory regarding
how firms respond to disturbances (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). I situate my study
within the North American automotive industry and focus on three key firms: The “Big
Three” automotive manufacturers—GM, Chrysler, and Ford. My case study adopts a
historical focus, commencing in 1965 and extending through to 2010. I compiled
qualitative and quantitative data from archival sources including annual reports and firm
and industry analysis.
I have adopted a case study method because the case method lends itself well to
building new theory and elaborating existing theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and
Graebner, 2007; Lee, Mitchell, and Sablynski, 1999; Yin, 2009). While dynamic
capabilities have received attention in the field of strategic management, new, empirically
derived theory is still needed to address how dynamic capabilities are built and
developed. At least one scholar has called for longitudinal studies to improve scholarly
understanding of how dynamic capabilities develop (Danneels, 2008). Case study
analysis is highly amenable to addressing “how” type research questions because case
analyses permit and even demand a focus on process and a strong contextual
understanding (Pettigrew, 1990; Yin, 2009; Pratt, 2009).
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My study focuses on the time period between 1965 and 2010. I have focused on
historical rather than contemporary events owing to a desire to understand the processes
of dynamic capability development over long periods of time. I chose this time period
because it encompasses the major disruptions affecting the automotive industry that
began in the 1970s, including oil crises, major regulatory invasions, and the emergence of
environmental and safety concerns. While contemporary case studies benefit from the
ability to examine events as they unfold, historically focused cases benefit from hindsight
and refined accounts of historical occurrences.
In designing the study I identified my unit and level of analysis and incorporated
these decisions into how I collected and analyzed my data. My level of analysis is the
firm; I aim to understand the firm’s responses to the disturbances they face. However,
my unit of analysis is a disturbance. In this research, my variance comes from studying
different persistent disturbances across a homogenous group of organizations.

3.2 Research Context
I chose my research context based on the principles of theoretical rather than
random sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989). I elected to study a single industry so as to control
for extraneous variation that may exist among firms in multiple industries (Eisenhardt,
1989). However, this single-industry focus also strengthened my understanding of the
automotive context. A strong contextual understanding is critical when studying
organizational change processes (Pettigrew, 1990) and capabilities, which can be contextspecific (Ethiraj et al, 2005). Studying a single industry allowed me to devote sufficient
time to understanding the complex social, ecological, political, cultural, and economic
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processes of a particular industry more deeply and over a longer period of time (Yin,
2009). Finally, a single-industry focus also facilitates comparisons among multiple
organizations (Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal, and Hunt, 1998).
I situated my study in the North American automotive industry. This industry has
been the site of a broad range of societal, economic, political, and environmental
disturbances over its long history, including labour disputes, regulations pertaining to
environmental and safety standards, and oil price fluctuations. The presence of these
disturbances makes it a suitable context in which to study how firms respond to
disturbances. The automotive industry also has a long and well-documented history,
which is an important consideration in selecting a context, and in particular when dealing
with long historical time periods (Yin, 2009). My case study of the automotive industry
was made feasible by the attention the industry has attracted over its history.
I chose to study three automotive manufacturers: GM, Ford, and Chrysler. A
critical reason for these choices is the depth of history each of these firms possess in
North America. The founding of each of these firms dates back to the turn of the 20th
century. This temporal depth provided me with the ability to study these firms’ responses
to disturbances over a long period of time. Throughout their history, these three firms
have formed an oligopoly that has dominated the North American market, collectively
possessing greater than 90% market share right up until the 1980s, when their dominance
began to be eroded by Japanese competition. As a result, much about these firms is well
documented. They have readily accessible annual reports and are discussed by analysts
in a majority of the reports pertaining to the North American automotive industry. My
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focus on this oligopoly meant the exclusion of the fourth and only other North American
automotive firm in existence throughout my study period - American Motor Corporation
(AMC). However data on its operations were difficult to obtain first because such data
were sparse and inconsistent but also because AMC was acquired by Chrysler in 1987. I
also excluded foreign firms such as Toyota and Volkswagen from my study because they
appear 10 to 20 years into my story, and data pertaining to these firms were not as readily
available.

3.2.1 North American Automotive Firms
Below I briefly discuss the long history of each of the automotive firms in my
study.
Ford was founded in 1903 by Henry Ford with a vision of providing mobility for
the masses. Ford’s early focus was on low-cost automobiles that were relatively simple
to use and maintain. To support this aim, Ford invented and elaborated early large-scale
assembly lines that served as the foundation for today’s modern manufacturing firms. A
distinguishing feature of Ford is that the Ford family has maintained control of the firm
for more than 100 years. Ford’s revenues during the study period have always trailed
those of GM, placing Ford a consistent but distant second place. However, Ford’s
profitability has regularly exceeded that of GM, particularly in the late 1990s and
periodically into the 2000s. Ford is an international company with operations across the
globe. Ford established their European presence early through Ford of Europe. Ford
offers vehicles through 3 brands: Ford, Mercury, and Lincoln.
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General Motors was founded in 1908 by William Durant. In stark contrast to
Ford, GM based their success on providing differentiated products, producing “a car for
every purse and purpose.” GM operated more as a holding company of differentiated
brands that Durant acquired and loosely integrated. GM has dominated the North
American automotive industry in terms of revenues over most of its history, and for the
entire period of this study. Historically GM has been a large firm with an employee base
twice that of Ford and three times that of Chrysler. Recently, however, GM’s labour
force has been reduced to 243,000, close to the size of Ford’s at 213,000. GM established
their international presence early with the acquisition of Germany’s Opel in 1929. GM’s
current North American brands include Buick, Cadillac, GMC, and Chevrolet, having
recently divested of their Pontiac, Saturn, Saab, and Hummer brands. In June of 2009,
GM entered bankruptcy protection, and with the help of the US and Canadian
governments, emerged one month later on more financially sound footing.
Finally, Chrysler was founded in 1925 following a reorganization of the Maxwell
Motor Company and was renamed in honour of Walter Chrysler, a significant figure in
North American automotive history. While Chrysler has consistently lagged behind GM
and Ford in terms of revenues and profitability, Chrysler has often led the industry in
innovative technologies and vehicles, such as the minivan. However, Chrysler has had
more than their share of financial difficulties, requiring government support in 1979 and
again in June of 2009 owing to its bankruptcy. Throughout this time foreign firms have
played important roles for Chrysler. Daimler merged with Chrysler in 1998 before
divesting their interests between 2007 and 2009. More recently, Fiat has acquired a
53.5% stake in Chrysler following their 2009 bankruptcy. Chrysler has less than half as
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many employees as Ford and GM and sells brands through their Chrysler, Dodge, Ram,
and Jeep divisions.
Despite significant homogeneity among these firms, there are some differences as
well. As outlined in Table 3, Ford and GM were both founded at the turn of the century,
and Chrysler followed a couple of decades later. The table also highlights that, while
each of the firms is publicly held, Ford has retained a strong family holding that sets it
apart. Each of the firms also has international alliances with Japanese firms.
Table 3 Overview of Case Firms
Firm
GM
Ford

Year
Founded
1908
1903

Chrysler

1925

Ownership
Publicly held
Publicly held;
strong family holding
Publicly held

Key International
Alliances
Isuzu, Suzuki
Mazda
Mitsubishi

Differences among the firms are further highlighted by Figure 2, Figure 3, and
Figure 4. Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrate how GM led the North American market both
in terms of revenues and in production volume for the majority of the study period.
GM’s revenues were consistently double those of Ford and many times more than those
of Chrysler. GM’s production share (Figure 4) was greater than the combined production
share of Ford and Chrysler up until the 1990s, when GM’s production share suffered
dramatic decreases. However, profitability was another matter. Ford frequently achieved
greater profitability than GM, especially during tumultuous periods for the industry, such
as the early 1990s, the late 1990s, and the late 2000s.
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Figure 2 Inflation-Adjusted Net Income

Figure 3 Inflation-Adjusted Revenues
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Figure 4 "Big Three" North American Production Share

3.3 Data Sources
My study employed qualitative archival data regarding the North American
automotive industry between 1965 and 2010 from four data sources. These included the
automotive firms’ annual reports, Ward’s Automotive Yearbook, Compustat, and other
data sources required on an ad hoc basis. These are diverse data sources providing
different information and describing events in the North American automotive industry
from different perspectives. The dataset included both qualitative and quantitative data.
This diversity was designed to strengthen my theorizing by allowing me to triangulate my
findings using multiple data points (Jick, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1989). Specifically, I used
quantitative data to validate qualitative findings through non-statistical methods. After
identifying codes and themes through analysis of qualitative data, I found supporting
quantitative data that both offered a more concrete understanding and also permitted me
to graph these data longitudinally. Each data source is discussed below and summarized
in Table 4.
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Table 4 Summary of Data Sources
Data Source
Ward’s
Automotive
Yearbooks

Description
Expert firm and industry
analysis regarding
automotive firms

Location
• Library collections and interlibrary loans

Data Points
• Expert firm-specific analysis
• Production volumes split by
firm, product category,
vehicle prices, registrations

Corporate
Annual
Reports

Security regulator
mandated reports
detailing a public firm’s
financial performance
and other important
metrics
Critical business metrics
for each firm

• Edgar (1993-) at
www.sec.gov
• Proquest Historical Annual
Reports (1844-)
• Library collections and interlibrary loans
• WRDS – Compustat

• Text of the letters to
shareholders

Supplementing data
from above with specific
metrics that were
identified as pertinent
during the course of
analysis

• National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration
• Environmental Protection
Agency
• The Federal Reserve
• Department of Energy

Compustat

Other Data
Sources

• Firm revenues, profitability,
capital expenditures, current
ratios, employment, and
other firm metrics
• Safety and fatality statistics
• Historical gasoline prices
• Interest rates
• Recessionary periods

Volume of Text
• 180 pages of editor
summary; 157 pages of
editorials on key
disturbances; 337 pages of
firm-specific analysis
• 540 pages of letters to
shareholders

• Dozens of spreadsheets
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The use of archival data offered significant advantages for my study. Archival
data permitted me to study organizational processes over my study’s long 45-year
historical time period; no other data source offers such a long reach into the past. My
archival data also offered consistent yearly snapshots. Each of these yearly snapshots
provided comparable data captured with consistent levels of detail; for the majority of the
years in question, Ward’s Automotive Yearbook was managed by the same editor. This
permitted appropriate sequencing of events and improved the reliability of my data vis-àvis contemporary case analysis by avoiding issues of retrospective biases that often result
from the difficulty respondents have in accurately remembering past events (Golden,
1992). Below I provide additional details pertaining to the data sources I employed in
this study.

3.3.1 Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks
Ward’s has been covering the automotive industry since 1938 and is one of the
pre-eminent sources of automotive industry knowledge and insight. Each yearbook
consists of hundreds of pages of textual analysis and data tables pertaining to the North
American automotive industry. While the nature of the reporting changed over time,
each report covers general industry trends; firm-specific analysis pertaining to Chrysler,
Ford, and GM; detailed tables on production, sales, and registrations; as well as editorials
detailing key government interventions, technological breakthroughs, and major industry
events.
In order to make data collection and analysis of this large qualitative textual
dataset manageable, I focused my attention on specific sections within the text. First, I
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read the 4-page editor’s summary. This summary provided information pertaining to the
key factors facing the automotive industry during a given year. Second, I read key
editorial pieces pertaining to topics that represented major disturbances to automotive
firms, such as government regulations and world events related to emissions, safety,
labour, and fuel economy challenges. On average, pertinent editorial pieces constituted 3
to 4 pages of text for a given year. Third, I studied the firm-specific analysis for each of
GM, Ford, and Chrysler. These sections were typically 2 to 3 pages in length for each
firm and contained detailed information about the challenges the automotive firm faced
during the year, major strategic actions they took, production-related decisions, and
financial highlights. In summary, I read 180 pages of editor summary and 157 pages of
editorials on key disturbances, and analyzed in more detail 337 pages of firm-specific
analysis.
To support my qualitative analysis, I collected quantitative data from the tables
within the Ward’s reports. My selection of quantitative data was driven by my
qualitative analysis. These data included production, registration, and sales figures split
out by company and vehicle characteristics. It also included details of government
regulations such as corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards and the per
vehicle costs of regulated equipment. These quantitative data gave shape and structure to
the qualitative data collected from the text, and they corroborated my findings (Jick,
1976).
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3.3.2 Annual Reports – Letters to Shareholders
Annual reports are issued yearly by firms in order to communicate information to
the public about the firms’ activities in the past year. Annual reports have grown to
include a great deal of information, including financial highlights, reports on products
and operations, strategic initiatives, management discussion and analysis, and
consolidated financial statements. For North American automotive firms these reports
are typically 100 pages in length.
I focused my analysis of the annual reports on the letters to shareholders. Every
annual report is prefaced with a letter to shareholders from the CEO or Chairman and
other senior management. These letters are relatively short, consisting of approximately
4 pages each. These letters describe the major strategic initiatives, the difficulties and
challenges the firm faced over the year, and how well the firm performed against
stakeholder expectations. In these letters, management frequently discusses the
disturbances their firm faces, and how the firm is responding (Staw, McKechnie, and
Puffer, 1983). In my study, letters to shareholders provided an overview of the
disturbances firms faced and of their responses to those disturbances.
Using letters to shareholders presents some difficulties. In recent years, these
letters have often been prepared by public relations departments that tailor the entire
annual report to convey specific messages (Barr, Stimpert, and Huff, 1992). As a result,
relevant information can be selectively reported or suppressed. For instance, despite the
publicity generated by the safety problems with Ford’s Pinto, it did not feature
prominently in the letters to shareholders in Ford’s annual reports during the course of the
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controversy. Despite these potential biases, letters to shareholders are important vehicles
for management to communicate with investors. Management often lends their pictures
and signatures to the letters; and informal discussions suggest that managers spend
significant amounts of time preparing communications to investors (Barr, Stimpert, and
Huff, 1992). Further, there are few data sources that can provide such regular, consistent
data pertaining to a firm’s operations. Annual reports are written at annual intervals
which alleviates retrospective biases that can hamper interviews. I triangulated insights
gained from letters to shareholders with other data sources such as Ward’s Automotive
Yearbooks.

3.3.3 Compustat
Compustat is a database compiled by Standard & Poor’s containing historical
financial information on corporations. From this database I pulled basic historical
financial data, including revenues, net incomes, return on sales, capital expenditure,
number of employees, and current ratios, for GM, Ford, and Chrysler.

3.3.4 Ad Hoc Data Sources
During the course of data analysis I acquired additional data that had been
identified as pertinent to my study. For instance, as I read about oil embargoes and oil
crises, I found it useful to collect and analyze historical gasoline prices. Similarly, as the
automotive industry is heavily dependent upon economic cycles, I found that data
regarding recessionary periods and interest rates were useful when juxtaposed against
financial and production data.
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3.4 Data Analysis
Following Yin (2009), I settled on a strategy for my data analysis prior to commencing
my case analysis. I approached my data analysis in three stages (see Table 5). In the first stage,
I analyzed the letters to shareholders from each of the firm’s annual reports and the firm-specific
sections of Ward’s yearbooks from 1965 to 2010, looking for and seeking to understand
disturbances identified as affecting the firms under study. In the second stage, I focused on how
firms responded to those disturbances, tying connections between the disturbances firms faced
and the ways firms responded to those disturbances. In the final stage, I extend these analyses
and built new theory and elaborated existing theory pertaining to how firms responded to
disturbances, and in particular to persistent disturbances. While all stages were iterative in the
sense that I returned again and again to the data for further analysis, the final stage also involved
iteration between existing theory and my emerging theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009).
Table 5 Data Analysis Stages
Stage
Objectives
Outputs

Data
Categories
Employed

Stage 1 – Disturbances
Identify and describe
disturbances affecting
the organizations

Stage 2 – Responses
Describe firm responses
to disturbances

•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Disturbance codes
Memos
Data tables
Annual Reports
(Letters to
Shareholders)
• Ward’s Automotive
Yearbooks
• Compustat
• Ad hoc data sources

Response codes
Memos
Data tables
Annual Reports
(Letters to
Shareholders)
• Ward’s Automotive
Yearbooks
• Compustat

Stage 3 – Theory Building
Build and elaborate
theory with respect to
how firms respond to
disturbances
• New theoretical
models
• Annual Reports (Letters
to Shareholders)
• Ward’s Automotive
Yearbooks
• Compustat
• Academic articles
• Historical texts
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Each stage was designed to accomplish distinct objectives, examine a clearly defined
dataset, and culminate in outputs including qualitative codes, memos, and data tables (Gibbert,
Ruigrok, and Wicki, 2008). Each stage also provided important context for subsequent analysis.
I employed an NVivo database to catalog and code the qualitative data from my data
sources so as to ensure transparency (Yin, 2009). The NVivo database included raw text from
the letters to shareholders in annual reports and key sections of the Ward’s Automotive
Yearbooks. I also graphed patterns of disturbances and responses over time. Below I discuss
each of these stages in turn.

3.4.1 Stage 1 – Identify Disturbances Facing the Firm
The objective of this first stage was to identify and understand the disturbances facing the
automotive firms in my study. I focused on those disturbances discussed by firm executives in
the letters to shareholders from the annual reports and by the automotive experts who authored
the Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks. These executives and industry experts were immersed in the
North American automotive industry and possessed a strong understanding of the challenges
facing the industry. Focusing on the disturbances identified by these executives and experts
improved the validity of my data analysis by increasing my confidence that I was focusing on
disturbances that were truly important to and had material impact on firms. Further, these
executives and experts recorded their analyses on a yearly basis, grounding their insights
temporally. Employing this approach thus offered a reliable way to consistently identify
disturbances at different points in time (Nunnally, 1978; Peter, 1979).
It was through the process of analyzing my data that I discovered the importance of
persistent disturbances. I began my data analysis looking to identify discrete events, such as
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specific regulations, swings in customer demand and tastes, strikes, and major incidents like
those caused by safety recalls or energy crises. However, as my analysis progressed, I found that
the disturbances experts and executives described were often without readily delineated start and
end points. The disturbances I found were connected to other disturbances that occurred at
different points in time. For instance, in 1975 the US government enacted legislation to bring the
CAFE standards into effect. These standards mandated more stringent fuel economy for cars
sold in the United States and required automobile manufacturers to engage in massive research
and development programs and to make significant investments in new technologies. Although
this event itself was important, the CAFE standards were not enforced until 1978 and the
standards increased in stringency over a period of 12 years, with mandated fleet fuel efficiency
averages growing from 18 mpg in 1978 to 27.5 mpg in 1990. Further, CAFE standards were part
of a broader issue pertaining to concerns over fuel economy, which were accentuated by energy
crises, changes in customer taste and demand, and other regulatory actions, that stretched from
before 1975 and remained a significant issue at the end of my study period in 2010. With this
recognition, I shifted my analysis from identifying discrete disturbances to discerning patterns of
persistent disturbances over time.
I analyzed my data looking for persistent disturbances that had affected the automotive
manufacturing firms over my study period. I began by coding my qualitative data from Ward’s
Automotive Yearbooks and the letters to shareholders from annual reports for specific instances
of disturbances. These disturbances included energy crises, high gasoline prices, strikes, wage
increases, government regulations of various kinds, competitor cost structures, inflation, and
recessionary periods. I sorted and grouped these disturbances into different categories denoting
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persistent disturbances. I sought persistent disturbances that were both distinct from one another
and relevant to firms over the duration of my study period.
Some disturbance codes were dropped because they represented isolated disturbances that
were not identifiable as being part of a persistent disturbance. Examples of dropped codes
include trade fluctuations, traffic congestion, resource shortages, wars, and production
overcapacity. I took measures to ensure that the codes I dropped did not materially impact my
findings and theorizing. First, the five persistent disturbances I identified were those that
manifested throughout my study period, whereas the codes there were dropped appeared over
short temporal durations. Second, the five persistent disturbances that I identified constituted the
largest volume of identified disturbances. They were referenced on average 49 times whereas
codes there were dropped were referenced at most 9 times (resource shortages). Finally, I
checked to ensure that dropped codes were not discussed as having a material or extended impact
they had on the firm. As such, the most substantive disturbances in my study — for example oil
crises or major regulatory initiatives — were always retained.
Figure 5 below illustrates this mapping of disturbance codes to persistent disturbances.
This mapping provides a detailed picture of how persistent disturbances were identified. At the
end of this process I arrived at a set of five persistent disturbances: economic cycles, labour
disruptions, energy challenges, competitive pressures, and government regulations.
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Figure 5 Mapping of Codes for Persistent Disturbances

I used the coding process to sensitize me to which persistent disturbances were important,
and then I built a longitudinal picture of these disturbances. To do so, I drew on additional data
from Compustat, Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks, and ad hoc data sources to build visual
displays to aid in making sense of my data. For example, with respect to the energy challenges
category of disturbances, fluctuating gasoline prices were clearly of critical importance to
automobile manufacturers. Higher gasoline prices put pressure on consumers to purchase more
fuel efficient vehicles. I graphed historical gasoline prices collected from the US Department of
Energy and mapped onto this graph critical events pertaining to energy crises and fuel economy
regulations that I pulled from Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks. These longitudinal depictions of
the data provided a more complete perspective on each disturbance and served to triangulate my
findings (Jick, 1976).
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3.4.2 Stage 2 – Identify Firm Responses
The objective of stage two was to identify firms’ responses to the persistent disturbances
they faced over the study period. My first step in stage two was to focus my analysis on a
specific set of firm responses. My decision to focus my research in this way followed advice
from prior dynamic capabilities research. Winter (2003: 994) advises scholars to focus on a
specific dynamic capability. He stressed that there is “no general rule for riches” and that it is
not possible to hedge against every contingency. As a result, investments in dynamic capabilities
are necessarily focused.
I chose to focus on how automotive firms built and deployed manufacturing flexibility in
response to the five persistent disturbances identified above. This decision followed from my
initial data analysis, in which I noted that industry experts placed a strong emphasis on how
automotive firms adapted their underlying manufacturing resources and capabilities in response
to environmental dynamism. Manufacturing flexibility has been studied extensively in the field
of operations (Slack, 2005; Sethi and Sethi, 1990; Gerwin, 1993). It can be defined as a firm’s
ability to adapt to environmental changes by varying products, product mix, and production
volumes (Upton, 1994). This definition highlights how manufacturing flexibility involves
modifying the underlying manufacturing resources and capabilities with which firms produce
products — a pattern of adaptation that is in keeping with that of dynamic capabilities.
Persistent Manufacturing Implications
In studying manufacturing flexibility, I found that the impact of persistent disturbances
was felt more acutely within the automotive firms’ manufacturing operations. While at the level
of the firm, there were five distinct persistent disturbances, I found that these five persistent
disturbances translated into three persistent manufacturing implications at the level of the firms’
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manufacturing operations. In my study these persistent manufacturing implications were
fluctuating consumer demand, profit margin pressures, and fluctuating consumer model
preferences. I treated these persistent manufacturing implications as external disturbances
because they operated external to the dynamic capability in which I was interested. Table 6
highlights the translation process. A similar table in the appendix (Table A3) also provides
representative passages associated with each of these persistent disturbances and highlights the
translation between persistent disturbance and persistent manufacturing implication.
Table 6 Persistent Disturbances and Persistent Manufacturing Implications
Persistent
Disturbance Codes
Economic Cycles

Labour Disruptions
Energy Challenges
Competitive
Pressures
Government
Regulations

Description
Economic cycles referred to the booms
and busts of recessionary cycles as
well as other economic factors such as
high inflation
Labour disruptions included strikes and
labour negotiations
Energy challenges included energy
crises as well as fluctuating fuel prices
Competitive pressures included those
from domestic competitors as well as
international entrants from Japan,
Europe, and Asia
Government regulations covered a
range of regulatory issues including
fuel economy, safety, and emissions

Persistent Manufacturing
Implication Codes
Fluctuating consumer demand
Profit margin pressures
Profit margin pressures
Fluctuating consumer model
preferences
Fluctuating consumer demand
Fluctuating consumer demand
Profit margin pressures
Profit margin pressures
Fluctuating consumer model
preferences

Dynamic Capabilities
In stage two I began by systematically analyzing the responses that the three automotive
firms in my study had, to the three persistent manufacturing implications which I had identified.
I focused on the responses that automotive executives and automotive industry experts wrote
about in the letters to shareholders and firm-specific analysis sections of the Ward’s reports,
respectively. By focusing on the responses identified by these automotive executives and
automotive industry experts, I increased my confidence that I was identifying appropriate
responses, thereby improving the validity of my study. Further, since responses were identified
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consistently at regular yearly intervals, attending to the analysis of automotive executives and
automotive industry experts increased the reliability of my data collection (Nunnally, 1978;
Peter, 1979).
This initial step yielded a substantial variety of responses (see Tables A4 through A12 in
the appendix). I subsequently analyzed these responses in order to make better sense of them. I
began by creating first-order codes. First-order codes are used to identify and group facts (Van
Maanen, 1979). I used first-order codes to identify and group specific types of responses to each
of the three persistent manufacturing implications. These first-order codes were given
descriptive labels (Miles and Huberman, 1994). For example, in 1983 when GM was described
as building N-cars for Oldsmobile, Pontiac, and Buick on a single line, I applied the first-order
code multiple divisions (platforms) to denote that vehicle platforms were being shared across
multiple automotive divisions within GM.
Next, I analyzed these data, grouping the first-order codes and applying second-order
codes. Second-order codes are theoretical in nature, helping to explain the patterning of the firstorder data (Van Maanen, 1979). For example, I grouped first-order responses related to
increasing or decreasing plant capacity and opening new or closing existing plants as alter
sources of production. A complete mapping of first-order and second-order codes is found in
Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8. These codes helped me subsequently, to build theory
explaining how dynamic capabilities developed over time.
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Figure 6 Mapping of Codes for Consumer Demand Fluctuation Responses

Figure 7 Mapping of Codes for Consumer Model Preference Fluctuation Responses
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Figure 8 Mapping of Codes for Profit Margin Pressure Responses

3.4.3 Stage 3 – Theory Building
I built theory from the case data iteratively, moving back and forth among data, theory
from existing literature, and my emerging theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Langley, 1999). The main
inputs to this theory building process were the data tables, coding, and figures I compiled during
prior data analysis stages. However, in addition I built new interim tables (Miles and Huberman,
1984; Yin, 2009) and figures (Langley, 1999; Yin, 2009) to help me make sense of the data.
During this final stage I spent weeks comparing my emerging theory with prior literature
on dynamic capabilities. I read this prior literature with specific intent, concentrating on two
broad topics upon which my emerging theory was focused. First, I re-read prior research
pertaining to the process of dynamic capability development. I focused in particular on
processes of layering and the role of dynamic capability structure. Second, I examined prior
research in dynamic capabilities paying attention to the role ascribed to environmental dynamism
and, in particular, to mentions of different configurations of environmental dynamism. I also
sought research that described environmental dynamism in terms that went beyond a description
of speed or velocity (see Table A2 in the appendix).
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This review of the literature offered two benefits. First, a focused review of prior
dynamic capabilities literature provided me with the language to better understand and explain
what I had found through my data analysis. A great example of this was identifying the term
dynamic capability architecture (Jacobides, 2006). This term assisted me in better explaining
the layered composition of dynamic capabilities that I had found. Second, the focused review
identified connections to related concepts and allowed me to better position my emerging theory
within the broader body of literature on dynamic capabilities. But perhaps more important, it
reinforced my research and gave me confidence that what I was finding was consistent in the
broadest sense with prior research. This served to build the internal and external validity of my
emerging theory (Eisenhardt, 1989).
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Chapter 4 – Findings
4.0 Findings
4.1 Overview
In this chapter I present my research findings, displaying and describing the data I
collected and analyzed. I group this data presentation into three sections. The flow of these
sections is depicted by Figure 9. First, I build narratives illustrating the history of the North
American automotive industry through the stories of five different persistent disturbances from
1965 through to 2010. These persistent disturbances are economic cycles, labour disruptions,
energy challenges, competitive pressures, and government regulation. In the second section I
discuss the implications of these persistent disturbances with respect to the automotive firms’
manufacturing operations. I identified three distinct implications: consumer demand
fluctuations, consumer model preference fluctuations, and profit margin pressures. I describe
these implications in detail. Finally I discuss the nature and development of three
manufacturing-related dynamic capabilities: production volume flexibility, production mix
flexibility, and partnering flexibility. I describe the development of these dynamic capabilities
over time.
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Figure 9 From Persistent Disturbances to Dynamic Capabilities

4.2 Persistent Disturbances in the Automotive Industry
The North American automotive industry has experienced a great number of disturbances
over its long history. Below I describe these disturbances, organizing my telling of the history
along the five different persistent disturbances I identified through my data analysis; economic
cycles, labour disruptions, energy challenges, competitive pressures, and government
regulations. For each I draw on my archival data to provide detailed illustrations.

4.2.1 Economic Cycles
The North American automotive industry is an industry that rises and falls with the
conditions of the economy. During strong economic times vehicle sales tend to be strong.
Conversely, when the economy is weak, consumers delay the purchase of large items or shift
towards less expensive vehicles. Figure 10 graphically depicts this turbulence. This graph
shows three things. First, the graph uses a solid line to display gross domestic product (GDP)
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growth as a percentage. Second, the dashed line shows sales of vehicles over the same period of
time in units. Third, vertical gray stripes depict recessionary periods. The graph shows how
during recessionary periods, and corresponding to low or negative GDP growth, sales volumes
drop dramatically. Since automotive manufacturing is heavily reliant on large capital
investments, these dramatic drops create significant difficulties. During down times, firms are
often forced to operate these expensive plants substantially below capacity, putting strong
downward pressure on profit margins. These cycles were borne out over six recessionary
periods occurring during my study period, in 1970, 1974 to 1975, 1980 to 1981, 1990 to 1991,
2001, and 2008 to 2009.
Figure 10 Economic Cycles

4.2.2 Labour Disruptions
Labour disruptions have been a central disturbance for automotive manufacturers since
well before 1965. What began as a fragmented labour movement in the 1930s developed into a
highly organized and powerful union called the United Auto Workers, with membership
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stretching across automotive firms and into other related and unrelated industries. The current
United Auto Workers organization is the result of years of hard-fought battles and increasing
consolidation of local unions into a national presence. It boasts a membership of close to
400,000 active members and 600,000 retired employees.

1

Figure 11 Employment and Labour Disruptions

Figure 11 depicts the number of employees at each of the automotive firms under study
and highlights labour disruptions over my study period. The lines illustrate the number of
employees in thousands at each of GM, Chrysler, and Ford. This graph highlights how each of
the automotive firms substantially reduced their employment levels over the duration of the

1

http://www.uaw.org/page/who-we-are, Accessed December 9th, 2011
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period under study. Since the late 1970s Ford and Chrysler respectively reduced their North
American employee base from highs of 506,531 employees in 1979 and 250,833 employees in
1978. In the case of Ford, they ended 2008 with only 213,000 employees—42% of their
previous high. More recently, GM’s employment levels dropped from a high of 876,800 in 1986
down to 243,000 by 2008—28% of their 1986 high. It is interesting to note that these
employment decreases were undertaken despite increasing domestic production, speaking to the
significant improvements in productivity made by these automotive firms.
The markers in the graph indicate the severity of different labour disruptions experienced
by the automotive firms over the study period. I calculated the severity of labour disruption on a
scale of 1 to 10, basing my analysis on the volume of automotive production loss and the
duration of the strike. Longer strikes and strikes that resulted in greater loss of automotive
production received higher severity scores. The graph shows how labour disruptions are
cyclical. Contracts bind parties to a given labour agreement for a period of between 3 to 4 years
at which time the contract comes up for renewal or renegotiation. It was very common for
unions to aggressively renegotiate labour contracts upon expiration. This set the industry up for
regular confrontations every few years as unions pushed to negotiate increasingly favourable
employment terms on behalf of their members.

4.2.3 Energy Challenges
Intertwined with the history of the North American automotive industry has been the
ongoing struggle for energy independence in the face of fluctuating fuel prices and sporadic
energy crises. This struggle was first dramatized during the two oil crises of the 1970s. The first
crisis, the Oil Embargo lasting from October 1973 to March 1974, was the result of an embargo
by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) that was undertaken in
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response to US military and financial assistance to Israel. This embargo caused challenges for
motorists who were faced with standby gasoline rationing and driving restrictions (eg new speed
limits). In 1979, the Iranian Energy Crisis caused similar dramatic concerns, including gasoline
shortages and much higher gasoline prices.
Figure 12 Historical Gasoline Retail Price

Beyond energy crises, fluctuations in the price and availability of gasoline have been a
significant factor driving the demand for more fuel efficient vehicles; both from the perspective
of changing consumer demand as well as changing government regulations. Figure 12 shows the
inflation-adjusted retail price of gasoline per gallon over the duration of the study period.
Gasoline prices spiked during the Iranian Oil Embargo and, despite low prices during the 1990s,
climbed rapidly through 2008 reaching a high of $3.31 per gallon before receding in 2009 and
2010.
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Figure 13 Total Miles Driven and Fuel Consumption (Light Vehicles)

While much progress has been made in terms of improving the fuel efficiency of
individual vehicles, fuel efficiency remains a perennial concern. This is because fuel efficiency
improvements have corresponded with increasing consumption that has led to higher total
consumption of fuel (Alcott, 2005), as illustrated by Figure 13. Americans are driving more
miles every year, negating much of the fuel efficiency improvements, meaning that total fuel
consumption has been rising steadily. Fuel efficiency improvements have not been dramatic
enough to offset increased consumption meaning that energy challenges remain an ongoing
problem for automotive firms.

4.2.4 Competitive Pressures
Automotive firms faced increasing international competition throughout the study period.
Strengthening international competition was a concern beginning as early as the late 1960s [Ford
Annual Report, 1968]. However, international firms intensified pressures in the early 1980s, and
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sales of imports briefly exceeded 25% of sales before backing off temporarily in the 1990s.

2

Evidence of the significance of foreign competition is noticeable by viewing the production
share the Big Three enjoyed over the duration of the study. Their share dropped from a high of
over 90% down to 70% in the late 1990s, as foreign firms began setting up production facilities
in the US. Foreign firms enjoyed a significant cost advantage over domestic firms. Ford
executives summed up the cost problem facing the Big Three in a 1984 annual report interview:
“We require more hourly and salaried labour hours to make each car, and we pay more for each
of those hours.” In 1980, the productivity gap between North American and Japanese
automotive firms meant that Japanese competitors, on average, were able to produce vehicles for
$1513 less per vehicle. Over the study period this productivity gap decreased to between $313
and $355 in 2002. However, the increasingly global economy continues to present competitive
challenges for Ford, GM, and Chrysler.

4.2.5 Government Regulations
The 1960s marked the beginning of a period of increasing government involvement in
regulating the North American automotive industry. A quote from Ford’s 1966 annual report
illustrates this new reality well.
“In the past, our success has depended primarily on our response to the
test of the marketplace. In the future, we shall be severely tested by the
need to respond at the same time to the requirements of the market and
the requirements imposed by the Federal governments' safety and air
pollution regulations.”

2

Import figures are difficult to classify since Japanese firms set up production facilities in the United States
effectively rendering the vehicles produced there domestic vehicles for the purposes of reporting.
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The US government began regulating the automotive industry in a variety of areas, but most
notably in safety, emissions, and fuel economy.
Safety
Safety-related concerns evolved over the study period beginning with public criticism
and dissatisfaction, and evolving to encompass stringent and broad-sweeping regulations. In
1965, Ralph Nader released his book entitled Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-In Dangers of
the American Automobile. This book offered a strong critique of industry practices, arguing that
automotive firms actively avoided the issue of safety. At the time, this was surprisingly easy to
do, as safety was not in the collective consciousness of automotive buyers (Gioa, 1992).
However, shortly after Unsafe at Any Speed was released, concern over safety intensified. In
1966, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act became law and seatbelts were made
mandatory. This started a series of government-mandated safety improvements including head
rests, shoulder harnesses, high-mounted stop lights, and passive restraints such as airbags. In
1979, the government launched the New Car Assessment program, and the first cars were tested
in a 35-mph front crash test. Crash testing has since evolved into a complicated set of
procedures, the results of which are made publicly available to enable consumers to make
informed safety-related decisions. The National Highway Transportation Safety Association was
given responsibility for investigating safety issues and either initiating recalls or pressuring firms
to voluntarily recall vehicles for safety-related problems. Government-initiated recalls for safety
reasons became a common and costly problem for automotive firms. For instance, in 1977, 12.9
million vehicles were recalled for safety; in 1983, 6.1 million vehicles were recalled; and in
1984, 7.22 million recalls were made.
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Figure 14 Passenger Vehicle Occupant Deaths

Despite government-mandated improvements to vehicles, safety concerns remained, and
automotive firms were presented with safety-related challenges throughout the study period. For
the majority of the study period, the improvements in vehicle safety served only to hold traffic
casualties at a relatively constant level. This was still a meaningful accomplishment, given that
Americans were driving their cars 33% more miles each year. However, notwithstanding a
recent dramatic reduction in deaths, the issue of safety remained a concern throughout the study
period (Figure 14).
Emissions
A major challenge for automotive firms has been addressing smog-inducing air pollution
and caustic acid rain. Smog is a serious health concern in many cities, causing heart and lung
problems, and acid rain can damage the health of water and soil systems as well as animal and
human health. Automotive firms managed to comply with government regulations to reduce
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hydrocarbon emissions (by more than 80%) and carbon monoxide emissions (by almost 70%)
[Ford Annual Report , 1969]. Despite these achievements, automotive firms continued to face
stringent standards imposed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) resulting from
successive Clean Air Acts in 1977 and 1990. Automotive firms had repeated difficulties with
these more stringent regulations and missed deadlines between 1975 and 1978, requiring delays,
extensions, and interim standards. Dramatic improvements were made through cross-industry
collaboration with the oil and gas industry that collectively moved towards a combination of
unleaded fuel and catalytic convertors, dramatically reducing harmful emissions. Restrictions on
sulphur dioxide content in gasoline and the adoption of alternative fuels such as ethanol helped
to further reduce damaging emissions.
Despite these improvements, vehicle emissions have remained a significant problem for
the automotive industry through the end of my study period. A report by the Ontario Medical
Association issued in 2008 estimated that smog causes 9,500 premature deaths in the province
3

yearly. More recently, the definition of emissions has been broadened in the United States to
include carbon dioxide, raising further emissions-related challenges for automotive firms.
Fuel Economy
A number of government regulatory initiatives followed the oil crises of the 1970s. In
1973, the EPA took initial steps to rank the fuel efficiency (in mpg) of all cars. This marked a
first effort to understand the scope of the problem. Then, in 1975 the Energy Policy

3

Ontario Medical Association, https://www.oma.org/Mediaroom/PressReleases/Pages/PrematureDeaths.aspx,
Accessed September 14th, 2011
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Conservation Act was passed, mandating that automotive car fleets average 27.5 mpg by 1985.
These standards were regulated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA), while the EPA was responsible for measuring vehicle fuel efficiency. National
sentiment continued to build against larger cars, which had been dubbed “gas guzzlers”—a term
that highlights the growing moral and social aspects of car buying [Ward’s, 1979]. In 1980, the
government imposed a “Gas Guzzler Tax” on cars that exceeded a minimum threshold in order
to help shift consumption patterns. The tax started at $500 in 1980 and grew to $7700 in 1991.
More recently in 2007, the Energy Independence and Security Act was passed aiming at even
higher CAFE standards of 35 mpg by 2020.
All of these regulations have added substantially to the cost of individual vehicles. Table
4

7 illustrates the cumulative inflation-adjusted costs associated with vehicle production resulting
from emissions and safety regulations. While these numbers depict a dramatic increase in costs,
their rise is even more dramatic when considered as a percentage of the cost of an average
vehicle. The average cost of emissions and safety regulatory requirements as a percentage of the
average expenditure on a new vehicle rose quickly from only 0.34% in 1967 to 18% in 1981. It
has remained at approximately 19% since that time.

4

These numbers are cumulative in the sense that they include the costs as stated in prior years.
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Table 7 Cumulative Costs per Vehicle (in US dollars) of Emissions and Safety Regulatory
Requirements
Costs

Year
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991

11
107
176
331
586
699
861
1611
1871
2056
2257
2457
3097

Year

Costs
1992
3174
1993
3522
1994
3904
1995
3874
1997
3970
1999
4079
2001
4286
2002
4199
2003
4127
2004
4166
2005
4605
2006
4661
2007
4638

4.3 Persistent Manufacturing Implications
While automotive firms were confronted with five persistent disturbances over the course
of the study period, the implications of those persistent disturbances from the perspective of the
firm’s manufacturing operations were more focused. I found a translation process between the
persistent disturbances at the level of the firm, and how those persistent disturbances impacted
the firm’s manufacturing operations. I called these more focused disturbances persistent
manufacturing implications. I define persistent manufacturing implications as the
manufacturing-related implications of repeated temporary events confronting firms.
My data analysis revealed three persistent manufacturing implications; fluctuating
consumer demand, fluctuating consumer model preferences, and profit margin pressures. In
what follows I review each of these persistent manufacturing implications in turn. I describe the
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persistent manufacturing implication, showing how each was driven by persistent disturbances
stemming from economic cycles, labour disruptions, energy challenges, competitive pressures,
and/or government regulations. This relationship between persistent manufacturing implication
and persistent disturbance is depicted in Table 8.
Table 8 Persistent Manufacturing Implications and Persistent Disturbances
Persistent Manufacturing
Implications
Fluctuating Consumer
Demand
Fluctuating Consumer Model
Preferences
Profit Margin Pressures

Persistent Disturbances
Economic cycles
Energy challenges
Competitive pressures
Energy challenges
Government regulations
Economic cycles
Labour disruptions
Competitive pressures
Government regulations

4.3.1 Fluctuating Consumer Demand
Fluctuating consumer demand refers to changes in the volume of vehicles demanded by
customers over time. Below I review how consumer demand fluctuated over my study period.
In doing so, I draw a connection between fluctuating consumer demand and the persistent
disturbances the firms faced, in particular, economic cycles, energy challenges, and competitive
pressures. My analysis begins with total vehicle sales, and then breaks out both car and truck
sales over the study period because cars and trucks have historically represented distinctly
different markets and because doing so highlights consumer demand volatility more clearly.
Consumer demand for vehicles was volatile over my study period. In Figure 15 I
illustrate this volatility, employing unit volume sales as a proxy for changing consumer demand.
The spikes and valleys in vehicle sales highlight swings in vehicle demand. There are substantial
consumer demand fluctuations. Vehicle demand grew through the early 1970s from just over 10
million cars to 14.5 million vehicles in 1973—a 43% growth in just three short years. Following
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this rise, vehicle sales by unit volume fluctuated for several decades. Between 1973 and 1975
volumes tumbled to 11 million before rising again to 15.4 million in 1978. Subsequently, sales
volumes dropped again down to 10.5 million in 1982 before rising quickly to 16.3 million in
1986. Sales rose to historic highs of 17 to 18 million vehicles in the early 21st century before
collapsing in 2009 to 8.1 million vehicles, the lowest in many decades.
Figure 15 Industry Vehicle Sales
Source: Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks, US Domestic and Imports

Figure 15 highlights how diverse events contributed to volatility in vehicle sales. As
depicted in the vertical bars at the bottom of Figure 15, recessionary periods depress demand as
consumers scale back purchases of large-ticket items like vehicles. Major world events such as
the Arab Oil Embargo in 1973, the Iran Oil Crisis in 1979, as well as rising gasoline prices in the
early 1980s, have significant impacts on consumer demand for vehicles. Similarly, as the sales
of imports rose over my study period, the demand for domestic vehicles declined. These events
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are depicted in Figure 15 with tall vertical bars and identified with text and arrows. Sometimes
these events span multiple years.
Fluctuating consumer demand is even more pronounced when considering the swings in
demand experienced by individual firms. In Figure 16 each of GM, Ford, and Chrysler’s unit
volume sales of cars are graphed over the duration of the study period. GM unit volume sales of
cars are particularly volatile throughout the study period, with volume sales fluctuations of over
1 million units taking place within the span of only a few years and often in only a single year.
For instance, sales dropped from 4.4 million to 3.3 million units between 1969 and 1970 before
climbing again to 4.7 million in 1971. Similarly, sales dropped from 5.1 million in 1973 to 3.8
million in 1974. Between 1975 and 1976 car sales rose over 1 million units from 3.8 million to
4.8 million. Volume sales dropped by almost 2 million units between 1978 and 1982 from 5.4
million to 3.5 million. From the graph it is clear that Ford and Chrysler experienced dramatic
swings as well. What is also noticeable is the dramatic and continuous decline from the mid1980s through until the end of the study period in 2009. While this decline is most notable at
GM, Ford and Chrysler mimic this decline as well.
Figure 16 Big Three Car Sales (Units) –
1965 to 2009

Figure 17 Big Three Truck Sales (Units) –
1985 to 2009
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While less pronounced than with cars, trucks, SUVs, and vans also experienced
fluctuating consumer demand (see Figure 17). Sales were relatively flat through the 1980s until
the demand for SUVs rose in the early 1990s, almost doubling from 3.5 million combined units
of trucks in 1990 to 6.8 million units in 2000. This trend crested at the mid-point of the first
dcade of the 2000s and then dropped dramatically from a combined Big Three sales of 6.7
million in 2005 to only 2.9 million unit sales of trucks in 2009, a decline more rapid than the rise
of the class through the 1990s.

4.3.2 Fluctuating Consumer Model Preferences
The second persistent manufacturing implication is fluctuating consumer model
preferences, involving swings in the demand for vehicles with different properties. The most
critical property that fluctuated was the class of vehicles demanded. Below I discuss how
demand for different classes of vehicles fluctuated over time—from big cars to small cars and
from trucks to SUVs and then CUVs. I discuss these fluctuations in the context of the persistent
disturbances related to government regulations and energy challenges facing automotive firms
over my study period.
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Figure 18 Customer Demand for Cars by Vehicle Type as Share of Cars – 1971 to 1989

The demand for different types or classes of vehicles fluctuated over the study period.
Cars and trucks are both classified using criteria related to size and function. Figure 18 and
Figure 19 show swings in demand for different classes of cars as a share of total cars over two
5

different time periods: between 1971 and 1989 and between 1990 and 2009. Similarly, Figure
20 shows the swings in demand for different classes of trucks as a share of total trucks over the
study period. Taken together, these figures illustrate how firms faced fluctuating consumer
model preferences from year to year. To illustrate, the share of full-size cars dropped from 36%
of automotive sales in 1971 to 16% of automotive sales in 1981. Correspondingly, sales of

5

Across different years in the Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks, different labels are used to describe different types of
vehicles. For instance, the terms subcompact, compact, intermediate, and full-size or regular were used between
1971 and 1989. From 1990 onwards, the labels became small, middle, and large. Since some compact vehicles
became classified as small and others as middle, I split my analysis into two time periods.
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subcompact cars rose from 13% to 28%, and sales of compact cars rose from 21% to 26% in the
same time period. There were significant year-to-year increases as well. Sales of subcompacts
jumped 8% from 1971 to 1972 before dropping 5 points to 16% in the subsequent year. Between
1978 and 1979 subcompact sales rose 9 points from 14% to 23% of car sales. During the 1990s
and 2000s, sales of small and middle-sized vehicles traded off from one another, fluctuating 10
percentage points over a decade.
Figure 19 Customer Demand for Cars by Vehicle Type as Share of Cars – 1990 to 2009

Trucks and SUVs experienced similar swings. Demand for pickup trucks has been in
decline since the early 1980s, with SUVs and vans growing in the share of truck sales. SUVs
grew from no share of trucks in 1982 to encompass 25% of vehicles a decade later. During the
mid-1990s, SUV sales as a percentage of total truck sales grew another 10 points. Recently
however, sales of SUVs have dropped off considerably from a high of 38% in 1998 to a current
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low of 14%. Much of this swing can be explained by the increased share taken by a new class of
crossover utility vehicles (CUVs) that has grown to encompass half of the market of trucks in 10
short years. CUVs possess a smaller footprint than SUVs, pickup trucks, or vans while retaining
some of the cargo and handling characteristics, meaning that they have developed into substitutes
for larger, more expensive trucks.
These three figures also display events associated with changing model preferences that
occurred throughout the study period. Energy-related issues such as the Arab Oil Embargo in
1973 and the Iranian Energy Crisis in 1979 as well as spikes in retail gasoline prices appear to be
associated with fluctuations in consumer model preferences from larger to smaller vehicles.
Similarly, significant regulatory actions, including the launch and development of CAFE
standards from 1978 through 1985 and the Gas Guzzler Tax launched in 1980, coincide with
periods of increasing adoption of subcompact cars and abandonment of full-size vehicles.
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Figure 20 Customer Demand for Trucks by Vehicle Type as a Proportion of Trucks – 1982
to 2009

Fluctuating consumer model preference also includes changes in other vehicle properties.
For instance, the use of four-cylinder engines rose quickly in the 1970s from 0.03% of cars in
1970 to comprise 39.85% of cars in 1981 before stabilizing at 50% from the mid-1980s onward
[Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks]. In the same time period, the proportion of US cars produced
that were smaller than 250 CID [cubic inch displacement] grew from 12.9% to 70.7% [Ward’s
Automotive Yearbooks]. Similarly, shifts occurred in the move from rear-wheel drive to frontwheel drive vehicles. GM, Chrysler, and Ford produced few front-wheel drive vehicles prior to
the CAFE standards being introduced in 1975. However, a report by Arthur Anderson and Co in
1980 predicted that the number of front-wheel drive cars sold in North America would grow to
50% by 1985 [Ward’s, 1980]. By the mid-1990s and through to 2009, only a handful of highperformance sports cars remained rear-wheel drive.
67

Fluctuating consumer model preferences were also pronounced when considering swings
in the demand for individual vehicle models as compared with projections. For example, sales of
Chevrolet’s Citation dropped from 209,545 in 1982 to half of that in 1983 following a NHTSA
safety investigation into alleged brake problems. Over that year, Chevrolet sales increased by
5.8%, meaning that production of other models was increased to compensate [Ward’s, 1984]. At
Ford, sales of the Mercury Villager minivan never came close to capacity production, and the
joint venture with Nissan to produce these vehicles was ultimately called off in 2002 [Ward’s,
1999; 2003]. Similarly, in 1982 Chevrolet’s Chevette widely missed projections of 350,000
units, registering only 233,858 sales. In short, demand for different vehicles varied widely from
year to year and, perhaps more important, frequently deviated from manufacturers’ expectations.

4.3.3 Profit Margin Pressures
The third persistent manufacturing implication consists of persistent profit margin
pressures on North American automotive firms to maintain and decrease vehicles costs while
maintaining or increasing quality and other vehicle features. Below I discuss these pressures in
the context of the persistent disturbances from competitive pressures, labour disruptions,
government regulations, and economic cycles.
Japanese competitors, who were operating with significantly lower costs than GM, Ford,
and Chrysler, were important drivers of these profit margin pressures. Estimates produced by
Harbour and Associates show that this cost differential was driven largely by differences in the
number of hours it took North American firms to manufacture vehicles compared with their
Japanese competitors. In 1980, Japanese firms assembled smaller classes of vehicles in 17.4
hours, and their total manufacturing time was 30.8 hours. In contrast, North American firms
took 33.2 hours to assemble and 59.9 hours for total manufacturing. These differences in
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assembly and total manufacturing time (15.8 and 29.1 hours, respectively) contributed to a cost
advantage enjoyed by the Japanese of approximately $1513 per car [The Original Harbour
Report, 1980/1981]. Significant differences persisted over the study period, although North
American firms made considerable progress in reducing this spread. By 1998, the cost
differential per car as compared with Japanese firms was between $500 and $989; by 2002 it had
fallen to between $313 and $355 [Harbour Reports, 1980/1981; 1999; 2003].
While profit margin pressures came from competitors as described above, the regulations
imposed on North American automotive firms in terms of reduced emissions and improved
safety and fuel economy added significant costs to the development and manufacturing of
vehicles as well over the span of decades. As Table 7 illustrated, the cumulative costs attributed
to meeting emissions and safety requirements were considerable, constituting 19% of the total
cost of a vehicle from the early 1980s on. Since automotive firms were concerned about
consumer price inelasticity, these costs were rarely passed onto consumers in their entirety.
While cost pressures were an ongoing concern, owing largely to economic cycles of
boom and bust, cost inefficiencies became most apparent during economic downturns. I
employed return on sales figures as a proxy for cost challenges experienced during the study
period. Return on sales is a measure that automotive executives themselves deployed in
expressing concern about declining profit margins. This concern is illustrated in the following
excerpt from Ford’s 1970 annual report:
“Throughout the world, the automobile industry is challenged by
rapidly rising labor and material costs and by intense competition
which precludes price increases sufficient to cover rising costs. These
challenges are reflected in our after-tax return on sales, which declined
last year to 3.5% from 3.8% in 1969 and 6.7% ten years ago.”
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Return on sales is depressed when costs rise relative to revenues. As Figure 21 illustrates, each
of the automotive firms in my sample had regular difficulties in maintaining a healthy return on
sales, reflecting the challenges that these firms were having in managing their costs. Each of the
major dips corresponds to economic recessions where higher costs led to depressed return on
sales made worse when automotive firms dropped prices, as they often did, to maintain market
share. During economic booms cost advantages were less problematic as margins were retained.
Figure 21 Big Three Return on Sales

4.4 Dynamic Capabilities
My research focused on the responses firms took to adapt their manufacturing operations
to the persistent disturbances and associated persistent manufacturing implications they were
facing from their environment—that is, how firms built and developed manufacturing flexibility.
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Manufacturing flexibility has been studied extensively in the field of operations (Slack, 2005;
Sethi and Sethi, 1990; Gerwin, 1993). Manufacturing flexibility can be defined as a firm’s
ability to adapt to environmental changes by varying products, product mix, and production
volumes (Upton, 1994). This definition highlights how manufacturing flexibility fits the
description of a dynamic capability in that it is a capability through which firms adapt their
underlying manufacturing operation to changing environmental conditions.
Manufacturing flexibility comprises different types of flexibility that permit different
forms of adaptation. While the operations literature recognizes different types of flexibility, the
dynamic capabilities literature has largely treated manufacturing flexibility as a unitary dynamic
capability (see Malik and Kotabe, 2009). In analyzing my data, I found three types of
manufacturing flexibility pertinent in my study. The first was production volume flexibility,
which enabled firms to adjust the total volume of product produced. The second was production
mix flexibility, which enabled firms to switch among different classes of vehicles or vehicles
with different properties or characteristics. Finally, partnering flexibility enabled firms to
modify how they relied on partners with respect to satisfying their manufacturing obligations.
My data analysis revealed that each of these dynamic capabilities was aligned with a
particular persistent manufacturing implication. Figure 9 illustrated the relationships among
persistent disturbances, persistent manufacturing implications, and dynamic capability
development. As the figure highlighted, while my data analysis found that multiple persistent
disturbances translated into three persistent manufacturing implications, my data analysis also
showed that a one-to-one relationship existed between a persistent manufacturing implication
and a specific dynamic capability in manufacturing flexibility that firms built in response. In my
study, these dynamic capabilities developed over decades. In this section I build narratives
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describing how each of these dynamic capabilities developed over my study period. The raw
data for these narratives can be found in the appendix in Tables A4 through A12.

4.4.1 Production Volume Flexibility
Production volume flexibility refers to a firm’s capability to increase or decrease the
volume of vehicles the firm produces over a given time period. This was a dynamic capability in
that it was through production volume flexibility that the firm’s underlying manufacturing
capability was modified and adapted to meet changing environmental conditions. I found that it
was possible to discern the capabilities that comprised a firm’s dynamic capability in production
volume flexibility. These capabilities functioned as building blocks for the dynamic capability.
Figure 22 illustrates these capabilities as they pertain to the dynamic capability of production
volume flexibility. Below I discuss how these capabilities comprise an automotive firm’s
dynamic capability in production volume flexibility. These capabilities are alter sources of
production, utilize capacity, and adjust model timing.
Figure 22 Development of Production Volume Flexibility
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Alter Sources of Production
The first capability, alter sources of production, pertains to the ability to increase or
decrease plant capacity and to open or close entire plants. For instance, in 1994 Ford increased
the capacity of their St. Louis plant from 135,000 units to 445,000 units so as to build Ford
Explorer SUVs alongside Aerostar vans. This was accomplished through a 700,000-ft2
expansion [Ward’s, 1995]. Alternatively, adding new sources of production can involve opening
new plants, such as the Sterling Heights facility opened by Chrysler in 1984 to build the Chrysler
LeBaron and the Dodge Lancer [Ward’s, 1985], or unshuttering idled plants like the St. Louis
South plant in 1995, revived to produce Dodge Rams [Ward’s, 1996].
To adjust production volume down, manufacturing plants may also be closed or idled for
defined periods of time. For instance, between March 1980 and March 1981, GM idled their
South Gate plant [Ward’s, 1981], and in 1997 Ford shut down their Lorain plant for two years
[Ward’s, 1998]. Plants may also be closed indefinitely. In these cases, manufacturing firms
retain ownership over the facility and are able to re-open the plant should conditions warrant.
Finally, plants may be closed permanently, and the property sold and converted to other uses.
Utilize Capacity
The second capability, utilize capacity, involves increasing or decreasing the utilization
of a firm’s manufacturing plants. Capacity utilization can be increased through the use of
overtime by requiring employees to work longer days and by extending weeks to include
Saturdays. Adding new shifts to an existing plant also improves capacity utilization since
facilities are used for more hours of the day. Manufacturing firms increased the number of shifts
employed for a given facility from one or two shifts a day to two or three shifts a day. This
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requires hiring additional employees to work the new shifts. Finally, capacity utilization can be
increased by speeding up the production schedule at a facility, by increasing assembly line
speeds which may or may not involve hiring additional employees.
Reducing capacity utilization can be done in various ways. First and very simply, it can
involve temporary shutdowns to control inventory and reduce production volumes. In 1990,
Ford closed their plants for a total of 85 plant weeks to control inventory levels [Ward’s, 1991].
In the same year Chrysler engaged in sporadic one- and two-week plant shutdowns [Ward’s,
1991]. A second way to decrease capacity utilization is to reduce manufacturing line speeds so
as to produce fewer vehicles. This approach is typically associated with laying off employees.
A third way is to shut down lines within a plant. For example, in 2005 GM shut down a
production line in Oshawa and idled one in Spring Hill [Ward’s, 2006]. Finally, manufacturing
firms may reduce the number of shifts active at a given plant; for example, GM eliminated a
second shift at their Buick City in 1987 [Ward’s, 1988].
Adjust Model Timing
The final capability pertains to adjusting model timing. The automotive business is
seasonal, with new vehicle models released annually. New models may constitute dramatic
revisions of a vehicle including new specifications and features or they may involve small
updates in styling. Typically, new models are announced and displayed at annual automotive
shows early in the calendar year and manufacturing begins during the latter part of the summer.
At times when demand for the vehicles of a given model year is high, firms change models over
later, extending the run of the existing model and delaying the launch of new models. In 1984
GM extended the production run of the Fiero and 2000 Sunbird into November to satisfy
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sustained customer demand [Ward’s, 1985]. Similarly, a firm may delay plans to end the
production of certain models when demand warrants. In 1986, Ford delayed plans to drop the
Grand Marquis in response to stronger than expected market demand [Ward’s, 1987].
Conversely, when demand for vehicles is low, manufacturing firms cease production of a model
earlier than originally planned. This may involve an idle period for a plant, experienced as
unscheduled downtime, or it may involve commencing production on new models earlier than
originally anticipated.

4.4.2 Production Mix Flexibility
The repeated oil crises of the 1970s were catalyzing events for the automotive industry.
However, these crises were just the beginning of significant turmoil in the industry and marked
the start of fluctuations in consumer model preference. Despite the difficulty in doing so, North
American automotive firms were often required to make dramatic changes to the mix of vehicles
they manufactured from one year to the next. Customer demand swung between vehicles of
different classes, properties, and models. North American automotive firms initially responded
to these swings by leveraging their existing capabilities; converting plants, sourcing external
vehicles, and changeover models. As the need to rapidly adjust production mix persisted, firms
developed new and increasingly sophisticated capabilities in platform sharing and facility
sharing. Below I discuss how this dynamic capability developed over the course of my study
period from 1965 to 2010. I pull much of the data for this narrative from the annual analyses of
Ford, GM, and Chrysler found in Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks, supplementing the telling of
the story with facts from a variety of additional sources. Figure 23 depicts this development
graphically.
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Figure 23 Development of Production Mix Flexibility

The 1970s proved especially challenging for automotive firms. The repeated oil crises in
1973 and 1979 shocked the automotive industry, each causing large swings in demand from big
to small cars. Combined sales of compact and subcompact cars increased from 33% in 1970 to
over 50% of automobiles sold through the 1980s. Corresponding decreases in larger-automobile
sales were also recorded. Making matters worse, the swing towards small cars was not direct.
Following each of the crises the sales of larger automobiles bounced back when gasoline prices
temporarily declined, gasoline rationing was suspended, and national concern over energy
security diminished. The result was that firms were faced with swings in demand between large
and small cars over a 10-year period.
In response, firms were forced to change their production mix from one weighted with
large cars, to one that favoured smaller, more fuel efficient vehicles. Changing a firm’s
production mix involved either introducing new vehicles to fill a gap in the firm’s product lineup or shifting production among existing vehicles. During the 1970s, GM, Ford, and Chrysler
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deployed capabilities that were poorly developed. These firms relied on smaller, more fuel
efficient captive imports from Japanese partners, engaged in production changeover, and
dramatic and costly plant conversions. I discuss each of these in turn.
Captive Imports
Captive importing is the practice of importing vehicles from third parties manufacturing
in foreign countries and selling them under domestic brands. The term “captive” refers to how
the foreign cars are sold under the importer or domestic automaker’s own brand. North
American automotive manufacturers largely partnered with Japanese firms for their captive
importing programs. Ford partnered with Mazda, Chrysler with Mitsubishi, and GM with Suzuki
and Isuzu. GM and Ford also had extensive European subsidiaries (Opel and Ford of Europe)
and thus relied on imports of small cars from these subsidiaries as well.
Figure 24 Captive Import Cars as Proportion of Firm Car Sales
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Chrysler was particularly reliant on captive imports. Possessing no domestically
produced subcompact car, Chrysler was left with few options when responding to the shifts in
demand towards small cars that occurred during the 1970s [Ward’s, 1974]. Over this time,
Chrysler imported an increasing volume and variety of vehicles from Mitsubishi, including the
Dodge Colt, Plymouth Arrow, Dodge Challenger, and Plymouth Sapporo. Chrysler relied on
captive imports so much during the oil crises of the 1970s that units of captive imports more than
doubled from 6% to 16% of car sales between 1975 and 1980 (Figure 24). Ford and GM initially
relied on captive imports from their European subsidiaries. GM imported the Opelmanufactured Kadett, Manta, and GT; Ford, the Capri and Fiesta. Both firms subsequently
contracted the manufacture of these small European cars to their Japanese partners.
In all cases, North American automotive firms used captive imports to bolster their
underdeveloped small-car programs that had been struggling to compete with low-cost Japanese
competitors. Many small-car programs run by North American automotive firms were still in the
planning stages when the second oil crisis hit [Ward’s, 1981]. Chrysler Chairman Lee Iacocca
said it plainly when describing the impact Japanese firms were having on North American
automotive manufacturers: “they’re murdering us” [Ward’s, 1990: 15]. Making use of captive
imports allowed firms to avoid the years of research and development and millions of dollars of
investments to bring a new vehicle from concept through to production readiness. A single
engine plant alone can cost $600 million [Ward’s, 1982], and it was reported that Ford’s world
car program, the basis for the Ford Contour and Mercury Mystique, cost $6 billion and took
upwards of 10 years (from 1985 to 1995) to complete [Ward’s, 1995].
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Convert Plants
Each of the Big Three automotive firms struggled to adjust their production mix by
increasing the production of small cars to meet demand and decreasing the production of large
cars to slow the accumulation of inventories. Firms shifted their production in two ways. First,
they converted plants on a massive scale to adjust their production mix in favour of small cars.
Second, they adjusted model changeover times to permit the continued production of larger or
smaller cars as necessary. I discuss each approach below.
Each of the Big Three underwent massive plant conversions to replace big-car capacity
with small-car capacity. They shut down and reduced the capacity of large-car plants, and then
converted and opened new small-car plants or increased the capacity of existing small-car plants.
At Ford this conversion was perhaps the most dramatic. Ford increased production rates for their
small car, the Pinto, at Ford’s Metuchen and San Jose plants. Ford also converted Dearborn and
San Jose to the production of the Mustang II, Chicago to the intermediate-sized Torino, and
Wayne to the smaller Maverick. For Ford, these conversions added 1 million units of small
cars—a conversion of 40% of Ford’s annual sales [Ward’s, 1974]. This feat was referred to as
the “fastest and most expensive production model-mix shift in history” [Ward’s, 1973]. It was a
brute force approach to a dramatic problem. These are signs that firms were attempting to find
the right mix of vehicle and facility during this time. GM engaged in a number of plant
conversions as well, shifting the production of vehicles to different plants. In 1971, they moved
their Nova to their Van Nuys and Norwood plants and moved the Camaro from Van Nuys to
Norwood [Ward’s, 1972]. In 1977, they added the LeMans to their Baltimore plant and dropped
it at their Lakewood facility. They added the Sunbird to their Lordstown plant and the Phoenix
to both the Willow Run and North Tarrytown plants, while dropping the Ventura from their Van
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Nuys plant [Ward’s, 1978]. During significant conversion from big to small cars in 1973, GM
was forced to lay off workers while plant conversions occurred [Ward’s, 1974].
Production Changeover
New and updated vehicle models are introduced on a yearly schedule that starts in the
late summer. At this time, manufacturers may introduce entirely new vehicle models or make
smaller cosmetic or incremental adjustments. During the 1970s, automotive firms used these
model changeover periods to adjust the volume of a given vehicle or class of vehicles that was
produced. For instance, in 1977, as large-car sales rebounded, Ford shut small-car plants earlier
than scheduled so as to reduce the number of small cars produced. Simultaneously, they delayed
the changeover of full-sized cars until August of that year, thereby increasing the number of
larger cars produced [Ward’s, 1978]. GM engaged in similar activities during 1978, ending
production of their full-size vehicles several months early so as to convert the plant to new frontdrive E-body vehicles that were more fuel efficient [Ward’s, 1979].
I contend that these activities deployed a set of dynamic capabilities that had been
developed, and which were better suited to changing production volumes up or down than to
shifting production mix. Following the deployment of these poorly developed capabilities, the
automotive firms built new capabilities that enabled them to more effectively adapt to changing
consumer model preferences. Below I discuss the development of platform sharing and facility
sharing.
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Platform Sharing
Platform sharing refers to a practice whereby automotive firms design a vehicle platform
that can be used to build multiple vehicle models. A good example is the platform supporting
Chrysler’s popular Plymouth Reliant, Dodge Aries, and Chrysler LeBaron cars. These were
known as K-cars because they were built on Chrysler’s K-platform. As was the case with
Chrysler’s K-cars, vehicles built from the same platform were often shared across different car
divisions and, in time, different automotive partners.
Platform sharing served a number of purposes. One critical purpose was to spread the
cost and effort of producing new vehicles across a larger production volume. Engineering effort
and manufacturing complexity were dramatically reduced when a single vehicle platform was
customized and tailored to the needs of different car divisions, rather than having to build unique
vehicles for each division. Thus shared vehicle platforms served to reduce costs. Shared
platforms were first employed to manufacture two or three very similar vehicles branded with
different nameplates in order to satisfy the demands of different customer groups. This
capability provided firms with the flexibility to shift production mix among brands based on
varying demands and the changing tastes of customers. GM employed this strategy with many
of their new car launches, often building three vehicles from a single platform such as their Nand E/K-platforms, which each produced vehicles for Oldsmobile, Pontiac, and Buick [Ward’s,
1984; 1987]. Similarly, Ford built the Mustang, Thunderbird, and Fairmont off the same
platform [Ward’s, 1980], and, as discussed above, Chrysler’s sister K-cars, the Reliant, Aries,
and LeBaron, were all built on the K-platform [Ward’s, 1982].
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Vehicle platforms played a critical role in manufacturing flexibility as well. Shared
platforms permitted firms to fill critical gaps in product line-ups faster as new technology
became available and to more readily shift production among platform vehicles owing to the
strong overlap in parts and manufacturing knowledge required. Sharing platforms meant that a
firm’s limited technology offerings for vehicles in high demand could be spread more effectively
across the firm’s brands. For instance, automotive firms could take a fuel efficient subcompact
vehicle model, or a fuel efficient front-wheel drive vehicle model such as GM’s X-car, and better
leverage valuable engineering to satisfy fluctuations in consumer model preferences across
multiple brands.
Platform sharing also meant that automotive firms could focus engineering effort on a
reduced set of platforms. Ford was successful in reducing their platforms from 24 to 16 [Ward’s,
1995]. At first this was done by taking existing vehicles and combining them onto the same
platform. For instance, in 1979 Ford built both the Mustang and the Thunderbird from the
Fairmont platform, eliminating the body platform previously used by the older model of the
Thunderbird [Ward’s, 1980]. Subsequently, further platform reduction was accomplished as new
vehicles were designed and produced on existing platforms. Engineering effort was concentrated
in other ways as well. Ford had reduced the number of engines they used from 30 to 14 by 1996
[Ward’s, 1997]. GM began centralizing engine manufacturing to a greater extent, with divisions
sharing their engines. Chevrolet shared their V-8 engine with other divisions; Oldsmobile
provided their diesel engines to other divisions; and Pontiac shared their fuel efficient 4-cylinder
engines [Ward’s, 1979; 1980]. Further engine and transmission consolidation occurred when
GM created a central Powertrain Division [Ward’s, 1992]. In this way, shared platforms made it
easier to disseminate cutting-edge technology as it became available.
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Over time, platform sharing became more sophisticated, permitting firms to achieve an
increasing diversity of models from a single platform. The Chevrolet Lumina platform is a great
example of a single platform that permitted GM to produce a coupe, sedan, and minivan
[Ward’s, 1990]. Similarly, Chrysler built the new Pacifica platform originally to manufacture a
station wagon, but it also became the basis for Chrysler’s next generation of minivans [Ward’s,
2003]. GM’s GMT800 program enabled GM to produce 40 different models of SUVs and
pickups from a single modularized vehicle platform [Ward’s, 1999].
In addition to sharing platforms across brands, firms began to share platforms across
partner firms. Chrysler engaged in joint platform development with Mitsubishi for their C- and
D-segment vehicles that included the Dodge Neon [Ward’s, 2003], and Ford’s Probe was based
on Mazda’s 626-platform [Ward’s, 1986]. In other instances, Ford and Nissan teamed up to
share a platform to build small vans, including the Mercury Villager and the Nissan Quest
[Ward’s, 1992]. GM’s joint venture with Toyota at their NUMMI manufacturing plant produced
a variety of vehicles, including the Toyota Matrix and the Pontiac Vibe.
Platform sharing was not without its challenges. A critical challenge arose as consumers
had difficulty differentiating among vehicles that looked increasingly similar to one another.
Figure 25 shows three different vehicle models, the 1986 Oldsmobile Toronado, the 1986
Cadillac Eldorado, and the 1986 Buick Riviera. Each of these vehicles is based on the same
underlying platform—what GM refers to as their E/K-platform. The pictures in Figure 25 show
how the vehicles look very similar. Since each of an automotive firm’s brands is carefully
cultivated to appeal to specific market segments, this was a very real challenge. This was
particularly challenging when platforms were shared across firms or across distinctive divisions
within a firm, such as GM’s Chevrolet, Opel, and Saturn [Ward’s, 1998]. By this point shared
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platforms were not only heavily ingrained into the automotive firms, they were a financial
necessity keeping costs lower. Chrysler responded to these criticisms by separating Chrysler and
Plymouth into distinct brands, although the brands continued to share platforms. GM’s SUV and
pickup truck program, the GMT800, tried to get around some of the problems of undifferentiated
platform vehicles by using a variety of modules that could be mixed and matched to produce
greater variety of output from a still greatly reduced set of parts [Ward’s, 1999].
Figure 25 GM E/K Model Vehicles

This practice of sharing platforms became so pervasive that it would be difficult to find a
vehicle manufactured by GM, Chrysler, or Ford that is not built on a platform shared with
another vehicle within the firm or with one of its subsidiaries or partners.
Facility Sharing
In addition to sharing vehicle platforms, North American automotive firms developed the
capability to share facilities among automotive divisions and across subsidiaries and partners.
Automotive firms frequently shared plants among their varied brands. This gave these firms the
ability to more quickly adjust production based on which brands and vehicles were selling well.
For instance, GM’s N-cars were built for Buick, Oldsmobile, and Pontiac on a single production
line [Ward’s, 1984], and Chevrolet, Pontiac, and Oldsmobile split output for all-purpose vehicles
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(APV) being produced at the North Tarrytown facility [Ward’s, 1990]. At Chrysler, the Laser
was built on the same line as the Reliant and LeBaron [Ward’s, 1984]. Similarly, the New
Yorker and the LHS shared output, and the Ram and Dakota trucks both shared a production line
at Warren [Ward’s, 1993]. Thus automotive firms could adjust their production output based on
changes in market demand by shifting among their various brands.
Facility sharing developed further such that automotive manufacturing facilities were
able to produce very different vehicles in the same plant and even on the same line. For instance,
during the move from rear-wheel drive to front-wheel drive vehicles, Ford developed the ability
to manufacture both rear- and front-wheel drive vehicles at the same plant—a feat that had not
previously been accomplished. Since front-wheel drive provided superior fuel economy
performance, this permitted Ford to make adjustments to production output based on market
demand for fuel efficient vehicles [Ward’s, 1984]. Similarly, Ford and Chrysler, at their St.
Thomas and Sterling Heights facilities respectively, developed the ability to produce both big
and small vehicles [Ward’s, 1984; 1987].
Subsequently, automotive firms built capabilities in flexible manufacturing, permitting
them to manufacture models from multiple platforms on the same assembly lines. Such flexible
plants became more commonplace. Ford’s Chicago plant comprised a multi-supplier park and
assembly line that could produce eight models from two platforms by 2003 [Ward’s, 2004];
Ford’s Rouge plant was redone to accommodate three distinct platforms up from two [Ward’s,
2003]; and Ford’s Dearborn plant was capable of producing nine models from three platforms
[Ward’s, 2005]. Ford prepared for their CUV production by creating a flexible truck campus in
Oakville [Ward’s, 2008]. Chrysler developed similar capabilities, with 60% of their assembly
plants featuring advanced flexible manufacturing capabilities that permitted production of
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multiple models from various platforms on the same assembly line [Ward’s, 2006]. GM
bulldozed inefficient plants to build state-of-the-art facilities, such as new flexible manufacturing
facilities in Oshawa [Ward’s, 2005], and a 500-acre, state-of-the art facility named Buick City
[Ward’s, 1984].
Finally, firms began sharing facilities across partner organizations. One of the most wellknown facility-sharing arrangements occurred between GM and Toyota, which invested jointly
in a production facility called NUMMI in California. GM and Toyota split the output of this
facility, co-producing one vehicle, the Pontiac Vibe and Toyota Matrix, while using additional
capacity at the facility for other vehicles. Similarly, in 1986 Chrysler announced a joint venture
with Mitsubishi to assemble cars in Illinois under the banner of Diamond Star Motors, despite
selling their stake 2 years later [Ward’s, 1987]. Ford shared facilities with partners as well,
including an arrangement with Nissan to jointly manufacture minivans [Ward’s, 1992] and a
joint production facility with Mazda at their Flat Rock plant, Auto Alliance International
[Ward’s, 1993].
As demonstrated above, firms developed and then elaborated increasingly sophisticated
capabilities, which enabled GM, Ford, and Chrysler to exhibit a dynamic capability in flexibly
adjusting production mix. Figure 23 illustrated and summarized these capabilities, depicting
how they developed over time. Early capabilities included plant conversion, whereby firms
converted plants from producing one vehicle to producing another vehicle; external vehicle
sourcing, in which vehicles were acquired from external sources through captive importing; and
model changeover, with running changes and adjusted changeover times to take advantage of a
changing production mix. Subsequently, firms developed capabilities in platform sharing, which
evolved from an ability to share across multiple divisions to one where firms were sharing
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platforms across disparate vehicles and partner firms. Finally, firms developed facility sharing
that permitted firms to allow multiple divisions to share a single facility and, ultimately, to share
facilities across disparate vehicle types and partner firms.
Figure 26 Production Mix Flexibility Capability Deployment – Big Three

Despite the development of new capabilities in shared platforms and shared facilities,
firms continued to deploy prior capabilities in converting plants, importing, and model
changeover. Figure 26 shows how the use of plant conversion, facility sharing, and platform
sharing continued over the study period. What is striking about the graph is the continued
reliance on older capabilities. For instance, Ford continued to sell captive imports through 1997,
and both GM and Chrysler sold captive imports to the end of the study period.
In broad strokes, a firm’s ability to respond to production mix fluctuations developed
substantially over the study period. This development was characterized by a move from being
concerned with building production capacity for a specific vehicle, such as the Ford Mustang or
the Chrysler Intrepid, to building production capacity for classes of vehicles, such as small cars,
large cars, SUVs, or CUVs [Ward’s, 1998; 2005]. Firms regularly discussed exchanging car
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class capacity among brands. As an example, Oldsmobile exchanged some if their H-body car
capacity for additional X-car allocations [Ward’s, 1980].

4.4.3 Partnering Flexibility
The third persistent disturbance, profit margin pressures, led firms to develop dynamic
capabilities that allowed them to build and adapt partnerships with third parties in new and
innovative ways. Firms developed and then elaborated increasingly sophisticated capabilities
over the course of my study period. This development enabled GM, Ford, and Chrysler to
exhibit a dynamic capability in partnering flexibility. Figure 27 illustrates and summarizes the
capabilities which comprise partnering flexibility, depicting how these capabilities developed
over time. Firms began by incorporating partner-manufactured components into their vehicles,
subsequently developing this capability to facilitate sharing technology among partners.
Similarly, firms began leveraging partner capacity through captive imports and subsequently
developed this capability to support joint manufacturing and purchasing output capacity. I pull
much of the data for this narrative from the annual analysis of Ford, GM, and Chrysler found in
Ward’s Automotive Yearbook, supplementing the narrative with data from additional sources.
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Figure 27 Development of Partnering Flexibility

Leverage Partner Capacity
North American automotive manufacturers became increasingly reliant on partners to fill
gaps in their vehicle line-ups. This reliance began as firms leveraged captive importing partners.
Both GM and Ford began by using captive imports from their European division: Opel and Ford
Europe, respectively. GM received 669,626 units from Opel between the mid-1960s and the
mid-1970s. GM was particularly reliant on imports of subcompact vehicles from Opel [Ward’s
1974], owing to their poorly developed domestic small-car program. Similarly, Ford imported
495,695 units from Ford Europe over the same period.
Both GM and Ford subsequently moved the manufacturing of their small-car models
from their European subsidiaries to their Japanese partners, Isuzu (in 1976) and Mazda,
respectively. GM sourced the Sprint and Spectrum vehicles from Suzuki and Isuzu, respectively,
which helped GM bolster their small-car program starting in the mid-1980s. While Ford had
their strongest captive import relationship with Mazda, purchasing vehicles such as the Lynx
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[Ward’s, 1987], they did source vehicles from Korean manufacturer Kia, such as the minicompact Ford Festiva [Ward’s, 1987], and from Merkur in Germany [Ward’s, 1985;1988].
Chrysler, possessing no European subsidiary, partnered with Mitsubishi early and began
importing multiple Mitsubishi models in 1970, including the Challenger, Colt, Sapporo, and
Arrow, to fill out their smaller-car line-ups for the Dodge and Plymouth brands. Between 1970
and 1996, Chrysler imported over 2,130,000 vehicles from Mitsubishi. Captive importing was
an early effort by automotive firms to access the capacity of partners skilled at producing small
cars and trucks.
However, GM, Ford, and Chrysler’s Japanese partners became increasingly eager to get a
manufacturing foothold in North America in order to circumvent the voluntary import quotas
imposed on Japanese automobiles. The relationship GM, Ford, and Chrysler enjoyed with their
partners developed from one of captive importing to one of joint manufacturing. Each of the
North American automotive firms developed joint manufacturing operations with Japanese
partners on North American soil. Chrysler partnered with Mitsubishi in 1984 to form Diamond
Motors, which produced vehicles out of Illinois. Through this partnership, Chrysler purchased
vehicle output from this plant, including the Eagle Talon, Dodge Avenger, Chrysler Sebring, and
Dodge Stealth over the duration of its existence. Ford agreed to purchase a share of output from
Mazda’s new manufacturing facility at Flat Rock in 1985 [Ward’s, 1986], and subsequently in
1992 purchased a 50% equity stake [Ward’s, 1993]. Finally, a well-documented joint
manufacturing initiative called NUMMI Motors began between GM and Toyota in the 1980s
(Adler, Goldoftas, and Levine 1999; Adler, 1993). GM and Toyota reached an agreement to
deploy Toyota’s production system in an idled GM plant in Fremont California [Ward’s, 1984],
in which they built a variety of vehicles to be sold under both brands. GM’s share of the vehicles
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was initially the Chevrolet Nova, and then the Prizm and Geo Storm. These joint manufacturing
moves benefited the Big Three as well as their Japanese partners, since their own captive imports
had been capped by voluntary government quotas and they were having difficulty acquiring
captive import vehicles.
The North American automotive manufacturers developed additional joint manufacturing
arrangements as well. Ford partnered with Nissan in the late 1980s to build small vans—the
Mercury Villager and the Nissan Quest—with Ford adopting the role of assembler and Nissan
taking on the design and engineering [Ward’s, 1988; 1992]. This joint venture lasted until 1998
[Ward’s, 1999]. Further, Ford’s Hermosillo plant in Mexico was originally a joint venture
between Ford and Mazda. GM increased their integration with supplier partners, who took on a
more integral role in the assembly of GM’s automobiles. In 2001 GM named “lead interior
integrators” to manage the development of passenger compartments in every North American
vehicle, and these partners assumed overseeing and benchmarking roles. These deals were often
international in nature. A deal between Daimler Chrysler, Mitsubishi, and Kia was struck in
2000 to manufacture high-quality, low-cost cars for multiple world markets—vehicles like the
Dodge Neon [Ward’s, 2001]. A further relationship between Chrysler and Volkswagen was
struck to build minivans at Chrysler’s St. Louis plant [Ward’s, 2006].
These joint manufacturing relationships often involved substantial equity investments.
Ford held equity stake in Mazda that reached 35% in 1996 [Ward’s, 1996] before being reduced
to 13% in 2008 [Ward’s, 2009]. Similarly, GM held equity stakes in Isuzu (49%), Fuji (20%),
Suzuki (20%), and Fiat (20%) over the study period. GM ended the Fiat and Fuji relationship in
2005 [Ward’s, 2006] and the Suzuki and Isuzu relationships in 2006 [Ward’s, 2007]. Chrysler
purchased a 15% stake in Mitsubishi in 1971 [Ward’s 1972], and the then merged Daimler91

Chrysler, increased that ownership to 37% before ending the relationship in 2005 [Ward’s,
2006]. Joint ownership of facilities was also common. Ford, for example, purchased 50% of
Mazda’s facility in Flat Rock [Ward’s, 1993].
North American automotive firms moved even more towards the use of third-party
manufacturing plants, with North American automotive manufacturing firms purchasing output
capacity from partners. These partners included other automotive manufacturers. Ford’s Probe
was built at Mazda’s Flat Rock, based on Mazda’s 626-platform. While its production included
engineers from both companies, it was not a joint venture. Similarly, Mazda produced the frontwheel drive version of the Ford Mustang at the same plant. A Suzuki plant in Canada produced
GM’s Tracker [Ward’s, 1990]. Chrysler negotiated with American Motor Company (AMC) to
produce Chrysler’s full-size rear-wheel drive cars at their AMC’s Kenosha plant starting in 1987
[Ward’s, 1987].
These partners also include major suppliers such as Magna International, which styles
itself a Tier 0.5 supplier. Magna has the ability to conduct much of the full manufacturing and
assembly of vehicles for automotive firms. They can leverage highly flexible facilities across
multiple automotive clients. Chrysler is one firm to have taken advantage of this capability,
selling an assembly plant to Magna International in 2002, which then began assembling vehicles
for Chrysler [Ward’s, 2003].
In summary, relationships that began through captive importing with foreign partners,
moved first towards joint manufacturing and subsequently towards an inter-related system of
manufacturing capacity that was shared among partners. Firms moved from assembling entire
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vehicles themselves, to partnering with others, to outsourcing the full assembly of automobiles in
some cases.
Integrating Third-Party Components
A similar trajectory of development occurred with respect to how automotive firms
purchased and integrated partner-manufactured components. This began with relatively
straightforward relationships, as firms purchased manufactured components from suppliers.
GM, Ford, and Chrysler each sought components to satisfy demand for smaller and more fuel
efficient cars. For instance, GM sourced a diesel engine from Isuzu for their vehicles [Ward’s,
1980], and more recently GM’s Chevrolet Equinox featured a Chinese-built engine [Ward’s,
2003]. Chrysler sourced small engines and manual transaxles from Volkswagens to support their
efforts to build a domestic subcompact car [Ward’s, 1975], and regularly sourced parts and
components from external companies [Ward’s, 1981]. Chrysler used Mitsubishi engines to
power their New Yorker vehicles [Ward’s, 1988]; by 1995 they reversed the trend, looking to
move all engines in-house [Ward’s, 1996]. Ford received small engines from Mazda [Ward’s,
1985]. The liberalization of parts sourcing is well evidenced by Ford’s decision to source sliding
doors for a new minivan from GM’s parts department, as opposed to Ford’s own Visteon parts
arm [Ward’s, 1999].
Automotive firms built on these initial relationships with suppliers to develop joint
ventures with foreign and domestic partners to produce parts for shared projects. Ford was
involved in joint ventures with Alfa Romeo for aluminum engine components at their Windsor
plant [Ward’s, 2001], with Peugeot for two power plants [Ward’s, 2006], and with Changan and
Mazda in China for an engine plant [Ward’s, 2006]. Chrysler created a joint venture with
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Mitsubishi to build engines in Germany for use in Smart and Mitsubishi cars [Ward’s, 2002].
Chrysler also created a partnership with Hyundai and Mitsubishi to produce four-cylinder
engines [Ward’s 2003], increasing the extent of this relationship in 2004 [Ward’s, 2005].
Domestically, the Big Three also collaborated on projects, including one joint venture between
GM and Chrysler on four-wheel drive transfer cases, manual transmissions, and various driveline
products [Ward’s, 1998].
Some automotive firms took partnering beyond component sourcing and joint ventures to
the next level through technology sharing. Ford, for instance, developed and maintained a
relationship with Mazda that involved Ford using Mazda’s platforms to build vehicles, such as a
B-segment car that was based on Mazda’s Mazda2 architecture [Ward’s, 2009]. However this
collaboration went both ways, with Mazda designing their Mazda 626 in Ford’s Small Vehicle
Center in Cologne, suggesting that the 626 would share a platform with Ford’s next world car
[Ward’s, 1999].
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Chapter 5 – Analysis
5.0 Analysis
5.1 Overview
The purpose of this study was to examine how firms developed dynamic capabilities in
response to a specific form of environmental dynamism: persistent disturbances. In conducting
my research, I undertook an inductive theory-building approach, analyzing a longitudinal
archival dataset detailing the activities of Ford, Chrysler, and GM in the North American
automotive industry between 1965 and 2010. In what follows, I build on the findings presented
in the section above, formalizing propositions that capture insights about dynamic capability
development in the context of persistent disturbances. The propositions are summarized in Table
9 and are developed in detail in the remainder of this chapter.
Table 9 Proposition Summary
Proposition 1: The architecture of dynamic capabilities comprises capabilities. These capabilities
function to increase the speed, reduce the cost, or increase the flexibility of firms’ dynamic capabilities.
Proposition 2: When responding to persistent disturbances, firms that build dynamic capabilities
develop them so as to adapt to the more predictable, rather than stochastic, elements of the
environmental dynamism that the firms face.
Proposition 3: When responding to newly emerging persistent disturbances, firms initially deploy
existing capability endowments that have been developed for other persistent disturbances. This
response has low technical fitness.
Proposition 4a: When responding to newly emerging persistent disturbances in increasingly complex
environments, firms that build dynamic capabilities develop their dynamic capabilities through a process
of dynamic capability layering.
Proposition 4b: When responding to persistent disturbances, firms that develop dynamic capabilities do
so by building new capabilities and refine existing capabilities, which increase the technical fitness of
firms’ dynamic capabilities over time. The resulting dynamic capabilities develop in a path-dependent
manner along a trajectory that is reinforced by persistent disturbances.
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5.2 Dynamic Capability Architecture
My findings build on previous research that has stressed how dynamic capabilities
comprise assemblages of heterogeneous elements (Salvato and Rerup, 2011; Helfat et al, 2007).
In my study, I found that these heterogeneous elements consisted of a portfolio of capabilities
that underpinned each firm’s dynamic capabilities. For example, I found that five capabilities
underpinned production mix flexibility: convert plants, source external vehicles, changeover
models, platform sharing, and facility sharing. Similarly, utilize capacity, adjust model timing,
and alter sources of production were capabilities that comprised a dynamic capability in
production volume flexibility. These capabilities are akin to the building blocks of dynamic
capabilities. Other research has noted how dynamic capabilities comprise collections of routines
and capabilities (Schilke and Goerzen, 2010; Salvato and Rerup, 2011).
More important than the composition of dynamic capabilities are the relationships among
those heterogeneous elements. The concept of dynamic capability architecture stresses the
importance of these relationships. Dynamic capability architecture refers to how different
elements associated with a dynamic capability fit together or relate to one another (Jacobides,
2006). On this topic, there is existing research from which to draw. Most well understood is the
hierarchical relationship between dynamic capabilities and underlying ordinary capabilities.
Dynamic capabilities modify lower-order ordinary capabilities, which in the case of my study
were the manufacturing capabilities firms used to manufacture automobiles (Collis, 1994;
Winter, 2003; Salvato and Rerup, 2011). The microfoundations research by Teece (2007)
proposes three generic capabilities that undergird dynamic capabilities: seizing, sensing, and
transforming. Other research describes different modes through which firms can alter their
underlying resources and capabilities. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) describe four ways in which
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firms adapt their resource bases: leveraging existing resources, creating new resources, accessing
external resources, and releasing resources. This approach has received some preliminary
empirical support (Danneels, 2010).
The capabilities that I found stressed a supportive role for those capabilities comprising a
dynamic capability architecture. Figure 28 illustrates this architecture, distinguishing between
the capabilities that comprise a dynamic capability, and the ordinary capabilities that dynamic
capabilities are built to adapt. This role draws support from prior research, which has stressed
how capabilities can complement dynamic capabilities (Anand, Oriani, and Vassolo, 2010;
Helfat, 1997), serving both operational and dynamic purposes to “make change possible” (Helfat
and Winter, 2001: 1248). What distinguished the capabilities that I found is that they were not
necessarily geared towards change or adaptation themselves. Instead, capabilities facilitated
change processes, making change faster or less expensive or providing a range of alternatives.
Below I use examples from my study to illustrate how capabilities supported dynamic
capabilities in adapting underlying ordinary capabilities. Table 10 summarizes the different
ways in which the capabilities I found supported their respective dynamic capabilities.
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Figure 28 Dynamic Capabilities Architecture

Increase Speed
The capabilities that comprised a dynamic capability can increase how quickly a firm can
deploy a dynamic capability—in the case of my study, how quickly they could exhibit
manufacturing flexibility. Two examples of this from my study are platform sharing and facility
sharing capabilities. While these two capabilities did not directly modify lower-order
manufacturing capabilities, they enabled firms to more flexibly and much more quickly shift
between different vehicle models. Recall that in the 1970s and early 1980s, Ford, Chrysler, and
GM each engaged in months of effort to convert existing large-car plants to be able to produce
smaller cars. In the 2000s, with the development of platform sharing and facility sharing, this
same scale of conversion is unnecessary. Instead, the automotive firms are now able to adjust
their production schedule by switching among vehicles on the same platform and among
different platforms at a facility that is trained and capable of producing many different vehicles
from many different platforms.
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Decrease Costs
Similarly, while they were initially costly to build, platform sharing and facility sharing
capabilities dramatically reduced the costs associated with shifting production across different
vehicle models. Prior to the development of platform sharing and facility sharing, firms would
convert a plant, substituting the capability to manufacture one type of vehicle with the capability
to manufacture another type of vehicle (Lavie, 2006). These conversions involved new tools and
manufacturing equipment, as well as extensive training, all of which can be very expensive.
However, after building these two capabilities, firms could switch production among different
vehicles with minimal conversion costs.
Table 10 Capabilities Comprising Dynamic Capabilities
Capability
Description
How it Supports
Production Volume
Flexibility

Utilize Capacity
Adjust Model Timing
Alter Sources of
Production

Production Mix Flexibility

Convert Plants
Source External
Vehicles
Changeover Models
Platform Sharing
Facility Sharing

Partnering
Flexibility

Integrate Third-Party
Components
Leverage Partner
Capacity

Adjusting plant utilization through
overtime, number of shifts, line speed,
and temporary shutdowns
Adjust length of production runs; extend
to increase volume and end to decrease
volume
Change sources of production through
plant opening or closing and capacity
increases or decreases
Change which vehicles are produced in a
given plant
Source vehicles from foreign (or domestic)
partners
Selectively adjust length of production
runs; extend popular models and end
undesired models
Sharing multiple vehicle models across a
single vehicle platform
Sharing multiple vehicles or platforms
within a single facility
Source components from third parties
through purchase, joint ventures, and
technology sharing
Source vehicles from third parties through
captive importing, joint manufacturing,
and purchasing output capacity

Increases range of
alternatives
Increases range of
alternatives
Increases range of
alternatives
Increases range of
alternatives
Increases range of
alternatives
Increases range of
alternatives
Increases adaptation speed
Decreases costs of adaptation
Increases adaptation speed
Decrease costs of adaptation
Increases range of
alternatives
Increases range of
alternatives

Diversity of Alternatives
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The different capabilities that comprise a dynamic capability reveal a broad diversity of
response alternatives, each with different properties. This diversity of response alternatives
increases the flexibility with which a firm can respond to persistent disturbances. I illustrate the
importance of this diversity by considering production volume flexibility. This dynamic
capability comprised three distinct capabilities that permitted a firm to alter sources of
production, adjust capacity utilization, and adjust model timing. Two of these capabilities,
utilize capacity and alter sources of production, could be deployed in a variety of ways. These
capabilities offered many different ways to respond to fluctuating consumer demand. Firms
could increase the capacity of existing facilities through overtime, new shifts, or changing line
speeds. With more time, or as disturbances became more severe, the firm could add or remove
new plants or adjust the capacity of existing plants through investments. As an additional
illustration, consider the capability leveraging partner capacity, which is part of a dynamic
capability in partnering flexibility. This capability provided firms with a variety of partnering
options, ranging from sourcing fully manufactured components from partners, to engaging in
joint manufacturing of components, to technology sharing initiatives. I argue that this diversity
facilitates dynamism in the face of persistent disturbances because the firm is prepared to
respond to a variety of contingencies.
This preceding discussion is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: The architecture of dynamic capabilities comprises
capabilities. These capabilities function to increase the speed, reduce
the cost, or increase the flexibility of firms’ dynamic capabilities.
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5.3 Persistent Disturbances and Dynamic Capability Development
5.3.1 Environmental Dynamism – Unpredictability and Dynamic Capabilities
The dynamic capabilities literature presents a bit of a paradox. On the one hand, dynamic
capabilities exist to deal with environmental dynamism (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). Firms
are challenged to build dynamic capabilities today that help them respond to future challenges
(Teece, 2007; Doving and Gooderham, 2008). This dynamism, however, means that the
dynamic capabilities firms build today may not be useful tomorrow. The result is that, while
highly dynamic environments create futures where dynamic capabilities are thought to be most
valuable, the same dynamism simultaneously makes it difficult to anticipate whether a particular
dynamic capability will be useful in the future. Given that building and maintaining dynamic
capabilities is expensive (Winter, 2003), building dynamic capabilities is most practical when
firms are relatively confident that the dynamic capabilities in which they invest can be deployed
in the future—in short, that investments in dynamic capabilities will be paid back (Pacheco-deAlmeida, 2010).
Unpredictability is a key dimension of environmental dynamism (Davis et al, 2009). My
research highlights the importance of unpredictability in a firm’s environment with respect to the
development of dynamic capabilities. Environments are unpredictable when future events
cannot be anticipated based on past events (Farjoun and Levin, 2011). Unpredictability is
associated with higher levels of disorder that make identifying patterns in a firm’s environment
difficult or impossible (Davis et al, 2009). All configurations of environmental dynamism are
unpredictable in some respect. Environmental shifts are unpredictable because they are
dramatic, one-time, discontinuous events that are difficult to predict and that can take
organizations by surprise (Danneels, 2010). Ongoing environmental change is unpredictable
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owing to the rapid pace of change that makes the future difficult to anticipate (Teece, Pisano, and
Shuen, 1997). Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) picked up on the central role of unpredictability in
environmental dynamism when they defined moderately dynamic markets as those exhibiting
some predictability with respect to direction and frequency of future changes.
I argue and find evidence to support that persistent disturbances exhibit lower levels of
unpredictability than environmental shifts or ongoing environmental change do. There are two
reasons for this lower level of unpredictability. The first is repetition. Persistent disturbances
often comprise relatively homogeneous disturbances that have been repeated over time, and
which appear likely to continue repeating. For instance, the socioeconomic and political
dynamics underlying past oil and gasoline price fluctuations are harbingers of future gasoline
price fluctuations in the same way that the increasing encroachment of government regulators in
the 1960s and 1970s led firm executives and industry analysts to expect increasing regulation.
Managers recognized that the increasing encroachment of government through regulations on
emissions, safety, and fuel economy were becoming a part of the fabric of the industry:
“In the past, our success has depended primarily on our response to the
test of the marketplace. In the future, we shall be severely tested by the
need to respond at the same time to the requirements of the market and
the requirements imposed by the Federal governments' safety and air
pollution regulations.” [Ford Annual Report, 1966]
Automotive firms demonstrated that they were concerned about and predicted future
disturbances throughout the period of my study. For instance, in 1983, Ford’s annual report
contained the following excerpt predicting a cyclical economy:
“[W]e are in a cyclical industry and must be prepared to face
economic recessions down the road. We must husband our resources
and spur our progress during times of favorable business conditions so
we will be prepared for future downturns.”[Ford Annual Report, 1983]
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It is reasonable to assume that managers at automotive firms also viewed the occurrence
of future labour difficulties and energy challenges as highly predictable given the nature of fixedduration labour contracts and the regular fluctuations in oil prices that occurred. In each of these
instances, the persistent disturbances in question were predictable owing both to past repetition
and to a reasonable expectation that this repetition would continue.
However, persistent disturbances also exhibit increased predictability when, through a
process of translation, a diverse set of persistent disturbances affect particular firm functions,
such as the firm’s manufacturing capability, in a more focused manner. This translation process
was highlighted in Figure 9. Consider, for example, one set of translation processes from my
study. Fluctuations in consumer model preference were driven by different persistent
disturbances: first, by energy-related challenges such as oil or energy crises and gas price
increases that pushed consumers to purchase smaller, more fuel efficient vehicles; second, by
regulations that tinkered with the incentives to purchase particular vehicles, including the Gas
Guzzler Tax, and the crash testing program that changed public opinion regarding vehicle safety;
third, by competitive activities, such as when firms launched new types of vehicles like
minivans, SUVs, and CUVs. Even fashion trends can drive fluctuations in consumer model
preferences. While these diverse disturbances at first glance appear disparate, the impact that
they had on the firm’s manufacturing operations was surprisingly consistent. Each forced the
firm to adapt their production mix to changing preferences. In the process, a diverse set of
persistent disturbances was translated into a more predictable persistent manufacturing
implication.
I found that firms built dynamic capabilities specifically to address the predictable
patterns that emerged from these persistent disturbances. Prior theorizing supports this finding
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(Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 2009). In the North American automotive industry, I found
three persistent manufacturing implications: fluctuating consumer demand, fluctuating consumer
model preferences, and profit margin pressures. In my study I drew links among these three
persistent manufacturing implications and three dynamic capabilities: production volume
flexibility, production mix flexibility, and partnering flexibility. I argue that in each case,
automotive firms built dynamic capabilities that helped them respond to the predictability
inherent in these persistent manufacturing implications.
Persistent disturbances, owing to their homogeneity and repetition, attract the attention of
managers and justify deliberate investments in dynamic capabilities. I argue that what drove
firms to develop new dynamic capabilities was not the dynamism of the firm’s environment, but
instead its relative stability. The presence of persistent disturbances draws attention to those
disturbances that are predicted to repeat in the future, and simultaneously justifies the
investments in dynamic capability formation owing to greater certainty that the dynamic
capability will be required in the future. In short, I found that firms built dynamic capabilities
not in preparation for unpredictable futures but, instead, for persistent disturbance that were, and
which continue to be, prevalent in their environments—persistent disturbances that can be
predicted. This leads me to propose the following:
Proposition 2: When responding to persistent disturbances, firms that
build dynamic capabilities develop them so as to adapt to the more
predictable, rather than stochastic, elements of the environmental
dynamism that the firms face.

5.3.2 Coping with Newly Emerging Persistent Disturbances
On occasion, firms are confronted with new disturbances that threaten to become
persistent. My analysis identified two such disturbances during the study period: the first when
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consumer model preferences began fluctuating more substantially in the 1970s, coinciding with
the two oil crises; the second when profit margin pressures intensified as Japanese firms brought
and sustained strong competition at about the same time. These newly emerging persistent
disturbances presented challenging environments to which firms were required to adapt.
My data analysis revealed that firms were poorly prepared for these new disturbances.
The automotive firms redeployed pre-existing capabilities (Zollo and Reuer, 2010), or what
Helfat and Peteraf (2003) would call endowments. In the case of consumer model preference
fluctuations, my study shows that GM, Chrysler, and Ford each redeployed plant conversion and
model changeover capabilities that had been built to enable the firms to adapt to fluctuations in
consumer demand. Firms responded with massive plant conversions to remove large-car
capacity and replace it with small-car capacity. They shut down and reduced the capacity of
large-car plants, and then opened up new (or converted) small-car plants or increased the
capacity of existing small-car plants. At Ford this conversion added 1 million units of small-car
capacity—a conversion that amounted to 40% of Ford’s annual sales. Similarly, as profit margin
pressures threatened to affect sales, firms turned to captive imports and sourcing third-party
components; both of these approaches that firms were already deploying to satisfy the increased
demand for smaller cars due to consumer model preference fluctuations. The above discussion
highlights how the effectiveness of a firm’s dynamic capabilities is contingent on the
environment in which the firm is operating (Helfat et al, 2007). In my study, this contingency
meant that the effectiveness of different dynamic capabilities was contingent upon the specific
persistent disturbance being addressed. A well-developed capability exhibiting strong technical
fitness in response to one type of persistent disturbance may be poorly suited to other persistent
disturbances and may perform ineffectively (Helfat et al, 2007).
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These repurposed dynamic capabilities permitted adaptation, but at great cost. These
dynamic capabilities exhibited poor technical fitness (Helfat et al, 2007). The concept of fitness
addresses the concern that not all dynamic capabilities are created equal (Winter, 2000).
Scholars use the concept of fitness to capture differences between dynamic capabilities of higher
and lower effectiveness. The literature on dynamic capabilities distinguishes between two
different forms of fitness: evolutionary fitness and technical fitness (Helfat et al, 2007).
Evolutionary fitness refers to how well a dynamic capability enables a firm to survive and even
grow in changing environments. It is akin to whether or not firms are performing the right set of
activities (Mie and Teece, 2009). Technical fitness pertains to how effective a dynamic
capability is at performing its intended function (Teece, 2007; Martin, 2011). Dynamic
capabilities with greater technical fitness enable firms to respond to disturbances at less cost
(Helfat et al, 2007).
My data suggested that as new persistent disturbances emerged, firms deployed primitive
dynamic capability endowments that exhibited low technical fitness. They satisficed, deploying
the first capability that provided an acceptable solution to the new challenge (Winter, 2000).
Early periods of ineffectiveness or temporary underperformance are well documented in the
research on dynamic capabilities. Rosenbloom (2000), in his study of NCR Corporation’s efforts
to adapt to the introduction of electronics in the field of business equipment, described how NCR
experienced a painful crisis because NCR’s capabilities were poorly suited to adapt to these
changes. Salvato (2009), in his study of an Italian design firm, similarly identified an initial
period of temporary underperformance when the firm was confronted with new challenges,
followed by a permanent increase in performance. These findings are consistent with the idea
that firms may at first simply cope with new challenges. This reinforces a view of dynamic
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capabilities as emergent and evolving (Rindova and Kotha, 2001; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000;
Danneels, 2008), and initially fragile (Narayanan, Colwell, and Douglas 2009). Dynamic
capabilities are not always built fully formed in advance of a disturbance. Instead, they need to
be developed and enabled (Pablo et al, 2007; Rosenbloom, 2000).
This leads me to formalize my third proposition:
Proposition 3: When responding to newly emerging persistent
disturbances, firms initially deploy existing capability endowments that
have been developed for other persistent disturbances. This response
has low technical fitness.

5.3.3 Dynamic Capability Development Through Layering
Prior to the 1970s, firms in the North American automotive industry possessed a dynamic
capability in manufacturing flexibility that consisted largely of production volume flexibility.
Firms deployed this dynamic capability to adjust production volumes in different ways, such as
by opening and closing plants, changing line speeds, adding or removing shifts, and adjusting
overtime. Initially, production volume flexibility was the extent of the North American firms’
dynamic capability in manufacturing flexibility.
However, beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, the environment facing North American
automotive firms became increasingly complex. Environments are complex when they comprise
multiple heterogeneous contingencies that need to be addressed (Davis, Eisenhardt, and
Bingham, 2009; Dess and Beard, 1984). Complexity manifested in my study as multiple
concurrent persistent disturbances confronting the automotive firms. In addition to facing
significant fluctuations in consumer demand, the automotive firms faced new disturbances:
fluctuations in consumer model preferences and profit margin pressures.
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As discussed above, firms initially coped with these new disturbances. However, as these
disturbances persisted, firms responded to this complexity by building new layers of dynamic
capabilities. Initial coping gave way to deliberate investments in improving the technical fitness
of the dynamic capabilities that the automotive firms were deploying (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003;
Keil, McGrath, and Tukiainen, 2009; Arikan and McGahan, 2010). I refer to this process as
layering because at the core of each new dynamic capability was the set of initial capabilities that
the firms had deployed in coping with the new disturbance. These existing capabilities served as
the core around which new dynamic capabilities were elaborated. In the case of production mix
flexibility, this core set of capabilities consisted of plant conversion capabilities, upon which
layers of platform-sharing and facility-sharing capabilities were added. Similarly, a dynamic
capability in partnering flexibility grew out of early captive importing and from sourcing partner
manufactured components. The new dynamic capabilities were layered on top of existing
capabilities, accumulating over time (Dosi, Nelson, and Winter, 2000). Thus the process of
layering builds from a base capability, adding new layers to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the firm’s dynamic capabilities (Rindova and Kotha, 2001; Lampel and Shamsie,
2003). Figure 29 depicts this process of dynamic capability layering.
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Figure 29 Dynamic Capability Layering

The foregoing discussions lead to my fourth proposition:
Proposition 4a: When responding to newly emerging persistent
disturbances in increasingly complex environments, firms that build
dynamic capabilities develop their dynamic capabilities through a
process of dynamic capability layering.

5.3.4 Dynamic Capability Development: Nested Layering
In addition to layering that occurred at the level of dynamic capabilities, I found that this
layering process nested, extending down to the capabilities that comprised dynamic capabilities.
For example, a capability in platform sharing began as a comparatively simple capability
permitting firms to share vehicle platforms across different brands. This capability enabled firms
to share innovative technology, such as front-wheel drive or smaller-car designs, more broadly
across the firm’s product line-up. Over time this capability evolved further to also enable firms
to share similar vehicles that were customized to different geographies through Ford and GM’s
global car programs, and then to share platforms across disparate vehicle classes, such as
Chevrolet’s versatile Lumina platform that supported both a sedan and a van. Subsequent
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refinements extended the platform-sharing capability beyond organizational boundaries to
incorporate partner firms. Ford and Mazda offer an excellent example of a platform-sharing
partnership. Similar patterns of capability refinement occurred in facility sharing, integrating
third-party components, and leveraging partner capacity capabilities. Refining existing
capabilities, as opposed to acquiring new capabilities, permits firms to build on their strengths
and have been found to provide greater payoffs with lower investments (Helfat et al, 2007;
Lavie, 2006; Shamsie, Martin, and Miller, 2009).
In my context, what motivated this layering at the levels of both dynamic capabilities and
the capabilities they comprised was the nature of the environmental dynamism firms were facing.
Persistent disturbances repeated, exposing firms time and again to disturbances that had similar
impacts. The effects of this exposure were three-fold. First, the continued repetition of
persistent disturbances provided firms with ongoing opportunities to improve their ability to
respond. Repetition has been shown to be an effective learning mechanism (Eisenhardt and
Martin, 2000), and dynamic capabilities have been conceptualized as learned capabilities (Teece,
Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). Firms get more proficient when dynamic capabilities are used more
frequently.
Second, persistence disturbances justified continued investment in dynamic capability
development. Each time firms were exposed to the persistent disturbance they had another
opportunity to improve the performance of their response. Managers thus more readily
recognized and could more easily justify the need to build and refine dynamic capabilities to
respond to persistent disturbances.
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Third, the persistent disturbance reduced ambiguity by enhancing what the firm knew
about the persistent disturbance. Disturbances to which firms have not been exposed are more
ambiguous because firms have a poor understanding of the disturbance. Firms confronting a
one-time environmental shift are unlikely to have developed a sophisticated understanding of this
new disturbance. Similarly, firms facing ongoing change are continuously being presented with
disturbances, but the disturbances are different and thus affect the firm in a myriad of new and
different ways. In contrast, persistent disturbances repeat relatively homogeneously over time
and thus with each repetition firms are able to improve their understanding of the persistent
disturbance. Understanding the disturbance a firm is facing is critical to developing an effective
response (Zollo and Winter, 2002).
This is consistent with current theorizing regarding how firms both accumulate new
capabilities and deliberately improve their existing capabilities. Zollo and Winter (2002) argue
that firms learn what does and does not work by trial and error, and that these firms may then
deliberately articulate and codify that knowledge to improve their ability to adapt. High levels of
complementary knowledge can positively moderate this effect (Helfat, 1997), and this is
consistent with descriptions of dynamic capability development as path dependent (Teece,
Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Vergne and Durand, 2011). In this way, dynamic capability
development displays a tendency towards continuous improvement, always striving for better fit.
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This leads me to state my final proposition:
Proposition 4b: When responding to persistent disturbances, firms that
develop dynamic capabilities do so by building new capabilities and
refine existing capabilities, which increase the technical fitness of
firms’ dynamic capabilities over time. The resulting dynamic
capabilities develop in a path-dependent manner along a trajectory that
is reinforced by persistent disturbances.
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Chapter 6 – Discussion
6.0 Discussion
6.1 Overview
In this study I sought to understand how firms developed dynamic capabilities in
dynamic environments that were characterized by persistent disturbances such as government
regulations, energy crises, labour disruptions, economic cycles, and competitive pressures. I
focused my analysis on the manufacturing flexibility of the North American automotive firms I
was studying. I identified and further analyzed the dynamic capabilities that these firms were
building in response to persistent disturbances.
To do this, I adopted a longitudinal, inductive case-based approach to studying the North
American automotive industry between 1965 and 2010. I focused on three key firms: GM, Ford,
and Chrysler. I built a qualitative archival dataset primarily from industry and firm analyses
found in Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks and the letters to shareholders in firms’ annual reports.
I complemented this dataset with firm-specific financial information from Compustat and
industry data from a variety of sources. I analyzed these data first by identifying the
disturbances that were salient to the firms under study, and subsequently by examining the
responses that the firms had to these salient disturbances. My analysis was designed so as to
better understand the patterns of disturbances and responses occurring in the North American
automotive industry over my 45-year study period.
In this section, I discuss the theory that I presented above, positioning it firmly within the
dynamic capability and strategic management literatures. My discussion proceeds in two
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sections. The first pertains to how dynamic capabilities develop over time. To begin this
discussion, I pay particular attention to dynamic capability architecture. I show how the
architecture that I found offers insights regarding how dynamic capabilities develop. In the
second section, I offer insights into the role played by different configurations of environmental
dynamism in the formation and development of dynamic capabilities. I discuss differences in the
dynamic capabilities firms build in environments characterized by ongoing environmental
change, environmental shifts, and persistent disturbances.

6.2 Dynamic Capability Development
I begin by discussing the importance of dynamic capability architecture (Jacobides,
2006). My research casts new light on what the architecture of dynamic capabilities looks like,
particularly in the context of persistent disturbances. In turn, I use this capability architecture to
offer insights into how dynamic capabilities develop over time.

6.2.1 Dynamic Capability Architecture
Capability architecture pertains to how different capabilities relate to one another
(Makadok, 2001; Jacobides, 2006). Prior research into dynamic capabilities has addressed
capability architecture in a variety of ways. Most common is the expression of dynamic
capabilities as comprising part of a hierarchy of capabilities, distinguishing between dynamic
and ordinary capabilities. Figure 30 highlights how dynamic capabilities are higher-order
capabilities, the purpose of which is to modify underlying resources and lower-order ordinary
capabilities (Danneels, 2008; Collis, 1994; Winter, 2000; Salvato and Rerup, 2009; Helfat et al,
2007). In my study, the firms’ ordinary capabilities were their abilities to manufacture particular

114

products, such as a model of a car (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003), while dynamic capabilities referred
to manufacturing flexibility (Malik and Kotabe, 2009).
Figure 30 A Hierarchy of Dynamic Capabilities

While there is broad agreement on this hierarchy and where dynamic capabilities fit with
respect to ordinary capabilities, the architecture of dynamic capabilities themselves has been
discussed with less consistency and in less detail (Salvato and Rerup, 2009). Some work has
attempted to address this gap. In their seminal article on dynamic capabilities, Teece, Pisano,
and Shuen (1997) discussed how dynamic capabilities comprise coordination, learning, and
reconfiguration routines. More recent research has refined this, arguing that three generic
capabilities—seizing, sensing, and transforming—underpin dynamic capabilities (Teece, 2007).
Despite this, research into dynamic capability architecture remains nascent.
My research highlights the importance of considering how dynamic capability
architectures comprise capabilities. These capabilities largely comprised the building blocks of a
dynamic capability offering a greater variety of ways in which to respond to disturbances that the
firm faced. However, these capabilities do not necessarily engage in change to underlying
resources and capabilities. Instead, these capabilities often enable a firm’s dynamic capabilities
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to change underlying ordinary capabilities faster and at less cost. Two examples include
platform sharing and facility sharing which both made shifting production among different
vehicle models much faster and less costly.
Prior research has hinted at the capabilities that comprise dynamic capabilities but has
offered little empirical elaboration. Helfat and Winter (2011) very briefly discuss the concept of
dual purpose capabilities—capabilities that serve both ordinary and dynamic purposes. These
dual purpose capabilities are described as those that “make change possible” (Helfat and Winter,
2011: 1248). However that research stream is at an early stage. Dual purpose capabilities are
mentioned at the conclusion of a more expansive article on dynamic capabilities, and few
empirical details are offered. Other research in this regard explores the microfoundations of
dynamic capabilities. Microfoundations are defined as those “skills, processes, procedures,
organizational structures, decision rules and disciplines…which undergird” sensing, seizing, and
reconfiguring (Teece, 2007: 1319). These microfoundations include governance, research and
development, and building loyalty and commitment, and they are theorized to span all dynamic
capabilities across different contexts.
However, whereas the concept of microfoundations as put forth by Teece is independent
of context, my findings strongly emphasize the importance of context. Prior research is split in
this regard, with some research encouraging the study of very general dynamic capabilities
(Teece, 2007; Marcus and Anderson, 2006) and other research stressing the difficulties with
separating dynamic capabilities from their context (Ethiraj et al, 2005; Winter, 2000). This latter
camp argues that dynamic capabilities have very specific purposes and support very specific
activities, such as acquisitions, alliances, and new product development (Helfat and Winter,
2011). The arguments for context cast some doubt on whether it is even possible to identify a
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common set of microfoundations that undergird all dynamic capabilities. My own research
pertained to a focused set of dynamic capabilities in manufacturing flexibility.
One consequence of the search for a common underpinning of dynamic capabilities may
have been a homogenization of how dynamic capabilities are viewed. Salvato (2009) has
lamented that capabilities are often discussed as though they are homogeneous across firms and
time. A case in point comes from well-cited research by Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), who
argue that dynamic capabilities are akin to best practices and possessed by many firms. Picking
up on this discussion, my research shows how dynamic capabilities that seem very similar can in
fact be very different. These differences are revealed by their capability architecture and the
different capabilities each dynamic capability possesses. Two firms possessing dynamic
capabilities that appear similar but that possess different capability architectures respond to
disturbances in heterogeneous ways. For example, my study highlights how automotive firms
responded to similar disturbances in different ways at different points in time throughout my
study period. In the 1970s the automotive firms shifted their production mix by converting big
plants to small plants, completely retooling facilities (plant conversion). Flash forward 20 years
and these same firms responded to consumer model preference fluctuations by adjusting
manufacturing schedules in flexible manufacturing facilities (facility sharing, platform sharing).
Similarly, at different points in time the firms’ manufacturing flexibility included production
volume flexibility, production mix flexibility, and then partnering flexibility. Each of these
modified the firms’ same underlying manufacturing capability, but in different ways. They
modified, respectively, how much product was produced, what product was produced, and with
which partners. In short, I found that similar dynamic capabilities adapted lower-order ordinary
capabilities in different ways. My research stresses the layered nature of dynamic capabilities,
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offering a new granularity with which to understand differences in dynamic capabilities among
firms and over time.
These differences in dynamic capability architecture can help to explain differential
abilities in similar dynamic capabilities. For instance, firms may have a strong dynamic
capability in partnering flexibility but possess weak production volume or production mix
flexibility. Further, firms may have strong platform sharing capabilities but inferior facility
sharing capabilities, each of which can influence how well a firm responds to consumer model
preference fluctuations. Deeper still, firms may have mastered how to share platforms across
similar vehicles sold under different brands within the same firm, but not yet figured out how to
share platforms across very disparate vehicles or partner firms, a gap that would negatively effect
the technical fitness of the firm’s production mix flexibility.
In short, not all firms exhibit manufacturing flexibility in the same way or at the same
point in time. Malik and Kotabe (2009) illustrate this point, identifying how in an emerging
market context, handling fluctuating consumer demand and reducing process inventories were
challenges of critical importance while other challenges, such as handling consumer model
preference fluctuations, were less critical. By conceptualizing dynamic capabilities at finergrained levels of analysis, scholars will be in a better position to more clearly understand the
dynamic capabilities that firms possess. McKelvie and Davidsson (2009) have suggested that the
difficulty in identifying supportable hypotheses (a concern also shared by Leiblein, 2011) may be
due in part to pursuing an understanding of dynamic capabilities that is too general. My research
suggests that scholars should dig more deeply into the architecture of dynamic capabilities,
attempting to achieve greater understanding through a more detailed view of the nature of a
firm’s dynamic capability.
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6.2.2 Changing Dynamic Capabilities
In the analysis chapter above, I built theory pertaining to how dynamic capabilities
developed over time. I argued that dynamic capability development began with firms coping in
response to newly emerging persistent disturbances by redeploying dynamic capabilities that
were designed and better suited for addressing other persistent disturbances (Proposition 3).
Subsequently, while developing dynamic capabilities, firms responded to the predictable aspects
of persistent disturbances in their dynamic environment (Proposition 1). Over time firms built
additional capabilities that improved the technical fitness of the dynamic capability by making it
increasingly better suited to addressing a particular persistent disturbance (Proposition 4a and
4b). In what follows, I place this theorizing within the context of prior research on dynamic
capability development. I draw on the above discussion pertaining to dynamic capability
architecture to do so.
Dynamic Capability Development: Initial Development
A debate in the dynamic capabilities literature centers on whether dynamic capabilities
are developed in anticipation of future environmental dynamism and then deployed, or
developed in parallel as environmental dynamism unfolds. Early definitions of dynamic
capabilities seemed to suggest the former. Dynamic capabilities “address rapidly changing
environments” (Teece et al, 1997: 516) and permit firms to “match…market change” (Eisenhardt
and Martin, 2000: 1107). However, more recent research has found that dynamic capabilities
develop substantially when firms encounter change in the nature of environmental dynamism
facing the firm (Danneels, 2010; Helfat, 1997). For instance, a study of firms that had recently
undergone initial public offerings found that capabilities for conducting acquisition and alliance
deals crystallized quickly, but then evolved substantially over time (Arikan and McGahan,
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2010). Promising research into the origins of dynamic capabilities has found that dynamic
capabilities may at first be latent, requiring strong development from managers who identify and
subsequently develop them (Pablo et al, 2007; Rosenbloom, 2000).
My research lends support to the argument that dynamic capabilities are built in parallel
as the environmental dynamism unfolds. More specifically, I found that initially firms coped
with new environmental dynamism. That is, they responded to the new environmental
dynamism but in a technically inefficient manner. This finding is similar to prior research that
found that as dynamic capabilities developed, firms experienced an initial period of poor
performance (Rosenbloom, 2000; Salvato, 2009). My research builds on this by showing that
firms initially underperform because they redeploy existing capabilities that were developed for
different environmental dynamism. The strongest illustration from my study was the dramatic
plant conversions in which the automotive firms engaged. Ford converted 40% of their
production capacity from large to small cars. Similarly inefficient was the North American
automotive firms’ reliance on captive imports from Japanese partners. This reliance led North
American firms to give up much of their autonomy and control over their small-car programs.
Both examples illustrate how firms did not necessarily deploy poor capabilities to address new
environmental dynamism, but rather inappropriate capabilities.
In related research, scholars have found that firms are often required to maintain multiple
capabilities simultaneously as environments change (Gilbert, 2006). In environments
characterized by environmental shifts or ongoing change, this is because firms need to operate in
both the existing environment and the changed or changing environment. The firm requires a
capability for each environment. When the change to a new environment is complete, the firm
can presumably shed the prior capabilities. For instance, Daneels (2008) studied how Smith
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Corona responded to a shift from mechanical to electric typewriters. As this shift progressed,
capabilities in designing, manufacturing, selling, and servicing mechanical typewriters became
less and less important. However, in an environment characterized by persistent disturbances, I
found that firms maintained multiple capabilities over longer periods of time. This is because
persistent disturbances persist and thus firms respond to these disturbances by redeploying
familiar dynamic capabilities at a later point in time.
A key insight from my research is that, in an environment characterized by persistent
disturbances, a firm’s dynamic capability architecture reflects the past responses the firm took in
response to the persistent disturbances they faced. It follows then that firms that have been
exposed to different persistent disturbances, or which have experienced persistent disturbances in
different ways, are likely to develop different dynamic capabilities and thus have built
capabilities that permit the firm to adapt their underlying ordinary capabilities in different ways.
This finding reinforces research that has suggested that a firm’s ordinary capabilities are
developed through different strategies—in short that dynamic capabilities develop their
capabilities in nonlinear ways (Shamsie, Martin, and Miller, 2009). This result can explain
differences between firms that each possesses some variant of a dynamic capability; such as the
different manufacturing flexibility dynamic capabilities the automotive firms possessed over the
study period. This insight may help to explain differences in technical fitness among similar
dynamic capabilities by providing the language, dynamic capability architecture, with which to
understand these idiosyncratic differences.
Dynamic Capability Development: Change
The literature on dynamic capabilities suggests that dynamic capabilities are changed by
other dynamic capabilities (Helfat et al, 2007). Just as dynamic capabilities act on ordinary
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capabilities, higher-order dynamic capabilities (2nd, 3rd, 4th, and so on) modify lower-order
dynamic capabilities (Collis, 1994). These higher-order capabilities are such that they allow
firms to overcome the path dependence that led to the rigidity of lower-order capabilities. While
simple in concept, this approach suffers from the problem of infinite regress because firms are
required to have an infinite number of higher-order dynamic capabilities (Collis, 1994). This can
quickly become intractable.
My study offers an alternative perspective on how dynamic capabilities are changed,
articulating how dynamic capabilities are developed through a process of layering at both the
level of dynamic capabilities, and the capabilities that comprise them. I found that a firm’s
manufacturing flexibility comprised layers of dynamic capabilities (production volume
flexibility, production mix flexibility, and partnering flexibility). In turn, I found that each of
these dynamic capabilities was supported by layers of capabilities. I argue that change to a
dynamic capability was accomplished not by higher-order capabilities or managerial oversight,
but as firms respond to persistent disturbances by building new or developing existing
capabilities.
This process shares some similarities with the concept of resilience capacity. LengnickHall and Beck (2005) coined the term resilience capacity to refer to a firm’s ability to choose
appropriate responses from a collection of possible responses that the firm already possesses.
Similarly, Capron and Mitchell (2009) highlighted the importance of the firm’s ability to
appropriately select between internal and external sourcing in the development of new
capabilities. I found that a firm’s portfolio of layered dynamic capability functioned in a similar
manner, providing a memory of past responses from which firms can select when responding to
persistent disturbances.
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The layering process that I found helps to reconcile conflicting research on changing
dynamic capabilities. On the one hand, scholars question the very nature of dynamic
capabilities. Schreyogg and Kliesch-Eberl (2007) argue that since capabilities are highly
practised and purposeful, it does not make sense that they should be dynamically changeable.
Even dynamic capabilities scholars acknowledge that when environments are changing too
much, dynamic capabilities can become fragile and improvisational (Eisenhardt and Martin,
2000). Similarly, Rindova and Kotha (2001) have described dynamic capabilities as emergent
and evolving (Rindova and Kotha, 2001). It is a classic debate pertaining to the plasticity of
organizations—how much of the organization is predetermined and how much is changeable
(Levinthal and Marino, 2011)?
The process of layering, and the resulting dynamic capability architecture, demonstrates
how dynamic capabilities can both be practised and purposeful while simultaneously being
emergent and evolving. This is because dynamic capabilities consist of a relatively stable core,
and are developed by adding new capabilities which elaborate the existing dynamic capability.
For example, in my study, production mix flexibility began as a rudimentary dynamic capability
in plant conversion and developed over time into a sophisticated dynamic capability that
involved plant and facility sharing. Similarly, partnering flexibility began with outsourcing
arrangements, whereby firms purchased parts and entire vehicles from their Japanese partners.
This developed into much more sophisticated dynamic capabilities in sharing technologies and
facilities. Thus, the dynamic capability architecture and layering process illustrate how the
dynamic capability changed, often quite dramatically, but did so by modifying a relatively stable
core.
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6.3 Environmental Dynamism and Dynamic Capabilities
While environmental dynamism is central to dynamic capabilities, the dynamic
capabilities literature has overemphasized a firm’s internal abilities, at the expense of the
external environment (Vergne and Durand, 2011). A dynamic environment is always present
when studying dynamic capabilities, yet it is rarely formally incorporated into dynamic
capability theory. When environmental dynamism is modeled, the focus has been on individual
dimensions of environmental dynamism such as velocity or degree (Eisenhardt and Martin,
2000; Rindova and Kotha, 2001; Drnevich and Kriauciunas, 2011). Not surprisingly, research
studying the impact of these dimensions of environmental dynamism has found significant
effects. Dynamic capabilities are less effective than ordinary capabilities in stable settings
(Drnevich and Kriauciunas, 2011), but increase in value and effectiveness when the degree of
environmental dynamism increases.
My research extends the study of the impact of environmental dynamism on dynamic
capabilities from its current focus on dimensions to incorporate configurations of environmental
dynamism. By configurations I am referring to patterns of environmental dynamism. Two
common configurations include environmental shifts and ongoing environmental change, each of
which has attracted significant research attention in the field of strategic management (Tushman
and Anderson, 1986; D’Aveni, 1994). Dynamic capabilities have been studied in both contexts:
environmental shifts (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009; Anand, Oriani, and Vassolo, 2010; Danneels,
2008; Gilbert, 2006; Danneels, 2010) and ongoing environmental change (Capron and Mitchell,
2009; Drenevich and Kriauciunas, 2011; Lee et al, 2010). A third configuration that I call
persistent disturbances has been defined in this study. Unlike environmental shifts and ongoing
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environmental change, persistent disturbances depict an environment that, while dynamic and
challenging, presents firms with similar challenges repetitively.
Dynamic capability theory has not formally incorporated the role of configurations of
environmental dynamism. Instead, configurations of environmental dynamism have remained
research contexts. This presents a difficulty. Scholars may be inappropriately generalizing
research that applies in a context characterized by one configuration of environmental
dynamism, to a context characterized by another configuration of environmental dynamism.
Prior research lends credence to this concern. For instance, King and Tucci (2002) argue that in
environments of rapid change, firms are unlikely to engage in dramatic transformation as such
transformation is likely to take too long. Conversely, in Danneels (2008) study of the shift
between mechanical and electronic business equipment, a dramatic transformation at Smith
Corona was required. Thus, it follows that firms responding to different configurations of
environmental dynamism would build very different dynamic capabilities. I argue that dynamic
capabilities research needs to explicitly incorporate the impact of different configurations of
environmental dynamism on the characteristics of dynamic capabilities themselves.
In what follows I discuss this theoretical gap, pulling from both my study and prior
literature to distinguish from one another, dynamic capabilities built under different
configurations of environmental dynamism. I discuss the implications in terms of the nature of
the dynamic capabilities developed, the origination of dynamic capabilities, the development of
dynamic capabilities, and the deployment of dynamic capabilities. I also offer some suggestions
on appropriate research methods with which to study dynamic capabilities in each configuration
of environment dynamism. Table 11 highlights these insights and the following paragraphs
expand on them in more detail.
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Table 11 Configurations of Environmental Dynamism and Dynamic Capabilities
Dynamic
Capability
Characteristics
Nature

Origination

Development
Deployment
Literature
Tradition
Research Method

Environmental Shift

Ongoing Environmental
Change

Persistent Disturbances

Sensing oriented –
identify future
possibilities and act
quickly to prepare and
respond;
vertical capability
architecture
Originated well in
advance of
environmental shift;
anticipation of
unknowns

Highly routinized change
processes that
continuously evolve the
firm’s underlying dynamic
and ordinary capabilities;
vertical capability
architecture
Originated in advance of or
in conjunction with
emergence of dynamic
environment; anticipation
of unknowns

Developed in
anticipation of future
challenges
Deployed through a
combination of sensing
and adaptation
Resource-based view;
disruptive technologies
Case based –
interviews;
retrospective

Development is ongoing,
modified by higher-order
capabilities
Deployed continuously as
processes of ongoing
adjustment
Routines; learning

Highly specific, targeted,
and multi-layered
collection of capabilities
that firms deploy during
disturbances;
horizontal capability
architecture
Originated when
disturbance becomes
persistent; dealing with
knowns; initial
development involves
period of expensive
coping
Development occurs as
disturbances are
repeated
Firms select appropriate
capabilities to deploy for
given disturbance
Jolts

Case based – ethnographic,
interviews; real-time

Case-based – archival;
retrospective and realtime

6.3.1 Nature of Dynamic Capabilities
Prior research has argued that the nature of dynamic capabilities differs based on
different dimensions of environmental dynamism, such as velocity, that the firm is facing.
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000: 1105) theorize that in highly dynamic environments, dynamic
capabilities take the form of “simple, highly experiential and fragile processes with unpredictable
outcomes,” while in moderately dynamic environments they are stable and predictable processes.
Similarly, Lavie (2006) argues that under conditions of high uncertainty, akin to unpredictability,
dynamic capabilities are evolutionary in nature such that they modify capabilities incrementally.
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In this paper I argue that different configurations of environmental dynamism play an
important role in shaping the nature of dynamic capabilities. Above, my study highlights how
dynamic capabilities built in response to persistent disturbances comprised a layered capability
architecture. Each dynamic capability in that architecture in turn comprised a set of capabilities.
This nested architecture was built as firms responded to the persistent disturbances in their
environment. The resulting dynamic capabilities permitted firms to adapt to multiple, concurrent
persistent disturbances that each affected firms in different ways. In contrast, dynamic
capabilities associated with environmental shifts emphasize the important role of sensing (Mie
and Teece, 2009) or environmental scanning (Danneels, 2008) to identify and prepare for future
possibilities. Once an environmental shift occurs, firms activate latent dynamic capabilities to
respond quickly (Danneels, 2010; Teece, 2007). Dynamic capabilities built in the context of
ongoing environmental change take the form of highly routinized processes that continuously
evolve a firm’s underlying ordinary capabilities (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Zollo and
Winter, 2002). These dynamic capabilities are routines that modify routines (Winter, 2003;
Collis, 1994).

6.3.2 Origination of Dynamic Capabilities
I argue that different configurations of environmental dynamism influence how dynamic
capabilities originate. Environments that are characterized by persistent disturbances provide
continuity and relative stability that facilitate dynamic capability origination. I argue that in
these environments, firms build new dynamic capabilities in response to those facets of the
underlying environment that become predictable due to repetition. Thus, the origination of
dynamic capabilities in response to persistent disturbances is more about responding to
disturbances that have become stable and commonplace, than to change and dynamism
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(Levinthal and Marino, 2010). In contrast, dynamic capabilities built in response to either
environmental shifts or ongoing environmental change pertains to preparing for the unknown.
With respect to environmental shifts, firms originate dynamic capabilities well in advance of,
and in anticipation of environmental shifts. Similarly, in contexts of ongoing environmental
change, firms build dynamic capabilities so as to keep pace and stay ahead of environmental
dynamism, building and then deploying dynamic capabilities “faster and more fortuitously” than
competitors (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).
One implication of this focus on unknowns which is associated with environmental shifts
and ongoing environmental change, is that this research has been less concerned with the early
development of dynamic capabilities. Most literature on dynamic capabilities has emphasized
how firms build dynamic capabilities that are fully formed and effective at responding to the
shifts and the ongoing environmental change that the firms may face. In contrast, my study
captures this early dynamic capability development period, highlighting how nascent dynamic
capabilities initially struggle and perform poorly. Nascent dynamic capabilities exhibit poor
technical fitness, permitting firms to cope with dynamic environments but in inefficient ways.
The two oil crises of the 1970s and early 1980s illustrate this well. In responding to these crises,
firms reacted strongly by converting, slowly and at great expense, automotive capacity geared to
producing big cars to small-car capacity. Lacking well-developed dynamic capabilities which
would have offered more sophisticated responses, the firms spent large sums of money and a
great deal of time coping with the challenge of the oil crises. This coping is similar to the
responses described by other scholars. Periods of coping were identified in studies of how NCR
laboriously and painfully restructured and reorganized over decades as the industry moved from
mechanical to electronic cash registers (Rosenbloom, 2000), how Smith Corona engaged in
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extensive efforts over 20 years to adjust resources before ultimately failing in 2001 (Danneels,
2010), and how firms experiment before finding appropriate investments (Ahuja and Katila,
2004).
Further, considering how configurations of environmental dynamism influence the
origination of dynamic capabilities makes explicit how dynamic environments motivate dynamic
capability development. Prior research has argued that environmental dynamism motivates the
development of dynamic capabilities (Wang and Ahmed, 2007; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) or
that dynamic capabilities are more effective in dynamic environments (Drnevich and
Kriauciunas, 2011). However scholars have had difficulty articulating why or how. Drawing
distinctions among these different configurations of environmental dynamism takes a step
towards more explicit attention to the role of environmental dynamism in dynamic capability
origination. My results suggest that dynamic capabilities built in anticipation of environmental
shifts and ongoing environmental change follow a development pattern akin to path-deepening
(Ahuja and Katila, 2004), characterized by inertia and momentum of capability development
(Helfat, 1997; Miller and Friesen, 1980). In contrast, dynamic capabilities developed in response
to persistent disturbances involve significant new path creation (Ahuja and Katila, 2004), as
firms build new capabilities and even expand the family of dynamic capabilities in response to
dynamic environments.

6.3.3 Development of Dynamic Capabilities
I argue that how dynamic capabilities are developed, is influenced by the configuration of
environmental dynamism in which the firm is operating. In contexts characterized by persistent
disturbances, dynamic capabilities are developed as repeated disturbances drive firms to respond
in an increasingly efficiently manner to disturbances that remain persistent. For example, in my
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study firms built increasingly efficient dynamic capabilities in changing the mix of products they
produced. The dynamic capability developed as the firms layered on increasingly sophisticated
capabilities in platform sharing and facility sharing.
In contrast, dynamic capabilities built in the context of environmental shifts are
developed in advance of and in anticipation of future challenges. These capabilities tend to
emphasize sensing capabilities that permit firms to identify shifts before or while they are
occurring (Teece, 2007). One difficulty is that in these contexts it is difficult to anticipate how
effective a dynamic capability will be to an unknown and uncertain future environmental shift.
If a firm is developing a dynamic capability to address an unknown environmental shift, it is
difficult to know how effective a dynamic capability will be, until that occurs. Finally, dynamic
capabilities in the context of ongoing environmental change develop as higher-order dynamic
capabilities modify lower-order dynamic capabilities (Winter, 2003; Collis, 1994). This form of
change can be considered more routinized, and change can be considered to be occurring
continuously across the multiple levels of the dynamic capability hierarchy.

6.3.4 Deployment of Dynamic Capabilities
Firms also deploy dynamic capabilities differently for given configurations of
environmental dynamism. In the case of persistent disturbances, firms in my study responded to
disturbances by selecting appropriate dynamic capabilities from their dynamic capability
architecture; dynamic capabilities which had been built in response to past disturbances. I found
that firms continued to deploy dynamic capabilities that were built decades earlier. In contrast,
dynamic capabilities built in environments of ongoing environmental change continuously
deployed their dynamic capabilities across multiple levels of the capability hierarchy (Collis,
1994; Winter, 2003). Finally, dynamic capabilities built in anticipation of environmental shifts
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were deployed through a combination of sensing an environmental shift and responding to that
shift.

6.3.5 Research Approaches for Dynamic Capabilities
Finally, different configurations of environmental dynamism have a bearing on the
methodological approaches and empirical measurements that scholars use to study different
dynamic capabilities. When studying persistent disturbances, scholars should focus on archival
data incorporating interviews for context and interpretation. Studying persistent disturbances
mandates a longitudinal perspective encompassing many years. However, when studying
environmental shifts, researchers may wish instead to focus on the managerial cognition
processes associated with sensing and interpreting environmental shifts. The use of interviews
and ethnographies to build contemporary case studies is highly suitable. While identifying
organizations in the middle of an environmental shift would be ideal (see Meyer’s 1982 study of
jolts as an example of a study taking advantage of a unique opportunity in the environment),
practically these studies would be designed as retrospective accounts of organizations that have
successfully, and preferably recently, navigated dynamic capabilities in the context of an
environmental shift. Finally, in studying dynamic capabilities built in response to ongoing
environmental change, scholars could employ detailed surveys, interviews, or even diaries to
capture and interpret change processes in real-time.

131

Chapter 7 – Conclusion
7.0 Conclusion
7.1 Summary of Contributions
My research offers four contributions to the study of strategic management and, in
particular, to dynamic capabilities. First, it offers a stronger understanding of the role that
configurations of environmental dynamism play in the development of dynamic capabilities.
While prior research most commonly conceptualizes environmental dynamism in terms of
different dimensions, such as velocity, my research focuses on configurations of environmental
dynamism. I examine an important but understudied configuration of environmental dynamism
that I call persistent disturbances, defined as repeated temporary events confronting firms. I
argue that persistent disturbances are an important but understudied configuration of
environmental dynamism.
My research also highlights how dynamic capabilities develop differently in the presence
of different configurations of environmental dynamism. This finding highlights an important
recursive relationship between a firm’s dynamic capabilities and its environment. In this study I
found that, while dynamic capabilities were built in response to dynamic environments, the
nature of the dynamic environment in which a firm operated played a significant role by
influencing the nature, origination, development, and deployment of the dynamic capabilities
that the firm developed.
Second, my research contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the architecture of
dynamic capabilities. By examining in detail firm’s manufacturing flexibility related dynamic
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capabilities that developed over 45 years, I discerned that the dynamic capability architecture of
these firms manufacturing flexibility comprised a family of dynamic capabilities which in turn
comprised layers of capabilities that changed over time. I found that this family of dynamic
capabilities, comprising production volume flexibility, production mix flexibility, and partnering
flexibility, was built over time in response to specific persistent disturbances from the firm’s
environment. These dynamic capabilities in turn comprised capabilities which made adapting a
firm’s underlying ordinary capabilities more effective by increasing speed, reducing costs, and
providing a range of alternatives. This highly layered dynamic capability architecture serves a
critical function in explaining how dynamic capabilities that seem similar can behave differently.
Third, building on my insights into dynamic capability architecture and the longitudinal
nature of my data and analysis, my research sheds light on how dynamic capabilities develop
over time. I found that in environments characterized by persistent disturbances, instead of
building dynamic capabilities in response to uncertainties and unknowns, firms built dynamic
capabilities over time in response to repeated and predictable disturbances. A firm develops its
dynamic capabilities by building entirely new dynamic capability layers or by adding or
modifying capabilities that support the firm’s dynamic capability. Development proceeds from
early periods of coping, as firms struggle with dynamic capabilities that have poor technical
fitness with respect to the type of change required, to periods in which the dynamic capabilities
exhibit high technical fitness and are well adapted to the demands of the persistent disturbances.
Finally, my research offers a methodological contribution as well. Critics of the dynamic
capability literature have expressed concern that dynamic capabilities cannot be observed or
measured and most work on dynamic capability stops short of showing dynamic capabilities in
much detail (Pavlou and El Sawy, 2011). My approach which sought to understand different,
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albeit related, responses to persistent disturbances facing them firm could be duplicated in other
settings and with other dynamic capabilities to delve into the underlying architecture of a
dynamic capability and understand that dynamic capability in greater detail.

7.2

Implications for Managers and Policy Makers
My research has implications for managers and policy makers. The first implication is

that managers should strive to understand the configuration(s) of environmental dynamism they
are facing in their environments. Some industries or environmental contexts are associated with
particular configurations of environmental dynamism. For instance, the semi-conductor industry
due to its rapidly changing technology is often held up as hypercompetitive and fast paced and
resembles ongoing environmental change. Dynamism in other environments may resemble
environmental shifts, such as industries that are strongly dependent upon technological or
regulatory regimes which are subject to dramatic change as new technologies or governments
sweep into use or power. Still other environments are characterized by persistent disturbances,
like the North American automotive industry. Since, as I argue above, the dynamic capabilities
firms build in response to each configuration of environmental dynamism differ, a strong
understanding of these configurations of environmental dynamism can help firms build the
dynamic capabilities that are most appropriate for their environments. Further, my study
highlights to managers that they may be required to address very different configurations of
environmental dynamism concurrently. It is not simply a matter of building faster or more
efficient dynamic capabilities, but rather dynamic capabilities of different types.
Second, my research highlights the layered architecture associated with dynamic
capabilities. At the core of this discussion on architecture is the insight that even dynamic
capabilities that appear very similar, can provide very different abilities to change and adapt. For
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instance, prior to the 1970s, an automotive firm’s dynamic capability in manufacturing flexibility
rested in the firm’s ability to adjust the production volume—altering sources of production and
adjusting how the capacity of plants and facility was utilized. Over time, however, firms layered
on additional dynamic capabilities that helped the firm exhibit new forms of manufacturing
flexibility that included the ability to flexibly adjust its production mix and to work in new and
creative ways with partners to lower costs. For managers this means that dynamic capabilities
that appear similar, come in many different shades. Managers must understand what
disturbances the firm is prepared to respond to, and be aware of those the firm will have greater
difficulty with. A contemporary example is the recent difficulties that the Japanese automotive
firms Toyota and Honda have had in adapting to tsunamis in Japan and flooding in Thailand.
While these firms are lauded for their manufacturing flexibility that incorporated just-in-time
systems and highly flexible manufacturing facilities, they have been forced to shut down plants
as a result of parts shortages from their tightly integrated suppliers that have been hit by these
natural disasters.

7.3

Limitations and Future Research
This study is not without its limitations. First, my study is inductive theory-building

research, and thus my findings are not generalizable in the statistical sense. Instead my findings
generalize to theory (Yin, 2009). I situated my study within a single industry—automotive—and
in a specific geographical region—North America. Since prior research has stressed that
capabilities are often context specific (Laamanen and Wallin, 2009; Ethiraj et al, 2005), my
study may not generalize beyond the automotive industry. However, the automotive industry
shares similarities with other manufacturing industries and industries possessing homogeneous
oligopolies in moderately dynamic and regulated environments. Thus, my insights are most
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likely to be applicable in manufacturing industries and industries such as telecommunications,
energy production, forestry, and mining, which are oligopolistic in structure and which have
strong regulations and have had many disturbances over their long histories. Within the
automotive context my study is further focused on a particular category of dynamic capabilities
in manufacturing flexibility. Thus the theories I propose may be further limited to dynamic
capabilities that closely resemble manufacturing flexibility. Further research should study a
broader range of industries and dynamic capabilities.
Further, my case study has a historical focus and differs from contemporary case studies
in its reliance on archival and historical documentation. The nature of this archival dataset
constrained my interpretation and analysis because I was reliant on what experts had chosen to
write about and did not have the opportunity to ask pointed questions as one would with
interview or focus group data collection methods. This constraint is a reflection of the
longitudinal nature of my study, which makes interviews and focus groups unreliable owing to
retrospective biases (Golden, 1992). While I took steps to address and mitigate the difficulties of
this historical focus, such as employing high-quality data sources and corroborating qualitative
opinions and perspectives with quantitative data (Jick, 1979), this limitation remains an inherent
challenge of conducting inductive research examining long historical periods.
Third, the strength of my dataset, and thus my analysis, is that it is longitudinal. This has
permitted me to analyze patterns over a full 45 years of data. While this is a strength of my
study, it carried with it implicit difficulties with respect to the depth of analysis for a given year.
Future research may explore specific events in more detail, such as the actions that firms took
prior to, during, and following major oil crises and regulatory events, so as to gain greater depth
of insight into how dynamic capabilities originate and develop.
136

One specific limitation of my archival data was that they did not provide information
about managers’ cognitive processes and how managers perceived their environments before
developing dynamic capabilities. Danneels (2011) stresses the importance of cognition with
respect to how dynamic capabilities are deployed, arguing that to be effective, managers need a
strong understanding of their firm’s resources and capabilities. Gavetti (2005) in turn, highlights
the importance of cognition in building an accurate interpretation of the challenges the firm is
facing. Recent research on dynamic managerial capabilities argues for the reintroduction of the
manager as decision maker into studies of dynamic capabilities (Adner and Helfat, 2003; Sirmon
and Hitt, 2009). Incorporating information about cognition processes could also shed light onto
how persistent disturbances are perceived. An analysis of my data suggests that different firms
identified different disturbances as being most salient. For instance, from a study of annual
reports it was clear that for Chrysler, the Vietnam War imposed significantly on their business,
while managers at Ford and GM made no mention of any difficulties associated with that war.
Future research could explore how managers within firms perceived the persistent disturbances
in their environments, and attempt to better understand the decision-making processes through
which they build dynamic capabilities to respond. Extending this study by interviewing
managers about how they perceive disturbances and how they respond would provide a stronger
cognitive understanding of managerial action that could be very valuable.
In addition, my study distinguishes among environments possessing different
configurations of environmental dynamism. I distinguish environmental shifts from ongoing
environmental change and persistent disturbances. However, firms face complex environments
that invariably include some combination of different configurations of environmental
dynamism. Thus firms likely face two or more of these configurations simultaneously. Future
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research could consider how firms build dynamic capabilities that permit them to respond and
adapt to environments characterized by multiple configurations of environmental dynamism at
the same time. How do firms build and maintain these different dynamic capabilities? Research
could also examine the interactions between different configurations of environmental dynamism
and between dynamic capabilities developed to address each configuration.
My research has demonstrated that delving deeper into a particular dynamic capability,
such as manufacturing flexibility, can offer critical insights regarding the inner workings of a
dynamic capability. In particular, my study offered an understanding of dynamic capability
architecture. I argue that future research should delve deeper into specific dynamic capabilities
such as alliance management, dynamic managerial capabilities, and new product development
processes. This approach has the potential to empirically ground future understanding of
dynamic capability architecture.
Finally, my research highlights how automotive firms dramatically improved the
technical fitness of their dynamic capabilities in manufacturing flexibility over the course of my
study period, from early incompetence in adapting product mix and partnering to strong, welltested, and technically fit dynamic capabilities. However, despite these improvements the firms
floundered. The firms’ financial performance deteriorated to such a point that in 2009 both
Chrysler and GM declared bankruptcy, with Ford narrowly avoiding a similar fate. Future
research should explore this disconnect between the technical fitness of a given dynamic
capability and the performance of the firm as a whole. Some research has begun to address this
important question. Shamsie, Martin, and Miller (2009) found that dynamic capabilities do not
necessarily lead to performance improvement. Still other research has argued that dynamic
capabilities operate across levels of analysis (Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; Drnevich and
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Kriauciunas, 2011). Research by Coff (2010) shows how rent appropriation should be
considered from very early stages of capability development, arguing that both should coevolve.
In short, future research should pursue what firms require, beyond a technically fit dynamic
capability, in order to achieve superior (or even average) returns.

7.4 Concluding Remarks
In a recent article on dynamic capabilities, Helfat and Winter (2011) pondered the
paradox of the (n)ever-changing world (Birnholtz, Cohen, and Hoch, 2007) asking “[i]f
everything is changing all the time, what then is the basis of the impression that some things do
not change at all?” Indeed, managers are often left with the impression that the world is
changing too fast or too dramatically, but at the same time they are confronted with variations on
familiar disturbances. Addressing this paradox requires thinking that advances our understanding
of environmental dynamism and the capabilities that firms build in response.
In my research, the (n)ever-changing world is well illustrated by a configuration of
environmental dynamism that I call persistent disturbances, defined as repeated temporary events
confronting firms. The persistent disturbances I studied in the North American automotive
industry were economic cycles, government regulations, labour disruptions, competitive
pressures, and energy challenges. Each of these persistent disturbances depicted arenas of
ongoing concern for automotive firms, but also ones which the firms had had decades of
experience addressing.
My research studied the dynamic capabilities related to manufacturing flexibility that
firms built in response to these persistent disturbances—both what they were and how firms built
them. I found that firms built dynamic capabilities in these environments, progressing from
139

technically unfit dynamic capabilities towards increasingly technical fit dynamic capabilities
through a nested process of layering. As persistent disturbances remained in place, firms added
and elaborated both dynamic capabilities and the capabilities they comprised to improve the
effectiveness of their responses to the persistent disturbances. The resulting dynamic capabilities
resembled the process by which they were built, possessing a multi-layered capability
architecture.
In short, my research emphasizes the importance of better understanding dynamic
capabilities through three avenues. First, my research stresses the importance of moving beyond
dimensions of environmental dynamism towards a better understanding of configurations of
environmental dynamism and the role these play in the development of dynamic capabilities. I
take steps in this regard by discussing the influence that different configurations of
environmental dynamism have with respect to the nature, origination, development, and
deployment of dynamic capabilities. Second, I encourage scholars to identify and study the
capability architecture of different types of dynamic capabilities across different contexts. Even
subtle variations in capability architecture reveal differences in how and how well a firm can
respond to disturbances. Finally, my research highlights how dynamic capabilities can develop
in parallel as environmental dynamism unfolds. Through a process of layering on top of existing
dynamic capabilities, firms can, over time, improve the technical fitness of their dynamic
capabilities for a particular persistent disturbance.
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Appendices
Table A1 Definitions of Key Terms
Term
Dynamic Capabilities
Disturbance
Persistent Disturbance
Persistent Manufacturing Implication
Manufacturing Flexibility
Capability Architecture
Evolutionary Fitness (of Dynamic Capabilities)
Technical Fitness (of Dynamic Capabilities)
Environmental Dynamism
Configuration (of Environmental Dynamism)

Definition
A firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competencies to
address changing environments
Adversity, either internally generated or externally imposed, that disrupts the normal
functioning of the firm
Repeated temporary events confronting firms
The manufacturing related implications of repeated temporary events confronting firms
A firm’s ability to adapt to environmental changes by varying products, product mix and
production volumes.
How different capabilities fit together or relate to one another
Evolutionary fitness refers to how well a dynamic capability enables a firm to survive and
even grow in changing environment
Technical fitness pertains to how effective a dynamic capability is at performing its
intended function
Change in a firm’s external environment
Recognizable patterns of environmental dynamism
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Table A2 Dynamic Capabilities Literature Review – Empirical Review
Author

Dynamic Capability

Dynamic Capability
Development

Adner and
Helfat, 2003

Dynamic Managerial
Capabilities
Managerial human capital,
managerial social capital
and managerial cognition;
these factors can influence
how strategic decisions are
made; in strategic
reorientation in response to
changing conditions in
environment
Strategic Renewal
IBMs transformations from
electromechanical
accounting equipment to an
electronic computing
company and then to a
business computing services
company; also incremental
strategic renewal
Firm Entry
“Ability to create and
manage new alliances in
order to enter emerging
technological fields in the
presence of discontinuous
technological change.”
P1214
Capability Sourcing
Ability to select appropriate
modes of capability sourcing
- internal development or

NA

Agarwal and
Helfat, 2009

Anand, Oriani,
and Vassolo,
2010

Capron and
Mitchell, 2009

Environmental
Dynamism
Characteristics
Fluctuating Oil Prices;
Changing
environments

Method

Research Context

ANOVA

U.S. Petroleum
Industry from 1977
through 1997

NA

Dramatic shifts in its
external environment;
specifically new
technology or changing
competition

Case

IBM from 1940

NA

Discontinuous
Technological Change

Heckman probit
model

U.S. and European
Phramaceutical
firms from 1980s
through 2000.

NA

Rapid industry
changes, including
deregulation, price
competition,

Survey and survival
survey

International
telecommunication
s industry (2000 to
2005)
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Coen and
Maritan, 2011

Danneels, 2008

external sourcing – so as to
renew capabilities
moderator role
Resource Allocation Process
The capacity to manage
investments in operational
capabilities.
Operationalized as the
ability to recognize
opportunities (search) to
invest in new operational
capabilities
Exploration and Learning
Ability to explore new
markets (marketing) and
ability to explore new
technologies (R&D)
Ability to build new
competences.

NA

5 organizational
antecedents (4 of which
gained empirical
support): slack
resources,
environmental scanning,
willingness to
cannibalize and
constructive conflict.
Tolerance for failure not
Resource cognition plays
an important role
because managers
understand the
resources they have, and
their fungibility.

Danneels, 2010

Renewal of Resources and
Competences
How Smith Corona
attempted to modify its
resources (leverage, create,
access and release)

Doving and
Gooderham,
2008
Drnevich and
Kriauciunas,
2011
Galunic and

Altering service portfolio
offering of a firm (related
diversification)
IT ordinary and dynamic
capabilities

NA

Architectural Innovation

Social and economic

NA

technological
convergence and entry
of foreign competitors

Simulation

NA

Environmental change
making previously
acquired competences
obsolete or create
opportunities for new
competences

Regression

Public
manufacturing

Environmental shift
from mechanical
typewriters to
electronics.
Environmental change
that threatens long-run
viability of the firm.
Market and
technological change
Changing
environments

Case

Smith Corona –
typewriters 19802001

Regression

Degree of
environmental
dynamism
Changing markets;

Regression

Small
accountancies in
Norway
Chilean firms – IT
based capabilities

Case

Multi-business firm
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Eisenhardt,
2001
Ethiraj, Kale,
Krishnan, and
Singh, 2005

Corporate level processes
by which multi-business
firms reconfigure or realign
their resources.
Role of client specific and
project management
capabilities

Gilbert, 2006

General – The ability to
move from one competency
configuration to another

Helfat, 1997

Creating new products and
processes
Decisions to engage in coal
gasification /liquefaction
R&D

Kale and Singh,
2007

Alliance learning process
Articulation, codification,
sharing and internalization
of alliance management
know-how. A higher order
DC, helps firms learn,
accumulate, and leverage
alliance know-how so as to
modify or improve its
operational alliance
management skills.
Market entry
A general DC surrounding
the role of experience on
market entry patterns

King and Tucci,
2002

logics
Simple rules that guide
charter redeployment
Executives are key
Capabilities develop
through repeated
interactions and through
deliberate and persistent
investments.
Argue that structural
differentiation permits
simultaneous holding of
two competency
configurations
DC accumulation based
on past complementary
assets (refining assets)
and know-how (refining
R&D; other synthetic
fuels); or strong
capabilities in new space
(ie coal assets)
Learning and knowledge
accumulation processes
are how firms build and
sustain a dynamic
capability that permits
the firm to modify its
alliance capabilities

evolving product
markets

Prior experience
important for dynamic
change

NA

Interviews and
Regressions

Software services
Industry; single firm
multiple projects

Discontinuous
environmental change

Case

Newspaper
organization

Oil price increases –
1973 and 1979

Regression

U.S. Petroleum
industry during
1970s and early
1980s

NA

Survey;

Large firms

Technological change;
development of new
markets; explicitly
recognizes different
types of environmental

Regression from
archival

Disk drive industry

155

Laamanen and
Wallin, 2009

Cognitive microfoundations
of capability development

Lampel and
Shamsie, 2003

Industry transitions
Identified mobilizing
(bringing together bundles
of resources) and
transforming (putting
together a finished product)
capabilities
Managing complementarity
relationships among firm’s
product markets to match
industry changes. Two
approaches – reconfigure
resource base of product
portfolio or reposition
product portfolio
Three dynamic capabilities
including manufacturing
flexibility, organizational
learning and reverse
engineering

Lee,
Venkatraman,
Tanriverdi, and
Lyer, 2010

Malik and
Kotabe, 2009

Marcus and
Anderson, 2006
Martin, 2011

General DC
Ability to renew, augment
and adapt competencies
over time
Dynamic managerial

Role of cognition at
operational capability,
capability portfolio, and
enterprise level in
dynamic capability
development
Environment transitions
can emphasize and
direct attention to
changing and innovating
one or more sets of
capabilities at the
expense of others.
NA

dynamism
NA

Case

Network software
security firms

Industry transition
from studio to hub and
spoke organizations (a
PE model)

Regression

Hollywood film
industry

Hypercompetition

Regression

Software industry

Underpinning DC –
learning (repetition and
experimentation),
reconfiguration (identify
opportunities and
changing resources external) and
coordination (how
managers coordinate
and integrate internally)
processes
NA

Shift from emerging
economy through
market liberalization

Survey and
regression

Indian and
Pakistani firms

NA

Survey/ regression

US Retail food

Antecedents of dynamic

Dynamic environment;

Multiple-case study

Multibusiness
156

capabilities

Moliterno and
Wiersema,
2007
Morgan,
Vorhies, and
Mason, 2009
Narayanan,
Colwell, and
Douglas, 2009

Resource divestment
capability
How divestment can
generate competitive
advantage
Acquiring and deploying
resources in such a way as
to reflect changing
environment
Fast drug development and
chemical biology R&D
platforms

Pablo, Reay,
Dewald, and
Casebeer, 2007

Learning through
experimenting;
Bringing together existing
resources in new ways

Pierce, 2009

Ability of firms to survive in
face of strategic change by
core firms in their industry.

Rindova and
Kotha, 2001

Continuous Morphing
Ability to change
organizational form
(structures, organizational
arrangements), function
(product strategy)
dynamically. Can be used to
support rapid changes in

managerial capabilities
include recombinative
structures,
recombinative processes
and social equivalence
NA

NA

Regression

Major League
Baseball

NA

NA

Mail Survey; SEM

Broad sampling of
US firms

Development of DC a
combination of path
dependent behaviours
and firm idiosyncratic
behaviours; early
dynamic capability
fragility
Phases of developing DC:
Identify latent DC,
enabling the DC and
managing ongoing
tensions
Forecasting capabilities;
Related experience in
niche market;

Fast paced
environment

Case based

Single US
Pharmaceutical

Continuous reduction
in financial resources
(squeeze); Continual
need for improvement;

Interviews

Public healthcare in
Calgary

Core firms create
shakeouts that
challenge niche
markets.
Hypercompetitive; high
velocity; regimes of
rapid change;

Regression

Automotive leases

Cases

Search Engines

Dynamic capabilities are
open-ended; emergent
and evolving over time;
process of layering
resources to convert
strengths to assets

uncertain and rapidly
changing

organizations in
software industry

It is about maintaining
dynamic fit with this
changing environment.
157

Rosenbloom,
2000

strategy required in dynamic
environments
Achieving new forms of
competitive advantage.

Rothaermal
and Hess, 2007

Seeking the locus of
dynamic capabilities –
individuals, firm or network

Salvato, 2009

Dynamic managerial
capabilities

Schilke and
Goerzen, 2010

Alliance management
capability
Degree to which
organizations possess
relevant management
routines that enable them
to effectively manage their
portfolio of strategic
alliances

Shamsie,
Martin, and
Miller, 2009

Investment decisions –
Choosing between
improving strengths or
developing weaknesses
Dynamic Managerial
Capabilities/Asset
Orchestration
Focusing on manager’s
resource-related decisions
such as resource investment

Sirmon and
Hitt, 2009

Actualize latent dynamic
capabilities; painful crisis
during adaptation
Finds that antecedents
for dynamic capabilities
at the individual, firm
and network levels of
analysis.
Encoding successful
experiments into higher
level capabilities;
ordinary and mindful
acts can play a strong
role in DC development;
initial temporary under
performance
NA

Radical technological
change in business
equipment
Exogenous paradigm
shifts

Case

Business
Equipment (NCR)

Regression

Biotechnology

Ever changing
competitive
environment

Sequential analysis

Alessi Italian
designer

NA

SEM

R&D Alliances

Resource allocation
between exploiting and
exploring

Constant and
unpredictable change

Regression

Hollywood film
industry

NA

NA

Two-stage least
squares regression

Banks
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and deployment (asset
orchestration)
Song, Droge,
Hanvanich, and
Calantone,
2005

Resource configuration,
complementarity and
integration.

NA

Moderated by low or
high technological
turbulence

SEM

Joint Ventures
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Table A3 Persistent Disturbance Codes and Persistent Manufacturing Implications
Persistent
Disturbance
Codes
Economic
Cycles

Labour
Disruptions

Description

Representative Passage

Economic cycles refer
to the booms and busts
of recessionary cycles
as well as other
economic factors such
as high inflation.

Deepening recession, double-digit inflation and public uncertainty over the availability and price
of gasoline took their toll of vehicle sales and industry profits in most major markets last year.
[Ford 1974 Annual Report]

Labour disruptions
included strikes and
labour negotiations

The year 1982 was another year of mixed economic results. While both inflation and interest rates
declined significantly, the long sought upturn in economic activity did not occur. As a result.
Industry deliveries of passenger cars and trucks declined for the third straight year. [GM 1982
Annual Report]
We had a good first half in 1995, second half automotive profits were reduced by lower U.S.
production volume caused by a soft car market [Ford 1995 Annual Report]
The strike by the UAW, extended from September 7 to November 11 caused the Company to lose
more than 600,000 cars and trucks from scheduled production in North America. This lost
production was particularly damaging because it came at the start of a new model year, when
customer demand is high. [Ford 1967 Annual Report]

Persistent
Manufacturing
Implications
Fluctuating
Consumer Demand
Profit Margin
Pressure

Profit Margin
Pressure

The new three-year agreement concluded last December between the Company and the United
Automobile Workers is by far the most costly in our history. It has increased the downward
pressure on profits, the upward pressure on prices, the gap between
U. S. and foreign labor costs and the difficulty of competing with foreign cars imported into the
U.S [Ford 1970 Annual Report]
A more important factor was the UAW strike in the fall, which shut down most GM facilities in the
United States for a minimum of ten weeks, and some for a longer period. … We estimate that the
strike caused production losses of more than 1.5 million cars and trucks. [GM 1970 Annual Report]

Energy
Challenges

Energy challenges
included energy crises
as well as fluctuating
fuel prices

Strike-related production losses in the United States and Canada during the first and fourth
quarters of the year reduced our earnings by approximately 1.2 billion. [GM 1996 Annual Report]
Late in the year, the Mid-East war and the Arab oil embargo transformed what had been a
worsening petroleum shortage into an immediate energy crisis. The energy crisis, in turn,
transformed what had been a steady trend toward small cars into a sudden rush. [Ford 1973
Annual Report]
… rising fuel prices caused demand for SUVs to drop sooner and faster than we had anticipated.
[Ford 2005 Annual Report]

Fluctuating
Consumer Model
Preferences
Fluctuating
Consumer Demand
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For the automobile industry, 1974 was the year the patterns of the marketplace went awry. In the
gasoline-short early months, demand for small cars soared to unprecedented levels while sales of
fullsize cars dropped sharply. For a time, used Vegas were bringing higher prices than used
Impalas. No one knew when the oil embargo and gasoline allocations would end; no one knew
where the new trends would lead. America's love affair with the automobile was said to be over.
[GM 1974 Annual Report]
The impact of 1979's fuel shortages and high prices is likely to last longer than it did after the
1973-74 crisis. By ignoring gas guzzlers and turning to smaller, fuel efficient cars, consumers seem
to be reasserting themselves as our No.1 taskmaster. [WARDS 1980]

Competitive
Pressures

Competitive pressures
included those from
domestic competitors
as well as international
entrants from Japan,
Europe and Asia.

“Ford’s main U.S. problem, abetted by the economy and the energy situation, was Ford’s small-car
lineup. It was no longer new and exciting. Its new-for-’79 downsized LTD was being passed up by
some buyers who became more interested in small cars as gasoline prices rose to $1.25 a gallon
and were expected to go nowhere but up in 1980 and beyond” (WARD, 1980:211)
With the reduction of trade barriers, the rapid growth of the Japanese automotive industry and
the merging of many European manufacturers to form larger and more efficient firms, worldwide
competition in our industry is becoming steadily more vigorous. The ability to sell at competitive
prices and still earn, a satisfactory return depends more than ever on efficiency gains made
possible through technological advances, as well as on continued innovation in product design.
[Ford 1970 Annual Report]

Fluctuating
Consumer Demand
Profit Margin
Pressure

One of the reasons for the strength of Japanese cars sales in the U.S. market is the price
advantage resulting primarily from the substantial disparity between Japanese and U.S. wage
rates. In 1977 Japanese labor costs were about $7 an hour below US costs. [Ford 1977 Annual
Report]
The current labor cost differential in excess of $8 per hour, comparing GM wages and benefits
with those of Japanese auto workers and with the average for all U.S. manufacturing workers,
represents a disadvantage to General Motors of approximately $8 billion in a typical year. No
company can compete for long, and no jobs are safe for long, with that kind of disadvantage. [GM
1981 Annual Report]
The competitive playing field is larger and more open than it's ever been before. That means Ford
is going to have to compete increasingly with the best companies in the world, wherever they are
located and wherever they operate. [Ford 1994 Annual Report]
Competition in the automotive industry is intensifying, with more market segments and more new
products than ever before [Ford 2003 Annual Report]
The second was the consistent pressure that rising costs and intensified competition exerted on
profits throughout the year. [GM 1971 Annual Report]
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Government
Regulations

Government
regulations covered a
range of regulatory
issues including fuel
economy, safety and
emissions.

While domestic-make car sales slumped 10% to 8.3 million in 1979 from 9.3 million in 1978, cars
from Europe and Japan soared 16% over 1978 to a record 2.3 million from 2.0 million units.
[WARDS 1980]
In the past, our success has depended primarily on our response to the test of the marketplace. In
the future, we shall be severely tested by the need to respond at the same time to the
requirements of the market and the requirements imposed by the Federal governments' safety
and air pollution regulations. [Ford 1966 Annual Report]
Fuel economy legislation passed during the last session of Congress requires progressive
improvement in the average fuel economy of the cars sold by each manufacturer. By the 1985
model year our cars will have to average 27.5 miles per gallon- a requirement that based on
existing technology, can be met only if the majority of the cars we sell are Pinto-size or smaller .
Today however cars in that class account for less than one-fourth of our sales. [Ford 1975 Annual
Report]

Profit Margin
Pressure
Fluctuating
Consumer Model
Preferences

Our efforts to comply with Federal regulations covering vehicle safety, damageability, emissions
and fuel economy continue to require large and growing expenditures. [ Ford 1976 Annual Report]
Meeting additional [regulatory] requirements will call for further redesign of much of the
Company's product line by 1985. From 1978 through 1985, the Company will launch 22 major new
North American product development programs, compared with six in the prior eight years. For
example from 1980 to 1984 Ford will introduce an average of one new engine a year compared
with one every 2.4 years between 1968 and 1980, and one new transmission a year, compared
with one every four years for the prior 15 years. [Ford 1978 Annual Report]
Government regulation of the auto industry had become a permanent fixture. The cost of
compliance with federal regulation by some industry estimates was over $100 billion a year.
[WARDS 1980]
“The Federal Government’s programs of conservation of energy, increased highway safety, and
protection of health are fully consistent with the goals of Chrysler Corporation. However, in the
past year alone, the Federal Government has put into final or proposed form four major standards
covering motor vehicles which go beyond reasonable limits, substantially increase our capital
needs, and raise the cost to the consumer.” (Chrysler Annual Report, 1977)
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Table A4 Ford Production Volume Flexibility
Year
1964
1967
1968
1970
1971

1977
1978
1980

1981
1982
1982

1983

1985
1986
1987
1989

Ford - Production Volume Flexibility
• New sources for Mustang added due to demand at Dearborn Michigan,
San Jose California, and Metuchen New Jersey
• Heavy overtime used to make up for losses due to strikes
• Common for vehicles to be built in a small number of plants – ie Falcon
just in St. Thomas Ontario
• High production cars launched at a number of plants – so Pinto at San
Jose, St. Thomas, and Metuchen plants
• Realignments and inventory adjustments cause production fluctuations –
as much as 16,000 units from week to week.
• Weak demand for some cars can mean facilities falter – Cougar facility in
Dearborn faltered due to weak sports car market
• Use of overtime to match demand for Mark IV
• Changed over two small car plants early due to diminished demand
• Full-size cars didn’t change over models until August
• Louisville and Atlanta plants closed a week early to adjust inventories
• Closed two assembly plants and two component factories
• Reduced active hourly workforce by 25%; cut salaried by 20,000
• Ability to ramp up production of Ford’s Escort is hampered by limited
engine capacity; plans in place to double capacity at Dearborn engine
plant and start production at Lima Ohio as well as a new plant in Mexico
• Two new sources for subcompacts – San Jose and St. Thomas
• In exchange for wage freezing, Ford agreed to a moratorium on plant
closings; this reduces ability to adjust demand
• Escort built at four plants – Edison, Wayne, San Jose and St. Thomas
• Reduced production volumes – UAW agrees to alternating shift routine –
10 days on and then 10 days off. Saved jobs and kept skilled workers
available for when sales picked up
• Cuts in plant scheduling
• Lincoln Mercury – a second shift added and 1100 workers recalled at St.
Louis to increase output
• 18% of cars built on overtime between July and December
• Production increases of Marquis and Grand Marquis at St. Louis and
Chicago
• Second shift added for Mark and Lincoln and an increase in line speed for
Wixom MI
• Tooling up to build 500,000 Taurus and Sable (sister cars)
• Delayed plans to drop Grand Marquis due to strong market demand
• UAW agreement stipulates no UAW employee could be laid off due to
domestically made component or car being replaced by an imported
vehicle. And a moratorium on plant closings granted to UAW
• Able to manage inventory adjustments by reducing daily overtime – not
until January 1990 did they need to close plants. This is because Ford had
kept capacity low, revamping existing facilities instead of building new
ones
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1990
1992
1993
1994

1997
2002

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

2004

2005

•
•
•
•

2007

•

Ford closes plants for 85 plant weeks and plans cuts to salaried staff
Increasing capacity of medium/heavy truck facilities
Plans to sell 800,000 of Mondeo world car yearly
Increased capacity at St. Louis plant by 135,000 units (to 445,000 units)
Halved production of Aerostar van
Michigan truck plant going to three crew for an increase of 32,000 units
Shuttering Lorain plant for up to two years
Large downsizing activity – 35,000 jobs and five NA plants (Edison,
Ontario Truck Oakville, St. Louis, Cleveland casting and Michigan-based
Vulcan forge) – Shrinking capacity by 1 million units by mid decade
Discontinued low margin plates – Cougar, Villager, Continental, and
Escort
Ford to cut a shift at Oakville
Closures of Ontario Truck, Edison, and Rouge plants
Wayne experiencing multiple down weeks to trim inventory
Major reshuffling calling for 14 plants closing (including St. Louis, Atlanta,
Wiixom, Twin Cities, Norfolk, and Batavia transmission) and reduction of
hourly workforce by 25,000 to 30,000 jobs by 2012
38,000 UAW members accepted buyout packages

Table A5 GM Production Volume Flexibility
Year
1971
1973
1974
1980

1982
1982
1983

1984

1985

GM - Production Volume Flexibility
• Plants working 6 days a week
• Closed down full-size model assembly plants for a week prior to
Christmas break
• Cutback of full size production in anticipation of more small car demand.
• Closed assembly plants at various points throughout the year to manage
inventory
• Ceased production of full-size models at South Gate and St. Louis
• South Gate idled from March 1980 to March 1981
• Reduced line speeds at many Olds factories towards end of model years
• Closed indefinitely South Gate, Fremont and Lakewood plants
• Consolidating two rear-drive assembly plants into one to produce frontdrive cars for ’86 – layoff of 3600 workers
• Second shift added to Livonia engine plant
• Second shifts added at Janesville and Lordstown for Cavaliers;
• Second shift added at Oklahoma for Celebrity
• Use of significant overtime at Lansing
• Layoffs, line speed reductions and idle weeks for inventory control at
Willow Run
• Fiero and 2000 Sunbird run extended into November - Fiero car always in
short supply
• 6000 production extended to North Tarrytown
• Daily and Saturday overtime common for Cadillac
• Second shift added at Fremont for Nova’s
• Daily and Saturday overtime common
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1986

•
•

1987

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

1989

1990
1991
1992
1994

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

2000
2001

•
•
•
•
•
•

2004

2005

•
•

A wave of plant closings – mostly inefficient and redundant older ones
Portion of Fremont (NUMMI) turned over to Toyota for production of
Corolla
Three cutbacks in production
Reduced demand at Fiero dropped output to one shift at Pontiac
Norwood closed permanently
GM eliminated second shift indefinitely at Buick City
Framingham added to indefinitely idled list
Lakewood closing in mid 1990
Sales slow down led to sporadic one and two week plant shutdowns
New plant – Saturn at Sprint Hill
Major losses leading to closing 21 plants, idling 74,000 employees over 4
years
Saturn moving to three shift production in June of 1993
Grand Prix adds second shift, recalling 750 laid off workers
Capacity hikes at several plants for pickups, vans and SUVs
Saturn cut production 25% in March through May due to slow sales and
rail car shortages
Delayed planned closure of St. Catharine’s engine plant
Built first U.S. Greenfield plant since 1986
Sporadically idled Orion (as opposed to reduce line speed – this saved
850 workers)
Closed Ste. Therese
Closed Saginaw Iron plant
Closed Baltimore assembly plant
Expanded Flint South engine plant by 500,000 square feet
Idling of Linden plant – could not be closed due to union contract
Restructuring plan to close 9 facilities, change operations at four plants
and cut 30,000 jobs in 3 years
Close a line at Oshawa, idle No 1 line at Spring Hill and cut third shift at
Moraine and Oshawa
In total, expected output reduction from 6.2 million to 4.3 million by 2008

Table A6 Chrysler Production Volume Flexibility
Year
1971
1972
1973

Chrysler - Production Volume Flexibility
• Minimum plant shutdowns for inventory adjustments
• Relatively constant production pattern – few peaks and valleys in schedules
• Valiant used same basic body for 6 years – very rare in the industry
• Layoffs and production cutbacks to manage big car inventories that
skyrocketed due to energy shortages

1974

•

1975

•

Plant downtime used in early and latter parts of calendar year (energy crisis
and recession respectively)
Intermittent assembly plant shutdowns and layoffs to keep pace with slow
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1978
1980
1981
1983

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

1984

1987

1989

1990
1993

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

1994
1995
1996
2000
2001

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

2002

2004
2006
2007

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

sales
Chrysler’s most modern plants operating at capacity early in 1979
Closed 8 plants and cut workforce by 31%
Lynch Road assembly mothballed
Employees working 10 hour shifts seven days a week to facilitate stamping
needs (led to wildcat strike)
Dodge production rose 46.5% straining capacity
Most U.S. facilities double shifted
Expected to add five shifts between 1983 and 1984 at each of St. Louis plant
1, St. Louis Plant 2, Sterling Heights, Warren and Windsor
Opened 6th US assembly plant in Sterling Heights to assemble two products –
Chrysler LeBaron and Dodge Lancer
Added additional source for vans at St. Louis (in addition to Windsor)
Corporate goals to increase production capacity by 25%
Plant acquisitions from AMC
Closing of a number of plants
Belvedere added a second shift to new full-size front drive cars
Slow sales led to sporadic one and two week plant shutdowns
Closing assembly plants at Detroit Jefferson Ave and St. Louis No. 1
Cancellation of second shift at Jefferson Avenue
Slow sales led to sporadic one and two week plant shutdowns
Third shift added at Windsor for small vans
Increasing outputs of minivans with a three-shift operation at Windsor
Sterling Heights can produce 190,000 units on 1 shift; 290,000 on two shifts
with overtime and 330,000 on a three crew system
Increasing capacity of vehicle assembly and powertrain over 3 years – up
6000 jobs and 500,000 units
Second shift added at Sterling Heights following start up of new JA cars
Unshuttering St. Louis South plant to increase production of Dodge Ram
New Brazil plant to assemble Dakota pickups
PT cruiser production hiked at Mexico plant
Week of shut down to control inventory prior to start up of new small vans
Downsizing – 19,300 workers by 2001; another 4200 by 2002 and then
another 2500 by 2003
Closing Mound Rd at Warren and Toluca Transmission plant; Campo Largo
operation in Brazil and Pillette road in Windsor
Closed Pillette plant
Mercedes reducing output in Germany of short term contract employees
Planned 12,000 workers to retire
35,000 employees reduced
Third shift added at Warren for new midsize
Belvidere plant added third shift and overtime shifts
Production cut of 135,000 for second half of the year
Calls for 11,000 hourly job cuts and a capacity decrease of 400,000; achieved
through shift reductions at three truck plants and a minivan plant
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Table A7 Ford Production Mix Flexibility
Year
1964
1971
1972
1973

1974
1975
1977
1979
1983

1989
1991
1994
1996

1997
1998
2002

2004

Ford – Production Mix Flexibility
• Having plants dedicated to a single car is unusual – but Mercury was out of St.
Louis
• Developed “back to back” launch between model years – close on Friday and
open on Monday/Tuesday with new model. Changeover week output closer to
50% rather than 10% during changeovers
• Increased use of “running changes” which means improving a model in
between model years
• Major model switch to production favouring small cars in 60 to 40 ratio
including: Pinto production rate increase at Metuchen; redesigning Dearborn
to produce Mustang II; Pinto production rate increase at San Jose; Mustang II
added to San Jose; second shift added at San Jose; Chicago conversion to
intermediate Torino; Wayne conversion to Maverick output. In total, adding 1
million small car units within 12 months. Called “fastest and most expensive
production model-mix shift in history”
• Employing imports from European operations
• More running changes than ever before
• Satisfying full-size and intermediate demand – changed over two small car
plants early while full-size cars didn’t change over models until August
• Mustang and Thunderbird built from the Fairmont platform. Body frame
platform for LTD II and old Thunderbird eliminated. A reduction in platforms
• Big cars and small cars built on the same platform in St. Thomas (Grand
Marquis with Ford Escort and Lynx)
• Dual front and rear drive production permitted swings based on market
demand
• Retooling Edison from Escort to Ranger compact pick up trucks mid-year
• Converting St. Louis from Aerostar to Explorer SUV
• Ford announcing desire to reduce platforms from 24 to 16
• UAW agreement where Ford must replace hourly workers that retire, die or
quit on a one to one basis (with some caveats)
• Trims platforms from 24 to 16, and engines from 30 to 14
• Ford absorbing workers from Flat Rock into UAW agreement providing
flexibility to shift Ford workers and Ford products into and out of the plant
• Low investment vehicle (aimed at China, India, Brazil, other emerging places)
would be very flexible – same platform for a pickup, car, van, four-wheel drive
• Philippines plant capable of three body styles – Ranger pickup, Laser Liata and
Econovan
• Flexible manufacturing taking hold in Europe (later in North America) involving
investments in supplier parks close to assembly plants. Chicago an example,
and other plants including Kansas City, Norfolk, and Dearborn (Rouge)
• Rouge redone to accommodate three distinct platforms instead of two
• Ford Focus is third vehicle built on global C-segment C1 architecture
• Overabundance of body on frame capacity for truck and SUV; not as much
capacity cross/utility vehiclesChicago plant involves multi-supplier park and
flexible assembly line capable of building eight models from two platforms
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2007

•

Dearborn plant capable of building nine models from three platforms

•

Preparation for cross utility vehicles (Ford Edge and Lincoln MKX) combined
Oakville Ontario and Ontario Truck into a single flexible campus
Plan in place called Global Product Development System (GDPS) in order to
bring vehicles out of Mazda quicker

•

Table A8 GM Production Mix Flexibility
Year
1968
1971
1973
1977
1978

1979

1980

1981
1982
1983

1984

GM Production Mix Flexibility
• Central General Motors Assembly Division took over responsibility of 6 of 11
assembly plants for Chevrolet and Fisher Body Division. This move was made
to achieve greater flexibility in processing chassis and body operations
• Shifted plants around – put Nova in Van Nyus and Norwood plants; Moved
Camaro from Van Nuys to Norwood
• Laid off workers while resourcing from big to small cars was carried out
• Sourcing changes – LeMans added at Baltimore and dropped at Lakewood;
Sunbird added at Lordstown; Phoenix added at Willow Run and North
Tarrytown; and Ventura dropped at Van Nuys
• Looking to centralize engine manufacturing more; Chevrolet shared its V-8 with
other divisions for first time; Chevrolet typically went alone
• Linden ended production of C-body cars several months earlier than other
plants to convert to front-drive E body
• Multi-divisional sourcing of supplies –such as engines from Chevrolet to Buick,
Oldsmobile and Pontiac
• Oldsmobile providing diesels for other divisions – Chevrolet, Pontiac, Buick and
Cadillac
• Pontiac’s fuel efficient engines sold to others within GM family
• Olds exchanged some production capacity dedicated to H-body Starfire cars for
additional X-car allocation
• Pontiac producing 4-cylinders for other divisions – phasing out V-8s to make
more four cylinders
• Oldsmobile produced diesel and gasoline V-8’s for all divisions – more diesels
given gasoline crunch
• Cadillac using Buick’s V-6 until it could produce its own
• Corvette production moved to Bowling Green from St. Louis
• Importing 4 cylinder engines from GM do Brazil
• In exchange for pay concessions, GM agreed not to close four component
plants
• Converting Pontiac plant to other use
• ‘88s and 98’s started at Cadillac’s Detroit plant – first time Cadillac shared its
home plant
• GM-20 (N-cars) being build by Oldsmobile for Olds, Pontiac and Buick on a
single line
• Buick City is born by converting 60 year old unrelated component
manufacturing and assembly plants into a 500 acre state of the art facility
• Buick City to build 314,000 cars annually – uses maximum JIT parts delivery –
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1985
1986

1987

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

1988

•

1989

•

1991

•
•
•

1997

•
•

1998

•

•
1999

•

2003

•
•
•

2005
2006

•
•

just one day of components on hand
LeSabre and Olds 88 designed on new platform
Hamtramck plant included robot painters
N-car trio – So three cars based on N-Body
E/K trio – three cars based on this (Buick, Olds and Cadillac)
Some difficulties from synergies with vehicles looking very similar
Mix of 4 door sedans and 5 door hatchbacks for NUMMI’s Nova
Specialized plant in Lansing for luxury 2 seater Reatta
Cadillac employing “simultaneous engineering” for quick design changes to
things like grill panels and tail-lights
Cadillac only fully integrated and self-contained GM North American car
division – they considered moving all output to a single plant in Hamtramck
Some switching around – Lordstown van output move to Flint and then Flint
moves to Janesville and then Janesville to Lordstown
Lumina trio – coupe, sedan and minivan on same platform
Chevrolet, Pontiac and Olds splitting APV output from North Tarrytown
Consolidation of engine and transmissions operations into the GM Powertrain
Division
Additional concerns that distinctive brand equity difficult when building
Chevrolets, Opels and Saturns from the same architecture
Shifted work from UAW plants in Pontiac to Oshawa where CAW agreed to
different work rule changes
GMT800 program was future of GM’s SUV and pickups. Eventually would form
basis of 40 models. Used a hydroformed frame with three box-shaped
modules that could be mixed and matched to produce maximum model
variation with minimum parts. Four front models, four mid sections and two
rear sections created 14 models. Result was reduced build time, less
changeover downtime and improved differentiation
Bulldozing inefficient plants to build state of the art facilities with modular
assembly that operated 24 hours a day (Yellowstone)
Project Yellowstone called for two new assembly plants (Lansing and
Lordstown) with suppliers bringing up to 15 built-up modules including interior
cockpits and doors. (Heavily challenged by UAW)
Equinox based on same Theta platform as Saturn
Saab building first SUV based on GM’s GMT360 midsize truck platform
Cobalt marked North American arrival of GM’s global Delta platform (also used
by Opel’s Astra)
New flexible manufacturing at Oshawa
Increased use of shared global platforms
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Table A9 Chrysler Production Mix Flexibility
Year
1973
1978
1979
1981
1983
1986
1987

1988
1992
1996

1997

2002

2005

Chrysler Production Mix Flexibility
• Reliant on Colt for its subcompact vehicle – lack of domestic subcompact left
Dodge and Chrysler in the lurch
• Lynch Road plant only ’79 model year plant to build a single body style
exclusively
• Shutdown Hamtramck assembly plant which was 6 stories high
• Eliminated the production sales bank system
• Continued use of sister K-cars – Reliant and Aries
• Windsor gutted and replaced with minivan – 123 robots helped with assembly
• Chrysler Laser built on same line as Reliant and LeBaron at St. Louis
• Chrysler and Plymouth separated – as part of the trend to distinguish cars from
one another despite shared platforms
• Building upscale subcompact alongside H-cars at Sterling Heights
• Switching production from Belvedere to former AMC plant in Kenosha lost 6
months of production of subcompact L cars
• Another transfer from St. Louis to Kenosha – m-cars Gran Fury, Fifth Avenue
and Dodge Diplomat
• Modern UAW agreement brought influx of robots (from 70 to 220)
• New Yorker and LHS sharing a body and output
• Ram and Dakota trucks sharing a line at Warren
• CAW negotiation yielded job security improvements. All jobs lost to
outsourcing would be replaced one to one
• Chrysler simplified minivan to have a fourth sliding door after 90% of orders
had that option
• China concept vehicle – idea of a really inexpensive and easy to manufacture
vehicle for China
• Adapting continuous improvement system from Toyota
• Talk of integrating passenger car platforms to reduce investment and focus on
light truck/SUV capacity – but stopped short of abandoning cars due to cyclical
nature of the industry
• Built new Pacifica platform for station wagon, but will be the basis for next
generation of minivans
• Sharing underpinnings of Neon with Mitsubishi- produced at Belvedere
• Joint platform with Mitsubishi for C-segment cars with possible expansion to Dsegment
• Announcement by CEO that by end of 2008 more than 60% of his groups
assembly plants would be feature advanced flexible manufacturing technology
capable of building multiple models off varied platforms on the same assembly
line
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Table A10 Ford Partnering Flexibility
Year
1983
1984
1985
1986

1987

1989
1991
1992
1994
1995
1997
1998

1999
2000
2005
2008

Ford – Partnering Flexibility
• Constructing assembly and stamping plants in Mexico to build 130,000 cars
annually for U.S.
• New engine from Mazda for the Escort and Tempo
• Merkur vehicles received from Germany
• Ford division getting version of Mazda 626 from Mazda’s first US assembly
plant in Flat Rock
• Front drive version of Mustang being produced at U.S. Flat Rock assembly plant
• Festiva coming from Kia – a mini-compact
• Lynx being imported from Mazda based on the 323 frame
• Opened first Mexican assembly plant
• Probe being produced at Mazda’s Flat Rock based on 626; included engineers
from both companies but no JV
• JV with Volkswagen to build and market cars in Brazil and Argentina
• Finalizing plans to build a minivan in North America with Nissan
• Tracer from Mexico plant replaced Lynx
• Additional model in Merkur line from Germany
• Escort coming from Wayne MI and Hermosillo Mexico
• Merkur from Germany dropped
• Ford partnering with Nissan to build small vans (Mercury Villager and Nissan
Quest) at Avon Lake plant. Ford’s role assembler; Nissan design and
engineering
• Ford purchased 50% of Mazda Flat Rock facility
• New world car: built in Kansas, engines from Mexico and Belgium, transmission
from Batvia, U.S. built transmission
• Ford of Europe to supply Mazda with rebadged version of Fiesta
• Galaxy mini-van launched jointly with Volkswagen in Portugal
• Raised stake in Mazda to 35%
• Combined Mazda cycle plan for first time – so a larger optimization of facilities
and skills over next 10 years
• Trotman expresses continued support for global vehicles
• Last year for Nissan mini-van JV
• Could not get sliding door in time for launch of mini-van from Ford’s Visteon
parts, so went with GM’s parts department
• Mazda 626 designed in Ford’s Small Vehicle Center in Cologne – so may share
same platform as next world car
• Sold rights to produce vehicles at their AutoEuropa plants – a Volkswagen JV in
Portugal
• JV with Alfa Romeo to build aluminum engine components in Windsor; had a
Nemak partnership with Alfa Romeo since 1979
• JV with Peugeot for two new power plants
• JV with Changan and Mazda in China engine plant
• New B-segment car based on Mazda2 underpinnings
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Table A11 GM Partnering Flexibility
Year
1972
1973
1975
1979
1983

1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

1997
2000
2001

2002
2003
2005
2006

GM – Partnering Flexibility
• Purchased interest in Isuzu – Importing light truck
• Reliance on Opel for subcompact
• Buick shifted from Opels to a T-car from Japan
• New diesel engine coming from Isuzu
• JV announced with Toyota to produce small cars at an idle GM plant in
Fremont
• Deals with Isuzu and Suzuki Motors to import up to 300,000 compacts starting
in 1985
• Nova built with Toyota at Fremont as part of NUMMI pilot
• Cars from Isuzu and Suzuki started to come in
• Plans for Pontiac branded South Korean subcompact imported from Daewoo
Heavy Industries
• GM getting bodies for Allante from Italy’s Pininfarina S.p.A
• Sprint and Spectrum captive imports helped a lot
• NUMMI built Nova not measuring up to Chevette or Ford Escort
• Establishing Geo franchise including Suzuki and Isuzu vehicles as well as Prizm
(Nova replacement at NUMMI) and Geo Storm (NUMMI)
• JV with Saab Scania to jointly produce cars for sale in West Europe
• Formed JVs with governments in East Germany and Hungary to begin
production in 1990s
• Canada based GM Suzuki plant at CAMI to produce Tracker replacing Japanese
imports with Canadian imports
• Daewoo’s LeMans vehicle strong – it was based on the West German Opel
Kadett
• Long 2 month strike in order to take greater advantage of global outsourcing
• Possible exchange of car production with Daewoo
• GM investing 20% in Fiat – resulting in a JV for purchasing and powertrain
operations in Europe and South America
• Planning on naming suppliers “lead interior integrators” to manage
development of passenger compartment of every NA vehicle. GM would
assume the overseeing and benchmarking roles
• Signed non-binding agreement to acquire large chunk of Daewoo
• Cut share of Isuzu from 49% to 12%
• GM exporting Meriva to Canada from Brazil – first global car GM launched in
Brazil before Europe
• Equinox featuring Chinese built engine
• Fiat deal exited – but 50/50 JV for engines remains
• GM dumps 20% in Fuji (Interesting note – Toyota jumped in with an 8.7% stake
in order to tap capacity of Subaru plant in Indiana and build Toyotas
• Unloaded 20.4% stake in Suzuki and its stake in Isuzu
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Table A12 Chrysler Partnering Flexibility
Year
1970
1971
1972
1974
1977
1980
1981
1984
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
2000
2001
2002

2004

Chrysler – Partnering Flexibility
• JV with Mitsubishi for production of vehicles for Japanese and other world
markets
• Purchased 15% equity in Mitsubishi
• Shifted Cricket from Great Britain to Japan to be built by Mitsubishi
• Sourcing small engines and manual transaxles from Volkswagen for
domestically built subcompact car
• Increased number of cars coming from Mitsubishi - 4
• Was going outside Chrysler for parts
• Jointly producing subcompact with Peugeot SA and getting 450,000 diesel
engines (but then Peugeot pulled out in 1982)
• Increased breadth of vehicles from Mitsubishi
• JV with Mitsubishi to build cars at new plant in Illinois under name Diamond
Star Motors
• AMC to begin production of Chrysler’s full-size rear-drive cars in Kenosha in
1987
• Mitsubishi venture underway at Bloomington Illinois
• Mitsubishi engine powers New Yorker vehicles
• Cancelled share of output of Summit from Mitsubishi’s Diamond Star plant
• Up to 55,000 four door K-cars imported from Mexico (despite UAW objections)
• JV with Renault to produce Junior jeep SUV in Spain
• Continued use of Mitsubishi imported vehicles – and from Diamond Star
• Dropping plans with partners – out of the ’92 Hyundai Sonata deal with Korea’s
Hyundai’s new plant in Quebec
• Out of JV with Renault over jeep
• Halved equity with Mitsubishi
• Eagle Talon, Dodge Avenger and Chrysler Seabring built at Diamond Star plant
• Multi-year deal reached to purchase from Italy’s VM Motori SpA 200,000 2.5 L
diesel engines for Voyager and Cherokee models in EUrope
• Moving all engines in house by end of century
• Negotiated end of MMC’s manufacture of Dodge Stealths
• Partnership between BMW and Chrysler to produce engines in Latin America
for sale outside of North America
• JV with GM to build 4-wheel drive transfer cases, manual transmissions and
other driveline products
• A deal between Daimler Chrysler, Mitsubishi and Kia to build high quality low
cost cars for all world markets – like Neon
• JV with Mitsubishi to build engines in Germany for use in Smart and Mitsubishi
cars
• Underpinnings of Neon shared with Mitsubishi
• Partnership with Hyundai and Mitsubishi to build 4 cylinder engines
• Sold off an assembly plant to Magna International; Production of Voyager
moved to Magna Steyr joining Jeep Grand Cherokee and M-Class
• Engine manufacturing with Mitsubishi and Hyundai increase size
• Dropped relationship with Mitsubishi to 25%
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2005

•
•

Sold stake in Hyundai
Deal with Volkswagen to build minivans at Chrysler’s St. Louis plant
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A13 Reflexivity Statement
An important practice in qualitative research is to practice reflexivity so as to understand
the origins of a researcher’s own perspective and in the process enhance the objectivity of a
scholars research outputs. A reflexivity statement captures a researcher’s perspective and
recounts some of the scholar’s experience in conducting the research.
First I will comment on my relationship to the automotive industry. I have never been an
employee of any organization within the automotive industry. This means that I read detailed
firm and industry analysis from the perspective of an industry outsider. Any biases regarding the
automotive industry that I held were those of a casual observer of popular news outlets. To
sensitize me to the industry, I read two to three books detailing the very early years of the
automotive industry including a book on Henry Ford and an economic survey of the automotive
industry prior to 1945. Both of these books provided me with a historically grounded
understanding of the automotive industry.
This research was conducted as part of my pursuing a doctorate degree in management.
In earlier versions of my thesis proposal, this research appeared as an effort to connect how firms
respond to disturbances to a multi-level theoretical framework called Panarchy which builds on
complex adaptive systems and resilience. While this theoretical framework was not explicitly
referenced, I believe that some of these ideas permeated my work (confirmed by Robert
Lannigan, a complex systems expert and thesis reviewer, who noted the strong undertones of
complex systems theory that were present in this thesis). Further, I have an enduring interest in
connecting ideas of sustainability and strategy together which may have further influenced my
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focus and data analysis such as by sensitizing me to perceive ideas critical to my research such as
persistent disturbances.
There was no direct funding for this research, however I was supported throughout my
PhD by funds originating from Western University, my thesis advisor, an OGS scholarship and a
personal SSHRC grant. None of these funding sources exhibit direct influence on the content or
direction of my research.

176

8.0 Curriculum Vitae
Name:

Brent McKnight

Post-Secondary Education
and Degrees:

The University of Western Ontario
Richard Ivey School of Business
London, Ontario, Canada
2006-2012, Ph.D Business Administration
McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario, Canada
2001-2002, M.B.A.
McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario, Canada
1995-2001, B.Eng. & Mgmt

Honours and Awards:

Academy of Management – BPS Division – Outstanding
Reviewer Award (2011)
Ontario Graduate Scholarship – The University of Western
Ontario (2007, 2010)
C.B. (Bud) Johnston Ontario Graduate Scholarship (2010)
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Grant
(2009)
Honourable Mention in ASAC Best Paper Competition (2009)
Strategy Division
Honourable Mention in ASAC Best Paper Competition (2009)
Social Responsibility Division
Brock Scholarship – The University of Western Ontario
(2006, 2007, 2008, 2009)
Plan of Excellence – The University of Western Ontario
(2006, 2008)
University Prize for Special Achievement – McMaster
University (2001)
McMaster Merit Entrance Scholarship for Academic
Achievement – McMaster University (1995)

177

Related Work Experience:

2012: Lecturer, Richard Ivey School of Business at The
University of Western Ontario
2011: Adjunct Professor, DeGroote School of Business at
McMaster University
2006-2011: Research Assistant, Richard Ivey School of Business
at The University of Western Ontario
2009-2010: Lecturer, Richard Ivey School of Business at The
University of Western Ontario
2001-2002: Teaching Assistant, DeGroote School of Business at
McMaster University

Publications:
Peer Reviewed Articles
•
•
•
•
•
•

Bansal, P. and McKnight. B. (2009), Looking Forward, Pushing Back, and Peering
Sideways: Analyzing the Sustainability of Industrial Symbiosis. Journal of Supply Chain
Management, 45(4), 26-37
McKnight, B. (2009) Give it Some Time: Corporate Diversification and Time,
Administrative Science Association of Canada Proceedings, 37th Annual Meeting, Niagara
Falls, Ontario.
Frooman, J., Branzei, O, McKnight, B. and Zietsma, C. (2009) Social (Ir)responsibility
Effects on Long-Term Capital Costs, Administrative Science Association of Canada
Proceedings, 37th Annual Meeting, Niagara Falls, Ontario.
Frooman, J., Zietsma, C. and McKnight, B. (2008). There is no good reason not to be good,
Best Paper Proceedings for the Administrative Science Association of Canada (paper 299), 36th Annual meeting, Halifax, Nova Scotia, May 24-27.
Frooman, J., Zietsma, C., McKnight, B., and Murrel, A. (2008). How Risk Mediates the
CSP-CFP Link, Best Paper Proceedings of the Academy of Management Conference, 68th
Annual Meeting. Anaheim, CA. August 10-13.
McKnight, B and Bontis, N. (2002), E-Improvisation: Collaborative groupware technology
expands the reach and effectiveness of organizational improvisation. Knowledge and
Process Management, 9(4), 219-227

Book Chapters
•

Zietsma, C. and McKnight, B. (2009). Building the Iron Cage: Co-creation work in the
context of competing proto-institutions. Invited contribution to Lawrence, T.B., Suddaby, R.
& Leca, B. (Eds.). Handbook of Institutional Work, Cambridge University Press.

Cases
•

Zietsma, C. and McKnight, B. (2007). Sensible Life Products (A) & (B), Registered with
Ivey, 9B07M057 and 9B07M058.
178

Conference Presentations
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

McKnight, B. (2011) The Role of System Diversity in Sustainable Development: A resilience
based conceptualization, Administrative Science Association of Canada, 39th Annual
Meeting, Montreal, Quebec, July 2-5.
Frooman, J., Branzei, O, McKnight, B. and Zietsma, C. (2010) The Shadow of the Future:
Social Assessments of Forward-Looking Risk and CSP-CFP, Academy of Management
Conference, 70th Annual Meeting. Montreal, Quebec, August 6-10.
McKnight, B. and Bansal, P. (2009). The Sustainability of Industrial Symbiosis, Academy of
Management Conference, 69th Annual Meeting. Chicago, IL, August 7-11.
Frooman, J. Zietsma, C. and McKnight, B. (2009) When it’s Good to be good and when it’s
good to be bad: CSP and the cost of debt vs equity capital, Academy of Management
Conference, 69th Annual Meeting. Chicago, IL, August 7-11.
McKnight, B. (2009) Give it Some Time: Corporate Diversification and Time,
Administrative Science Association of Canada, 37th Annual Meeting, Niagara Falls,
Ontario.
Frooman, J., Branzei, O, McKnight, B. and Zietsma, C. (2009) Social (Ir)responsibility
Effects on Long-Term Capital Costs, Administrative Science Association of Canada
Proceedings, 37th Annual Meeting, Niagara Falls, Ontario.
Frooman, J., Zietsma, C., McKnight, B., and Murrel, A. (2008). How Risk Mediates the
CSP-CFP Link, Academy of Management Conference, 68th Annual Meeting. Anaheim, CA.
August 10-13.
Frooman, J., Zietsma, C. and McKnight, B. (2008). There is no good reason not to be good,
Administrative Science Association of Canada (paper 29-9), 36th Annual meeting, Halifax,
Nova Scotia, May 24-27.
McKnight, B. and Zietsma, C. (2007). Local Understandings: Boundary Objects in High
Conflict Settings, International Conference on Organizational Learning, Knowledge and
Capabilities, June, London, Canada.
McKnight, M. (2007). Recognize Me? Reputation and the Liability of Newness, ASAC
Conference, June, Ottawa, Canada.
McKnight, B. and Zietsma, C. (2007). The Little Council that Could: How the Forest
Stewardship Council Changed Established Institutions, McMaster World Congress, January,
Hamilton, Ontario.
McKnight, B. and Bontis, N. (2001). E-Improvisation: Collaborative groupware technology
expands the reach and effectiveness of organizational improvisation, International
Symposium on Organizational Improvisation, June, Lisbon, Portugal.

179

